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ABSTRACT
Neoclassical economic theory defines an optimal or efficient
allocation of natural resources as one which secures the maximum out
put of preferred goods and services, or as an allocation in which the
resources are used in their highest valued uses.
on two important normative assumptions:

The theory is based

the welfare of the community

is an increasing function of the individual's welfare, and an indivi
dual is better off in a freely chosen position.

These assumptions

form a subjective theory of value which locates the source of intrin
sic value in the individual's tastes and preferences; value or wealth
is whatever satisfies the individual's desires.

An alternative objec

tive theory of value is a biblically based theory which locates the
source of value in an objectively good creation as created and sus
tained by God.

In this biblical and historical Hebrew-Christian

position, human beings are stewards (not owners) responsible for
proper care (welfare) of all of God's creation.
A biblically based theory of stewardship of creation does not
agree that all values are reducible to personal preferences.

Conse

quently, it rejects Pareto optimality as either a necessary or suf
ficient criterion for the optimal allocation of resources.

Nor does

it accept the related conclusion that resources will be optimally
allocated when property rights are well defined and exchangeable.
Stewardship theory thus rejects the fundamental normative conclusions
of neoclassical economic theory about efficiency.

v

Neoclassical economic theory seems to be persuasive for those
who only recognize the need to resolve conflicts in individual sub
jective valuations.

Thus, for conflicts over truly innocuous tastes

and preferences competitive markets function well (with a few well
recognized exceptions).

But for the conflicts between individuals

over objective valuations, competitive markets and neoclassical
theory are inadequate and misleading.

To resolve these conflicts,

stewardship theory points to a double criterion of proper ends and
economically efficient m e a n s .

The criterion of proper ends will

mean limits, duties and obligations, besides rights, on the part of
human beings as stewards of a valuable and purposive creation.

vi

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
What is the "optimal" allocation of our natural resources?'*'
This single question probably best captures the central problem for
natural resources economists.

Natural resources economists are not

alone in their concern for the "optimal" use of natural resources.
Moral and ethical philosophers have begun to study the question as
witnessed to by the publication of numerous articles, books, and even
the recent appearance of a journal, Environmental Ethics; all devoted
to a basic question:

what is the proper relationship between mankind

and the rest of nature?

Religious scholars also have begun to

address the question of stewardship of nature in light of ethical
and biblical principles.

2

And, of course, the so-called environ

mentalists and conservationists have long been involved with the
question of "optimal" use of natural resources.

Perhaps most eco

nomists will not be surprised at this broad range of interest.
Perhaps some are actually familiar with the ethical and theological
literature on natural i ’.sources, environments and nature.

But

"*As we will discovei, "optimal" is a loaded word, how one loads
it seems to depend on one's professional area of expertise, but more
importantly on one's theory of value.

2

See, for example, Mary Evelyn Jegen and Bruno V. Manno, eds.,
The Earth is the Lord's (New York: Paulist Press, 1978); and Loren
Wilkinson, ed., Earthkeeping:
Christian Stewardship of Natural
Resources (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1980).

1

2

relatively few have begun to integrate knowledge from these other
disciplines relevant to the economic analysis of natural resources.
The knowledge generated by these other disciplines is, of course,
normative.

It concerns the possible meanings of "optimal" in terms

of norms, goals, means and ends, and values.

Consequently, it helps

to explain the normative roots of "optimal" as used in neoclassical
economics.
The scientific question, "How are natural resources allocated?"
becomes both positive and normative when we ask how they are allo
cated "optimally."

To determine an "optimal" allocation the econo

mist must first answer the normative question, "What is optimal?"
Or, in the language of ethics, what is the good, worthwhile, desirable
allocation of natural resources?

What are the normative goals or ends

in pursuit of which we shall use natural resources?

What is the value

of natural resources, of nature, of creation?
The normative end, widely accepted by economists is referred to
as Pareto optimality or economic efficiency.

Although widely accepted

by economists, Pareto optimality has seldom been defended, or for that
matter criticized (until recently) on its own normative, ethical
grounds.

Pareto optimality is now being questioned, for example,

as to its implicit ethical assumptions regarding present and future
3

generations.
3

It is argued that Pareto optimality, as it is usually

See, for example, E. J. Mishan, Introduction to Normative
Economics (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 501-5 and
John V. Krutilla, and Anthony C. Fisher, The Economics of Natural
Environments (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975),
pp. 65-69.

3

defined and applied, does not (but should) include the welfare of
future generations as perceived by future generations.

The welfare

of future generations might be thought of as the ultimate opportun
ity cost of using a natural resource.

The opportunity cost of using

a natural resource in the present is that someone in the future can
not use it.

If natural resources are scarce and their use necessarily

entails irreversible entropic degradation and if our time frame is
across generations then it appears in principle impossible to allo
cate resources such that no individual is made worse off.^

In the

words of Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen:
Economists are fond of saying that we cannot get some
thing for nothing.
The Entropy Law teaches us that
the rule of biological life and, in m a n ’s case, of its
economic continuation is far harsher.
In entropy terms,
the cost of any biological or economic enterprise is
always greater than the product.
In entropy terms,,,
any such activity necessarily results in a deficit.
Yet another fundamental criticism of the normative premises of
Pareto optimality, developed in Chapter 2, that has received very
little exposure in the economic literature is their moral subjec
tivity.

I. M. D. Little is one of the first to clearly state the

subjective moral premises of Pareto optimality and modern welfare
economics:

Pareto optimal move is one where at least one individual is
made better off and no one else is made worse off.
’’Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, Energy and Economic Myths (New York:
Pergamon Press, 1976), p. 55.

A

. . . value premises are essential to welfare economics
because welfare conclusions are value judgements . . . .
[Our] analysis presupposes only two value judgements,
both of which we believe to be widely acceptable.
The
first is that the welfare of the community is an increa
sing function of the welfare of individuals.
The second
is that an individual is better off if he is in a chosen
position.^
These premises define an individualistic philosophy of mankind, com
munity and morality, known in moral philosophy as subjective moral
relativism.

Social welfare is simply a name for the sum of indivi

dual welfares; individual welfare has no definition other than what
individuals choose on the basis of their subjective preferences.
Subjective preferences are sovereign and cannot be judged or even
compared in objective terms.

There are no objective moral principles

or values

which can be rationally discussed as regards their truth

content.

In other words, a moral judgment is nothing more than a

description of an attitude or preference of the individual making
it.

Objective moral philosophy is impossible.

In contradistinction

to "optimal" resource allocation based upon the theory of subjective
moral relativism is the Hebrew-Christian view of mankind as stewards

I. M. D. Little, A Critique of Welfare Economics, 2nd ed.
(London:
Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 12A.
Contrast the
second premise with the following passage from Richard B. Brandt,
Value and Obligation (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961),
p. 15:
"It is a matter of universal agreement that there is some
times a discrepancy between what people want and what is good for
them to have or do.
Every language, anthropologists tell us, con
tains words used to mark off what is considered really good or worth
while from what people may like or want. Moreover, it is generally
supposed that it is relatively easy for a person to know what he
wants or would like to have but a much more difficult matter to
learn what is worthwhile or what would be the objects of a reasonable
desire."

5

of God's creation called to a discerning stewardship of all of cre
ation for the Creator's good purposes.
The Hebrew-Christian view of stewardship, developed in Chapter 3,
sees humans (individually and corporately) as responsible for the care
and welfare of all creation.

Simply put, the function and purpose of

our stewardly dominion is to "cultivate and keep" the Creator's good
purposes in creation-history.

This theory of stewardship stands in

stark contrast to Lynn White's now rather famous conclusion that the
roots of our ecological crisis lie in the Old Testament view of man
and nature where,
God planned all of this [creation] explicitly for man's
benefit and rule: no item in the physical creation had
any purpose save to serve man's p u r p o s e s . ^
White's view may, indeed, represent the predominant moral subjectivist
view that creation simply consists of natural resources, but it does
not represent the biblical view of stewardship where,
. . . stewardship is concerned with nothing less than
man's responsibility to God as he participates in the
whole technological-industrial-distributional system
of his environment context.
For stewardship is the
active recognition of the sovereignty of God over his
whole creation; over the creative and productive

Lynn White, Jr., "The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis >" Science 155 (1967), p. 1205. White's conclusion has received
widespread acceptance and rehearsal.
For example, in the area of
environmental economics, Hugh H. Macaulay and Bruce Yandle, Environ
mental Use and the Market (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1977),
pp. 7-8, say:
". . . Judeo-Christian theology holds that after God
created the world and everything in it, He proceeded to give man
dominion over all creatures therein . . . .
Other instructions given
to man were to till the soil and to build homes and fires, all of
which indicate that the welfare of man was the paramount consider
ation in running the world."

6

processes in which men share and the uses to which they
put all of the resources and means that come under their
*
Q
care and control.0
Although the Bible reveals that mankind is to be a steward (not
an owner) of all of creation, it does not reveal a ready-made set of
9

political and economic ends, or the insitutions to accomplish them.
This is not to say, however, that any end or institution is as good
as another.

It is the responsibility of the steward to seek after

and search out the best

(optimal) relational ends and institutional

ways of organizing our lives in creation.
God has granted humanity the possibility of organizing
its collective life through social, political, and eco
nomic structures.
The positive role of these structures
is outlined in the Bible, and should be affirmed and
celebrated by all Christians.
It is difficult to imagine
an orderly, secure life of any sort without nation, family,
law, commerce, and so on. At the same time, we must con
fess with humility that:
1) not all human structures have
been affected by Christians or Christian principles; 2)
not all Christians have felt or exercised any mandate to
improve structures; and 3) not all that Christians have
done with those structures has been ethically or biblic
ally correct.
As a result, the very structures that
support our struggle to live as members of G o d ’s kingdom,
restraining the influence of sinful acts, are themselves
tainted with human sin.^-O

g
Albert Terrill Rasmussen, "Stewardship in an Economy of Abun
dance," in Stewardship in Contemporary Theology, ed. by Thomas K.
Thompson (New York: Association Press, 1960), p. 232.
Q

Rather than political and economic ends (policies, projects)
and institutions, the biblical witness points to the good required
of the steward of creation.
For example, "he has told you, 0 man,
what is good; And what does the Lord require ofyou, But to
do jus
tice, to love kindness [or loyalty], And towalk humbly [or
circum
spectly] with your God (Micah 6:8)?"
^ L o r e n Wilkinson,

ibid., pp. 73-74.

7

The final purpose of this dissertation, presented in Chapters 4
and 5, is to contrast neoclassical economic subjective theories of
value, welfare, and property rights with a theory of stewardship.
Stewardship theory contends that individual subjective preferences
are not the sole arbiters of value.
and objective enterprise.

Valuation is both a subjective

Creation has subjective value as it satis

fies human preferences, but it ultimately has objective value as it
satisfies the ends of its Creator.

The actual political-economic

process of discerning and responding to the objective value of cre
ation is, of course, a human process and thus in some sense subjec-

11

tive, but not necessarily subjectivistic.

The subjectivistic

proposal of the Sophist Protagoras ("man is the measure of all
things") - a cornerstone of neoclassical economics - is changed to,
"man is the measurer of all things."
Neoclassical theory has tried to correct for one problem with
the Pareto criterion:
problems.

its limited range of application to practical

The result - the "new welfare economics" of compensation

tests and social welfare functions, however, has been severely cri
ticized, perhaps, even defeated in its attempt to expand the
criterion.

12

What has not been adequately criticized in this vast

^Subjectivism refers to the philosophical theory that all value
is subjectively derived and grounded; objective value is cognitively
meaningless.

12

See, for example, E. J. Mishan, Economic Efficiency and
Welfare (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981); S. K. Nath, A
appraisal of Welfare Economics (New York: Augustus M. Kelley,
and William J. Baumol, Welfare Economics and the Theory of the
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).

Social
Re
1969);
State

8

body of literature is the Pareto criterion itself.

This literature

takes to task the additional value judgments required by the various
"new welfare economics," but uncritically accepts the value judg
ments necessary for Pareto optimality.

A theory of stewardship,

however, does not find the subjective premises of Pareto optimality
either convincing or descriptive of objective-intrinsic values in
creation.

To put it bluntly, but succinctly, efficiency conclusions

based on Pareto optimality only necessarily satisfy those individuals
with subjective moral philosophies.

Since this is hardly a defensible

outcome for economic science, the role of neoclassical economics needs
to be both narrowed and broadened.

It needs to be narrowed to pro

nouncing on the economic efficiency of alternative means for achieving
an objectively valuable e n d .

It has no legitimate business pro

nouncing on the economic efficiency of alternative objective ends.
As Lionel Robbins long ago warned:
. . . the use of the adjectives 'economical' and 'uneco
nomical' to describe certain policies is apt to be very
misleading . . . . it is not intelligible to use them
as regards ends themselves . . . .
there are no economic
ends.
There are only economical and uneconomical ways
of achieving given ends. We cannot say that the pur
suit of given ends is uneconomical because the ends are
uneconomical; we can only say it is uneconomical if the
ends are pursued with an unnecessary expenditure of
means . . . .
In addition, neoclassical economics needs to be broadened to
include a stewardship theory of objective valuation of ends.
13

If

Lionel Robbins, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of
Economic Science, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan and Co., 1945), p. 145.

9

economics is going to aid us in determining the best ways to manage
creation it must differentiate between means and ends, subjective
and objective values.

It doesn’t help to know how to efficiently

allocate means to achieve objectively unworthy ends.

Nor does it

help to know the subjective economic valuation of things used as
means which are instead valuable ends and thus ought not to be used
as means.
Economics from a stewardship perspective has a clear and direct
impact on the new, so-called, economic theory of property rights.
It will be shown that the conclusion that problems of externalities
and common property resources can be solved by assigning, wherever
possible, private property rights, is incorrect.

The conclusion

that privately owned natural resources will be efficiently allocated
is, of course, based on the subjective premises of valuation.

Ste-

warship, however, argues that so-called natural resources are proper
ly valued and allocated only when both their subjective and objective
values are recognized and accounted for.

Absolute, unattenuated

property rights implicitly deny objective value or at least the
obligation to discern such value.

In contrast, stewardship argues

that before property rights can be properly assigned, the objective
worth of their ends must be determined.

Moreover, stewardship recog

nizes that creation (what we often blithely call natural resources)
is not simply a means to the satisfaction of our individual subjec
tive preferences.

All of creation, human and nonhuman, living and

nonliving, are properly "used" when we recognize - as best we can -

10

all their proper functions and relations, that is, their subjective
and objective value.

The process of stewarding creation, at times,

entails assigning attenuated property rights (both private and public)
to encourage or perhaps even to ensure objectively valuable ends and
to discourage unworthy ones.
A good example of this process is the Federal Endangered Species
Act which severely limits both individuals' and governmental agencies'
rights to threaten the existence of endangered species.

An examina

tion of this act, presented in Chapter 5, shows in a very specific
context the differences between a neoclassical and a stewardship
approach to the best "use" of nonhuman species.

CHAPTER 2
THE OPTIMAL ALLOCATION OF
NATURAL RESOURCES
What does it mean to say that a particular natural resource pro
ject or policy is optimal or economically efficient?

First of all, it

does not mean that the project or policy necessarily results in a
preferable income distribution.

It does mean, however, that compared

to the alternative projects or policies, the optimal one "will contri
bute the most to natural income and product."^
Putting aside the question of preferable income distribution; is
the optimal, efficient project the best project?
neoclassical economists seem to disagree.

On this question,

Freeman, Haveman, and

Kneese, for example, argue that the optimal allocation of resources
by competitive markets

(assuming a political mechanism for assuring

an equitable distribution of resources and income) is the "best pos
sible allocation of resources."
If these conditions [equitable distribution] hold, it can be
said that the competitive market system yields the best
possible allocation of resources.
It achieves this optimum
because it does the best that can be done with a given tech
nology, resource endowment, set of tastes and preferences, and
that particular distribution of resource ownership and its

John V. Krutilla and Otto Eckstein, Multiple Purpose River
Development (Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins Press for Resources for
the Future, 1964), p. 4.

11
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associated distribution of income that society has chosen
through an effective political mechanism.^
In similar fashion, Seneca and Taussig find it difficult to imagine
anyone opposing the principle of efficiency or Pareto optimality
(assuming, of course, no distributional problems.)
Efficiency is a deceptively simple and attractive objective
for government economic policy. Who can oppose the prin
ciple that more of every good for everybody is desirable.
Economists are careful to point out, of course, that greater
efficiency in the Pareto Optimum sense means only that more
of everything is potentially available for everybody . . . .^
Krutilla and Eckstein, however, argue that efficient does not mean
best.
We will attempt, first, to demonstrate which among several
alternatives for development, in a particular case, is the
more efficient, that is, which will contribute the most to
national income and product. We then will compare the income
redistributive consequences of alternatives in a particular
situation.
In neither instance will we be equipped, as
economic analysts, to judge which is the "best" alternative
from a "public" standpoint. While our discipline equips us
for expertise in the analysis of economic problems, it does

2

A. Myrick Freeman, Robert H. Haveman, and Allen V. Kneese, The
Economics of Environmental Policy (New York: John Wiley and Sons,
1973), p. 70.

3

Joseph J. Seneca and Michael K. Taussig, Environmental Econom
ics , 2nd ed.
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1979), p. 114.
"More of every good for everybody is desirable" is somewhat ambiguous.
It could be a tautology wherein the good is equated with desirable,
and so, of course, more of every good, i.e., desirable thing, is
desirable, i.e., good.
But it is neither common practice nor rea
sonable to understand the principle of efficiency as a mere tautology.
Tautologies are definitions not principles and they do not make for
objectives of government economic policy.
It appears then more rea
sonable to understand Seneca and Taussig as saying, "who can oppose
the principle that more of every desired thing for everybody is
desirable." This is a recognizable principle contending that the
desirable (the good) is the desired; clearly a debatable normative
theory of value.

13

not provide us with any expertise in making value judgments
or prescribing ethical v a l u e s . ^
Kruti'lla and Eckstein do not think economists can say that the effi
cient alternative is the best alternative because:
Values in addition to economic efficiency are at stake . . . .
aesthetic appeal, the improvements of public health and
welfare . . . . preferences for private institutions as
instruments for natural resources development . . . . belief
that natural resources are a property of the entire community
. . . . the socially desirable solution . . . depends on what
weights attach to each of the separate issues within the
larger policy context.
Nevertheless, efficiency is a sig
nificant value in our society . . . the public interest
requires that efficiency considerations be given due weight.
The conflict among these economists as to the normative (ethical)
nature of economic efficiency illustrates the confusion and differen
ces of opinion generated when otherwise positive economists enter the
field of welfare economics.
normative distinction.

The confusion is rooted in the positive-

As we will see, it is quite possible to do

positive, analytical tasks within welfare economics, but these tasks
do not a positive welfare economics make.

If economics is going to

analyze alternative economic studies, or alternative allocations of
resources in terms of better or worse then it must clearly state its
ends, objectives, values or norms.

This is seldom, if ever, denied,

but often hedged about by referring to the norms as merely "postu
lated" or "taken as given."

Apparently this hedging is due to the

widely accepted view within the economics profession that norms or
values cannot be rationally discussed because they are alledgedly
4

Krutilla and Eckstein, ibid., p. 4.

^Ibid., pp. 265, 277.

14

mere statements of subjective

preferences.^

This hedging merely

adds to the confusion and ambiguity of the economic analysis and
conclusions about resource allocation.

The following section attempts

to clearly identify and evaluate the norms of modern welfare economics.

MODERN WELFARE ECONOMICS
The development of modern welfare economics has moved away from
the explicit normative approach of the classicalists and toward the
implicit normative approach of the neoclassical positivists.

Welfare

economics has rejected the Marshallian-Pigouvian assumption of inter
personal comparison of utility and the goal of maximizing total util
ity as its normative criterion of value (worthwhileness).

Instead,

it has accepted the Paretian goal of satisfying individual subjective
preferences.

The classical, utilitarian approach was discarded by so-

called positive economists because it required the seemingly impos
sible tasks of measuring the individual's utility and redistributing
individual utility or income (a frankly ethical task) in order to
maximize the total.

The Paretian goal, on the other hand, requires

no measuring of utility nor ethical redistributing of utility or
income, etc.

It does not presume to pass judgment on the justness

or fairness of either the initial or the final distribution of util
ity or income.

More importantly, the positivist methodology purports

^Paul Hayne, "The Abuse of the Positive-Normative Distinction by
Economists," paper presented at a Conference of the Southern Economic
Association, Atlanta, Georgia, November 1974, p. 10.
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to examine economic welfare, in general, as a value-free, purely
scientific enterprise.

Its methodological strictures are supposed

to eliminate ethical criteria.

Its welfare conclusions are there

fore supposed to be as positive and scientific as those of price
theory.

All of this was to be accomplished by rejecting the ethical

assumption of interpersonal utility comparisons and by defining wel
fare in terms of efficient resource allocation.^

Whether or not

efficient resource allocation requires normative criteria is a cru
cial problem which is discussed below.

But first let us continue

with this brief historical sketch of modern welfare economics.
The development of modern welfare economics can be described as
an expansion out from its core of Pareto optimality and then back
again.

The attempts to expand upon Pareto's optimum conditions stem

from two basic problems.

First, there are an infinite number of

Pareto optimum positions and only "the optimum" (which depends upon
the best income distribution) is necessarily better than any other
position.
bution.

Second, there is no criterion for the best income distri
According to Little, these two problems result in the pos

sibility that,
. . . an "optimum" situation [on the contract curve] . . .
which corresponds to a bad distribution of income, may well
be worse than a "sub-optimum" position corresponding to a
good distribution of income.
It therefore follows that it

^John Elliott, "Fact, Value, and Economic Policy Objectives,"
Review of Social Economy 38 (April 1980), p. 10.
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cannot be said that an increase in welfare would follow
from putting the "optimum" condition into practice, even
assuming that there was a community to which the analysis
could be applied . . . . Pareto did not, indeed, clearly
say when one situation could be said to be better than
another.
He only laid down some of the necessary con
ditions which must be fulfilled if it is to be impossible
to make some individual "better off" without making any
other "worse off."®
The attempts to expand upon the Pareto conditions has led to what
Little identifies as at least three schools, besides the strictly
9
Paretian school.

These schools can be labeled:

1) Kaldor-Hicks-

Scitovsky; 2) ethical or social welfare function; and 3) Little.
The Kaldor-Hicks-Scitovsky school provides us with the sufficient
conditions for an "increase in general economic welfare."

The con

ditions are that the gainers from some change could compensate the
losers and the losers could not bribe the gainers not to make the
change.

Since actual compensation is not required, economic welfare

remains independent of distribution.

The ethical or social welfare

function school approach is to identify the necessary conditions for
a_ Pareto optimum and the sufficient conditions for the Pareto optimum,
which is the ideal distribution of economic welfare among individuals.
Needless to say, not much progress has been made in determining the
social welfare function which would reveal the Pareto optimum.

The

Little school has developed a "sufficient criterion for deciding when
a change is economically desirable," which has features of both of

g
I. M. D. Little, A Critique of Welfare Economics, 2nd ed.
(London:
Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 84-85.
^Ibid., pp. 84-93, 117-24.
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the above two schools.

A change is desirable if "it results in a

good redistribution of welfare" and if "the potential losers could
not bribe the potential gainers to vote against the ch a n g e . " ^

As

Little notes, his conditions permit the deduction of all the Pareto
optimum conditions with the added stipulation that a value judgment
has to be made on the redistribution of welfare.
In addition to trying to solve the problem of income distribu
tion, all three schools have tried to expand on Pareto optimality
which severely limits the practical application of welfare economics
to situations where no one is made worse off.

The limited use, if

not complete irrelevancy, of Pareto optimality is addressed by T. W.
Hutchison.
. . . if it is argued "that all contemporary welfare eco
nomics says is that where universal consent does not exist,
then welfare economists simply are unable to declare whether
there has been an increase in welfare in the cases in which
some people feel better off and others feel worse off,"
then, certainly, the conclusion seems to follow . . . that
"in most cases welfare economics is irrelevant." In fact,
analysis in Pareto-optimum terms seems confined to situa
tions not restricted by scaracity in a relevant politicoeconomic sense, that is to situations in which more can be
had of one desideratum (A's welfare) without diminishing
some other desideratum (B's welfare) .^
Whether or not the three schools have made any progress in
expanding welfare economics beyond Pareto optimality is open to
debate.

Less debatable is the common appeal to the Pareto optimality

10Ibid., p. 123.
^ T . W. Hutchison, "Positive" Economics and Policy Objectives
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 164, quoting H.
Leibenstein, "Notes on Welfare Economics and the Theory of Democ
racy," Economic Journal (June 1962), p. 311.
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of competitive markets for defining the optimum resource allocation
(always assuming no distributional problems).

That is to say, Pareto

optimality is often (but not always) used as a normative criterion.

ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AND POSITIVE WELFARE ECONOMICS
There seems to be some agreement that positive welfare economics
is possible if the economist merely analyzes alternatives with respect
to some postulated norm and describes the results but does not pre
scribe or advocate them.

Apparently the reasoning is that to use a

norm to rank and describe alternative projects or policies as better
or worse is positive economics, whereas to advocate the adoption of
the best alternative would be to practice normative economics.

This

rather ingenious definition of positive welfare economics as anything
short of advocacy does, however, put severe restrictions on the pos
itive economist.

As Mishan well notes:

Indeed, there is now no ground on which the economist, qua
economist, may challenge the allocative decisions reached
by the political process.
He may, of course, always draw
attention to the economic consequences of the course of
action to be adopted and give his opinion that, on balance,
they are favorable or unfavorable. What he cannot do, how
ever, is to pronounce the politically determined allocation
to be good or bad by reference to an independent economic
criterion.
Put otherwise, he may no longer judge the allo
cation to be "economically efficient" or "economically
inefficient" by reference to a criterion that transcends
current expressions of political opinion.12
Perhaps Mishan's position appears unreasonable.

To be sure, the

positive economist cannot advocate economic efficient allocations;

■^E. J. Mishan, Economic Efficiency and Social Welfare (London:
George Allen Unwin, 1981), pp. 259-60.
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but may he not even judge (describe) an allocation to be economically
efficient or inefficient?

The answer is:

no, he may not; for which

of the infinite number of norms that can be merely postulated by the
positive economist should be used to define "economic efficiency?"
Mishan's point is that if the positive economist cannot defend or rank
normative criteria either on objective ethical grounds or as "sanc
tioned by society . . . .

independent of any political expression

about allocative matters . . . [and] grounded in an ethical consensus," then his language must be extremely circumspect.

13

In other

words, "economic efficiency" might just as well be used to describe
the allocation of resources obtained through the political process as
through the market process; the choice is arbitrary as regards pos
itive welfare economics.
Mishan's point is crucial, but not new.

It was also made by

Lionel Robbins who succinctly mapped out the territory of positive
economics in his book, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of
Economic Science.

He identified the border between positive and

normative economics and indicated what can and cannot be done within
positive economics.

The limitations on the positive economist,

according to Robbins, are quite demanding.
And suppose . . . we had succeeded in showing that certain
policies had the effect of increasing "social utility,"
even so it would be totally illegitimate to argue that
such a conclusion by itself warranted the inference that
these policies ought to be carried out . . . .

13Ibid., p. 260.
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Exactly the same type of stricture may be applied to any
attempt to make the criteria of free equilibrium in the price
system at the same time the criteria of economic justifica
tion . . . . freedom to choose may not be regarded as an
ultimate good. The creation of a state of affairs offering
the maximum freedom of
choice may not be thought desirable,
having regard to other
social ends. . . . There is nothing
in the corpus of economic analysis which in itself affords
any justification for regarding these ends as good or bad.
Economic analysis can simply point out the implications as
regards the disposal of means of production of the various
patterns of ends which
may be chosen.
For this reason, the use of the adjectives "economical"
and "uneconomical" to describe certain policies is apt to
be very misleading . . . . it is not intelligible to use
them as regards ends themselves . . . . there are no economic
ends. There are only economical and uneconomical ways of
achieving given ends. We cannot say that the pursuit of
given ends is uneconomical because the ends are uneconomical;
we can only say it is uneconomical if the ends are pursued
with an unnecessary expenditure of means . . . . ^
Robbins' strictures on the use of "economical" (economic efficiency)
and "uneconomical" apply to economics in general, be it positive or
normative.

His point is that "economical" or "economic efficiency"

apply to alternative means not to alternative ends.

In other words,

it is not intelligible to label market valuations as economically
efficient and political valuations as inefficient.

Furthermore, it

is inappropriate to label as efficient or inefficient alternative
policies or projects that have different ends or objectives.

Only

alternative means to achieve the same ends may be judged efficient
or inefficient.
In addition to Mishan and Robbins, Hla Myint expresses doubt
about advocating economic efficiency as a criterion of value for
14

Lionel Robbins, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of
Economic Science, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan and Co., 1945), pp.

142-45.
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passing judgment on the acceptability of patterns of resource
allocation.
. . . interpersonal comparisons of utility can be avoided
by the Paretian formulation of the Optimum and the prin
ciple of Compensation . . . . welfare analysis need not
involve any normative value judgments so long as we take
the wants of the individuals to be given and constant and
confine our study to the purely mechanical efficiency of
the economic system in satisfying these given wants.
At
this pure subjective level of analysis our propositions
are logically as stringent as those of price economics.
But, since we stop short at this neutral concept of mechanical
efficiency, we are still on an intermediate plane of discourse
and although our propositions deal with quantities of satis
faction they are in some ways still as inconclusive as those
at the physical level as a guide to practical action.
Thus
when we have demonstrated that a particular pattern of allo
cating the resources satisfies the given wants better than
others, this does not amount to a categorical imperative
that this pattern ought to be adopted.
To obtain that we
need a further premise, viz. that these given wants are of
the same ethical quality of goodness.
It is easy to make
the mistake of slipping this premise implicitly into the
argument . . .
If we agree that Mishan, Myint, and Robbins have accurately
circumscribed positive welfare economics to the function of eval
uating alternative means for achieving the same ends, then we surely
must conclude that Freeman, Haveman, Kneese, Seneca and Taussig, if
not also Krutilla and Eckstein, are not positive economists.

Indeed,

we might even despair of finding a single positive economist among
us, if to be one means we cannot even advocate "freedom to choose"
because it just might "not be regarded as an ultimate good."

But

even if "freedom to choose" were regarded as an ultimate good (end),

■^Hla Myint, Theories of Welfare Economics (New York:
M. Kelley, 1962), pp. 198-99.

Augustus

22

the positive economist qua positive economist could neither advocate
it as an economic end, nor equate it with economic efficiency.

Ethi

cal, normative values or the processes that achieve them do not
become positive, scientific criteria (e.g. economical) simply because
they are unanimously agreed upon.
It is clear that Freeman, Haveman, and Kneese fail to pass
Robbins' stricture against making "free equilibrium in the price
system at the same time the criteria of economic justification . . . ."
when they say,
If these conditions [equitable distribution] hold, it can
be said that the competitive market system yields the best
possible allocation of resour c e s . ^
It can be argued that Krutilla and Eckstein also fail as positive
economists but on more subtle, less well recognized grounds.

And

yet it is precisely the subtlety and seeming acceptability of their
position that makes it more important for us to recognize it.
Krutilla and Eckstein violate Robbins' warning that because economic
analysis does not provide any justification for regarding social ends
as good or bad, "the use of the adjectives

'economical' and 'uneco

nomical' to describe certain policies is apt to be very misleading
. . . ."

Indeed, the misuse of "economical," "economic efficiency,"

and "optimal" is rampant.
1 f\

Freeman, Haveman, and Kneese, ibid., p. 70.
The most that can
be said is that competitive markets (under certain conditions) yield
a Pareto optimum allocation; which is far different from saying, "the
best possible allocation."
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Economic efficiency when used in place of Pareto optimality is
a deceptive term that spuriously connotes scientific objectivity,
rather than its true subjective, normative nature.

Whereas' Robbins

argued that, "We cannot say that the pursuit of given ends is uneco
nomical because the ends are uneconomical . . . ." that is exactly
what economists are saying when comparing non-market with market allo
cations.

When an eccaomist presumes to rank policies and institutions

with different allocational ends according to their economic effi
ciency, he has left the domain of positive welfare economics.

Eco

nomic efficiency has become Pareto optimality, rather than Robbins'
positive, scientific economical expenditure of means.

Allocational

ends may be Pareto optimal or not, but they are neither economically
efficient nor inefficient, at least not as ends.
Still another way of explaining the misuse of economic effi
ciency is to note that the general or normal meaning of efficiency
requires a comparison of the level of useful output to the total out
put.

Economic efficiency, when used in place of Pareto optimality,

refers only to maximum total output.

Typically, it is assumed that

all the output is useful and in some cases rhetorically asserted as
such:

"Who can oppose the principle that more of every good for

everybody is desirable."

17

Such an assumption is equivalent to

slipping in the ethical premise that individual subjective preferen
ces are the good.

■^Seneca and Taussig, ibid., p. 114.
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Frank H. Knight also recognized this problem of an efficiency
concept which ignores the question of value or usefulness of the
output.
It is impossible to form any concept of "social efficiency"
in the absence of some general measure of value.
Even in
physics and engineering, "efficiency" is strictly a value
category; there is no such thing as mechanical efficiency
. . . .
The efficiency of any machine means the ratio
between the useful output and the total output . . . .
There is no more important function of a first course in
economics than to make the student see that the whole prob
lem of social management is a value problem; that mechanical
or technical efficiency is a meaningless combination of
words.I®
As prominent as economic efficiency is in our vocabulary, we certainly
do not think it to be a "meaningless combination of words."

Krutilla

and Eckstein, for example, say "efficiency is a significant value in
our society . . . the public interest requires that efficiency con
siderations be given due w e i g h t . g u t what do they mean by
"efficiency":

economical expenditure of means to achieve some given

end or Pareto optimality?

Surely the former is of value (assuming the

given end is worthy of pursuit), but the latter is problematic, as we
will better see in the next section.
Krutilla and Eckstein do not make the mistake of thinking that
all ethical values are accounted for in the market's so-called effi
cient allocation of resources; they are, however, mistaken if they
think they have not made an ethical judgment - despite their disclaimer
1ft
Frank H. Knight, The Ethics of Competition (New York:
and Brothers, 1936), pp. 42-43.
^ K r u t i l l a and Eckstein, ibid., p. 277.

Harper
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of "any expertise in making value judgment or prescribing ethical
values."

Their value judgment or ethical premise is, as we have

seen, that "economic efficiency" (Pareto optimality) is of value
and ought to be used to judge between alternative allocational
projects or policies.
This ethical premise, so taken for granted by neoclassical
economists who otherwise eschew all thought of making value judg
ments, typically goes unnoticed or at least undefended.

Krutilla

and Eckstein, for example, assert but do not defend their ethical
prescription that:

"economic efficiency in a free society must

begin with the preferences of individuals."
The concept of economic efficiency for a free society must
include some notion of maximizing the output of those items
most preferred by the members of the community per unit of
input of those resources which are relatively the more
scarce.
That is, beginning with the preferences of indi
viduals making up a free society, our concept of economic
efficiency will require for any given resource endowment
and state of technological knowledge, the maximum level
of the preferred composition of output.^0
Asserting or simply assuming individual subjective preferences
as the criterion of value for an efficient or optimum allocation of
resources is standard neoclassical fare.

Moreover, this ethical

^ K r u t i l l a and Eckstein, ibid., p. 16.
Contrast this notion of
economic efficiency with J. M. Clark's notion of welfare, in Economic
Institutions and Human Welfare (New York:
Aired A. Knopf, 1961), p.
116:
"Welfare is here conceived in terms of needs, rather than of an
undiscriminating list of desires.
It calls for healthy and respon
sible individuals, organized in a healthy society which in turn is
responsible to and for its members."
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premise is effectively forgotten when expressed in terms of the
ma r ket’s ability to secure the optimum allocation of resources.
Coase, for example, on factory smoke regulation, says,
The aim of such regulation should not be to eliminate smoke
pollution but rather to secure the optimum amount of smoke
pollution, this being the amount which will maximize the
value of production.21
The casual reader might think that Coase has managed to remain a
positive economist by advocating what a market for smoke would achieve
if its formation were possible.

Perhaps Coase even things so, as he

goes on to say,
In this article, the analysis has been confined, as is
usual in this part of economics, to comparisons of the
value of production, as measured by the market. But it
is, of course, desirable that the choice between dif
ferent social arrangements for the solution of economic
problems should be carried out in broader terms than this
and that the total effect of these arrangements in all
spheres of life should be taken into account.
As Frank
H. Knight has so often emphasized, problems of welfare
economics must ultimately dissolve into a study of
aesthetics and m o r a l s . 2 2
Coase seems to give the impression that his economic analysis, con
fined to the "value of production, as measured by the market," has
thereby remained positive.

And only by expanding the analysis, of

the "optimum" amount of smoke pollution, into other "spheres of life"
would the analysis "dissolve into a study of aesthetics and morals."
Such an impression is quite common and quite wrong.

21r . H. Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost," The Journal of Law
and Economics 3 (October 1960), p. 42.
^^Ibid., p. 43.
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Economic welfare problems do not have to be expanded into other
spheres of life, or other disciplines before values and morals are
encountered.

The reason Frank H. Knight emphasized that problems of

welfare economics ultimately dissolve into morals and ethics is
because welfare economics is grounded upon moral and ethical premises.
It is true within limits that the purpose of economic
activity is to satisfy wants, and the fact raises a
group of questions for consideration in an appraisal
of any system of economic organization . . . .
It is
hardly necessary to remark that the questions which
wants and whose wants are to be satisfied are in fact
closely bound up together.
The system's answer . . .
constitutes its social economic value scale; and very
different social value scales may be formed from the
same set of individual wants . . . .
The striking fact
in modern life is the virtually complete separation
between the spiritual ethics which constitutes its
accepted theory of conduct and the unethical, uncri
ticized notion of efficiency which forms its substi
tute for a practical working i d e a l . 23
And finally, in the words of J. de V. Graaff:
Theoretical welfare economics proceeds from a number of
definite assumptions, factual and ethical, which are sel
dom stated explicitly.
If their nature were more widely
appreciated by professional economists, it is improbable
that the conventional conclusions of welfare theory would
continue to be stated with as little caution as is at
present the custom.24
Let us now turn to the ethical premises of welfare economics to see
what they are and how worthy they may or may not be.

^ K night,

ibid., pp. 45, 73.

^ J . de V. Graaff, Theoretical Welfare Economics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1967), p. 1.
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THE ETHICAL PREMISES OF WELFARE ECONOMICS
The goal of a positive, scientific welfare economics extends
back to Pareto and Weber.

The goal required the minimization or, if

possible, the elimination of normative judgments from economic
science.

Pareto was able to eliminate the interpersonal comparisons

of utility required

by the classical utilitarian approach.

he well recognized,

histheory did not eliminate

But, as

all norms.

. . . one has to state just what norms - they have to be
to some extent arbitrary - one intends to follow in
determining the entities that one is trying to define.
Pure economics has succeeded in doing that.
It has taken
a single norm, the individual's satisfaction, and it has
further set down that of that satisfaction he is the only
judge.
So economic "utility" or "ophelimity" came to be
defined.25
Pareto recognized that his theory was grounded upon the norm of
individual satisfaction, with the individual as the only judge.

He

also, and perhaps more importantly, recognized that this norm is
merely arbitrarily postulated.

He does not argue that this norm

is ethically better than others and thereby avoids the obvious
excursion into moral philosophy.

This excursion was to take place,

however, in his sociology which would provide a "positive basis for
policy."

In the words of Vincent Tarascio,

In his sociological discussion, Pareto dropped the
term "ophelimity" (economic satisfaction) and spoke of
community "utility" . . . . as the term was used by
Pareto, it is important to keep in mind that this has
25

Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society, trans. Andrew Bongiorno
and Arthur Livingston (New York: Dover Publications, 1963), p. 1458.
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nothing to do with economic "utility" theory as we use
the term today - it is a social concept, deriving from
.ethical, moral, religious, political, etc., as well as
economic causes.
In fact, Pareto originally made the
distinction between "ophelimity" and "utility" to avoid
confusion between strictly economic and "sociological"
(both economic and non-economic) considerations . . . .
Pareto was fully aware of the restrictive nature of the
Pareto Optimum criterion of "welfare" . . . .
The dis
tinction between Pareto's "ophelimity" theory and "utility"
theory has generally been overlooked, resulting in some
misleading impressions regarding this aspect of his w o r k . ^
In other words, Pareto recognized the rather arbitrarily postu
lated norm of individual satisfaction and thus carefully differen
tiated between this norm as a criterion of value for "ophelimity"
and what he called community "utility."

The latter would be developed

in his sociology.
. . . in his sociology, he attempted to provide another
type of "objective" criterion - the "real" norms of
society.
Hence Pareto's endeavors represented a program
aimed at establishing a positive basis for p o l i c y . ^7
Tarascio puts quotation marks around "real," apparently because, as
he explains, even those norms of society are not necessarily asser
ted

to be true, but may be only postulated.

^ V i n c e n t J. Tarascio, Pareto's Methodological Approach to
Economics (Chapel Hill:
The University of North Carolina, 1968),
pp. 83-84.
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Ibid., p. 130. Tarascio helps us to understand his meaning of
"objective" by using it in a footnote on page 129:
"Although welfare
economics deals with what ought to be, it does so "objectively,"
since it does not involve interpersonal comparisons of individual
utilities by the observer. Pareto, it will be recalled, carried
the same reasoning to his sociological "utility" theory: he believed
that the identification of the "real" norms of a society would allow
"objective" social welfare judgments for policy purposes."
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No value-judgments inevitably have to be asserted even
in discussions of policies, which can always be treated
in the perfectly "positive" technical-hypotehtical mood
by simply postulating (not asserting) particular objec
tives, and examining to what extent different policymeasures attain them.^®
Thus, Pareto fully realized the necessity of at least arbi
trarily postulating norms before welfare analysis can take place.
Moreover, the function of positive welfare analysis is to determine
"to what extent different policy-measures attain them."

The purpose

is to determine which policies or projects obtain a particular norm
with the least expenditure of resources.

The purpose is not (cannot

be) to rank various norms; nor is it to rank policies or institutions
which seek to obtain different norms or ends.

Thus, to say that

policy "A" is "optimal" is merely to say that it is judged less costly
than the alternatives means for obtaining some particular norm and
therefore may not be optimal for obtaining some other norm.
As we have seen, not all contemporary economists are equally
careful to point out, or perhaps even recognize, the arbitrary nor
mative foundation for determining so-called "optimum" or "efficient"
economic policies.

An exception is I. M. D. Little:

The above analysis presupposes only two value judgments,
both of which we believe to be widely acceptable.
The
first is that the welfare of the community is an incresing function of the welfare of individuals.
The second
is that an individual is better off if he is in a chosen
position. We found that value premises are essential to
welfare economics because welfare conclusions are value
judgments, and because value conclusions require value
oo

Ibid., pp. 116-17.
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premises . . . .
These foundations are, in our opinion,
sound.
If welfare economics is found to be useless, it
is not because there is anything shifty about the philo
sophical or logical foundations. We claim to have stated
the required postulates in a clear, precise manner.
It
only remains to accept or reject them.
It will be pre
sumed, in what follows, that they are a c c e p t e d . 29
Little clearly recognizes the necessity of postulating norms if one
is going to analyze policies or states of affairs in terms of better
or worse.

The two presupposed norms (premises) are familiar to the

economist and lead to the Pareto definition of an optimum.

The

second norm is also familiar to the moral philosopher who would
categorize it as an example of moral or ethical relativism.

What

is the philosophical nature of morally relative versus objective
norms?

MORAL OR ETHICAL RELATIVISM
Moral relativism is a philosophical theory that views moral
principles as relative or subjective rather than objective.

That

is, moral principles cannot be rationally discussed as regards their
truth content or authoritative appeal.

There is no authoritative

moral truth to which rational men can appeal.

There is no authori

tative moral reality external to the individual that is what it is
regardless of the opinions individuals entertain about it.

Thus,

value judgments or moral principles are at best relative or at worst
meaningless or emotive.

They are classified into three types:

29Little, ibid., p. 124.
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culturally relative, subjectively (individually) relative and
emotive.-*®

Culturally relative moral judgments merely describe

the shared attitudes and preferences of the particular culture of
which the individual making the judgments is a member.

Subjective

moral judgments are nothing more than descriptions of attitudes and
preferences of the individual making them.

And finally, to say that

a moral judgment is emotive is to say that it is cognitively meaning
less; it is an emotion, a taste.

For example, when one says

"stealing is wrong or bad," all one really is saying is "stealing ugh!"31
The one thing that these three different types of moral rela
tivism have in common is their opposition and challenge to objective
moral judgments.

If moral relativism is true then two individuals

could disagree over some fundamental moral principle and both be
correct as long as they were from different cultures or had dif
ferent attitudes and preferences.
Notice that it is not truth that is said to be relative and
subjective, but only moral principles.

To argue for a subjective

view of truth is to speak nonsense due to its self-contradiction.

For

■^Jeffrie G. Murphy, "The Possibility of Moral Philosophy,"
mimeograph, University of Arizona, Philosophy, Department, p. 13.
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Ibid., pp. 13-14.
Consider the following example in Edwin G.
Dolan, Basic Economics, 2nd ed.
(Hinsdale, 111.: The Dryden Press,
1980), p. 13:
"The mention of economic policies such as the price
controls or budget deficits tends to set little lights labeled
'hurrah' or 'ugh' flashing in our minds . . . .
1.
If Policy X is
followed, Outcome Y will resut.
2. Outcome Y is a good (or bad)
thing.
3. Therefore, hurrah (or ugh) for Policy X."
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example, to say that proposition "A" is true only for the individual who
believes it true, is itself a proposition which would be true only for
the individual who believes it and thus does not apply to anyone else.
It is not possible to have an objective, non-contradictory definition of
truth as subjective.
It is, however, possible to speak objectively about and rationally
discuss moral relativism.

Although the moral principles only describe

culturally or individually accepted preferences (or emotions) there is
the possibility that the culture or individual Is misinformed about its
preferences.

Therefore rational discussion about moral principles can

take place, albeit of a rather limited scope.

The function of such

rational discussion would not be to find objective moral truths when
supposedly none exist.

Rather it would be for the purpose of correctly

identifying existing cultural or individual-subjective preferences.

In

this limited sense, objective, rational discussion of moral judgments
can take place.

But, such discussion is limited, for in Lionel Robbins'

famous words,
If we disagree about ends [subjective preferences] it is a
case of thy blood or mine - or live and let live, according to
the importance of the difference, or the relative strength of
our opponents.
But if we disagree about means, then
scientific a^|lysis can often help us to resolve our
differences.
With this understanding of moral relativism, we can examine
Little's second value premise.

It is postulated that the individual is

better off if he or she is in a chosen position.

"^Robbins, ibid., p. 150.
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assume that Little does not mean to imply that individuals never make
mistakes in judging how best to get to a chosen position.

It also

seems fair to assume that Little does not mean to imply that the
individual once at a chosen position may not decide that it is not
what he expected and thus he may not perceive himself to be better
off.

To assume otherwise would be to assume perfect knowledge, but

this does not seem necessary.

Furthermore, it seems reasonable to

understand both of Little's two premises as nontautological, funda
mental assumptions (premises), rather than tautologies.

In other

words, his premises as with all premises may be either true or false,
whereas tautologies are definitional - neither true nor false, but
rather either useful or not.

Tautologies, therefore, cannot serve

as premises that are supposed to function as true statements and as
criteria of value.
Little's appeal to the wide acceptability of his two premises is
an appeal to cultural relativism, i.e., norms are merely the shared
attitudes and preferences of the culture.

Whether or not the premises

are widely accepted is an empirically verifiable question about which
Little presents no data nor cites any references.
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Regardless of

their acceptability of relative truth, there still remains the problem
33

In these days of the supposed prevalance of the "moral
majority" and their view of objective morals, one may entertain
serious doubts about the wise acceptability of subjective moral
relativism.
One is also led to recognize that grave mistakes can
be made in the name of objective morals.
Interestingly, the moral
relativist cannot criticize the "moral majority" - only a moral
objectivist can argue that the moral majority is objectively mis
taken in some of its v i e w s .
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of moral relativity versus moral objectivity.

It is not, however,

the purpose of this chapter to defend one or the other, but rather
to establish the fact that welfare economics is arbitrarily based
upon the former.
If welfare economics merely postulates relative, subjective
criteria of value, in what sense can it perform economic welfare
analysis?

The answer is fairly obvious:

welfare economics, arbi

trarily postulating individual subjective preferences as its cri
terion of value can only perform economic welfare analysis arbitrarily
and incompletely.

To say that competitive markets are economically

efficient or that policy "A" is Pareto optimal is not to say that
they are best or ought to be used; unless, of course, the economist
is prepared to rigorously define subjective moral relativism as true,
rather than arbitrarily postulating it as true.

Short of defending

his relative premises, the economist should at least avoid the per
suasive and deceptive positive sounding words, such as, optimum,
Q/

best, economic efficiency, etc.

A more accurate statement would

^ The following passages taken from S. K. Nath, A Reappraisal of
Welfare Economics (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1969), p. 152,
indicate that even economists are deceived:
"It should not be neces
sary to point out that, despite its slightly misleading name, the
concept of a Pareto optimum is completely objective and that our dis
cussions are thus of a positive rather than a normative nature." M. J.
Farrell, "The Convexity Assumptions in the Theory of Competitive Mar
kets," Journal of Political Economy (1959), p. 378.
"We notice, more
over, that the necessary condition ['maximizing a market preference
function'] is a condition of economic efficiency whilst the additional
condition for sufficiency (namely a "just" money income distribution)
involves a value judgment.
This suggests that we may continue to use
the market preference function without inhibitions and in the usual
way in discussions of such topics as "optimum tariffs," or "ideal"
tax systems, provided that we bear in mind that we are concerned with
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be to say that competitive markets or policy "A" obtains a Pareto
outcome as contrasted with other possibilities, e.g., egalitarian,
utilitarian, Rawlsian, or steady-state, to name only a few.

As

Samuelson has said,
It is a legitimate exercise of economic analysis to
examine the consequences of various value judgments,
whether or not they are shared by the theorist, just
as the study of comparative ethics is itself a science
like any other branch of a n t h r o p o lo g y . 35

CONCLUSION
To recognize that modern welfare economics is based upon subjec
tive moral relativism is to also recognize that a morally objective
or purposive approach is an obvious alternative.

To recognize the

difference between moral relativism and objectivism is to recognize
the irrelevance of the supposed "widely acceptable" premises of
welfare economics.

For a morally objective approach to economic

welfare analysis, the relevant question is:
premises objectively true?

are these subjective

The answer is "no, not necessarily."

The

individual is not necessarily better off because he is in a chosen
position, but only if he has chosen the good and avoided the evil.
In addition, the welfare of the community is not a simple aggrega
tion of the welfare of totally private, independent individuals.
The welfare of the community is a function of (among other things)

questions of economic efficiency and not with questions of justice
and injustice." I. F. Pearce, A Contribution to Demand Analysis
(Oxford, 1964).
35
York:

Paul A. Samuelson, Foundations of Economic Analysis (New
Atheneum, 1965), p. 220.
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good and proper human relationships which promote, for example,
justice and love.

Nor is the optimal allocation of natural resources

that which secures the maximum output of goods and services.

How can

we justify the identification of a welfare optimum with a maximum
output of taste-adequate goods?

Why should such maximization be

superior to Aristotle’s vision of "happy man . . . .

able to act

according to virtue with moderate means" or to the medieval ideal
of a traditional standard of living or to some other "homeostatic"
,,36
goal?
The purpose of this dissertation, however, is not to simply
replace these two arbitrary, subjective premises of welfare eco
nomics with a few objective premises; something perhaps equivalent
to a Kantian categorical imperative or a Rawlsian "maximin" cri
terion.

Rather, it is to expand the scope of neoclassical econom

ics; to introduce to the economic debate the biblical and historical
Hebrew-Christian view of mankind as stewards responsible for proper
care (welfare) of all of God's creation.

Thus, the following chap

ter develops a stewardship view of mankind as responsible for the
welfare of creation.

Adolph Lowe, "The Normative Roots of Economic Value," in Human
Values and Economic Policy, ed. by Sidney Hook (New York: New York
University Press, 1967), pp. 175-76. He goes on to argue that, ". . .
there is indeed one state of resource supply and technology in which
the attainment of any life goal is conditional on maximization of
production.
This is a state of destitution in which the available
stock of resources and the output produced from it do not rise above
the threshold that assures physical survival" (p. 176).

CHAPTER 3
A BIBLICAL CONCEPT OF HUMANS AS
STEWARDS OF G O D ’S CREATION
The biblical concept of humans as stewards of God's creation is,
for the most part, foreign to modern, scientific man.

The ancient

Hebrews and early Christians, in contrast to modern man, knew nothing
of an autonomous Nature, Mother Nature or the Laws of Nature.

The

ancient Hebrews, indeed, had no word equivalent to our word, nature.
This, perhaps, is less surprising when we consider a modern definition
of nature:

"The creative and regulative physical power which is con

ceived of as operating in the physical world and as the immediate
cause of all its phenomena."

As H. Wheeler Robinson has noted, "The

only way to render this idea [of nature] into Hebrew would be to say
simply

'God.'"'*'

In agreement with Robinson is another theologian,

B. W. Anderson:
The idea "nature" as an autonomous sphere governed by
natural law or set in motion by a First Cause is not
found in the OT.
The Creator stands in personal rela
tionship to his creation.
It is the divine decree . . .
that determines order . . . and it can even be said that
Yahweh has made a covenant with the day and the night
(Jer. 33:20).2

"hi. Wheeler Robinson, Inspiration and Revelation in the Old
Testament (Oxford:
The Claredon Press, 1946), p. 1.
2Bernhard W. Anderson, "Creation," Interpreter's Dictionary of
the Bible (New York: Abingdon Press, 1962), vol. 1, p. 729.
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To understand the biblical concept of man as steward of G o d ’s creation
it is necessary to understand the ancient Hebrews' and Christians'
perceptions of creation and the relationship between the Creator and
creation, including man.

A BIBLICAL VIEW OF CREATION
Current studies of the ancient Hebrews' perception of creation partially generated by a renewed interest in creation theology due to
the perceived environmental crisis - are far from unanimous in their
conclusions.

Three easily distinguishable theologies or "models of

God" and creation are emerging today which purport to be the Hebrews'
(and Christians') perception as recorded in the Old Testament.

Models of God and Creation
1.

God, self-sufficient and aloof, rather arbitrarily creates

the world and deeds it over to man.

God is sharply separated from

and unaffected by creation - a mere product of his will.

This thumb

nail sketch of the so-called "monarchical" relationship between God,
man and nature is said (by a few) to represent the dominant model
3

in the Old Testament.
White, Jr.
tation.

4

Theologian, Harvey Cox

and historian, Lynn

are two of the better known adherents to this interpre

According to White:

3
Harvey Cox, The Secular City (New York:

Macmillan, 1965).

4
Lynn White, J r . , "The Historical Roots of Our Ecological
Crisis," Science 155 (1967).
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God planned all of this [creation] explicitly for nan's
benefit and rule: no item in the physical creation had
any purpose save to serve m a n ’s purposes.
And, although
man's body is made of clay, he is not simply part of
nature: he is made in God's image.
Two other theologians recognized for their "monarchical'" theolo
gies are Karl Barth and Emil Brunner.

John Macquarrie, a critic of

the monarchical view, sees the physical world devalued and profaned
by Brunner in his book, Christianity and Civilization, because Brunner
sees the world as a more or less arbitrary product of divine will.
Brunner sums it up in two equations:
God minus the world

= God

The world minus God = Zero.^
According to this view, "The Hebrew understanding of creation . . .
separates nature from God.

Nature thus becomes 'disenchanted' and

can be seen in a 'matter-of-fact' way."^
Richard Baer accuses both Barth and Brunner of suffering from
"cosmological nearsightedness"

when they argue that nature is simply

8

the stage for the God-man encounter. In agreement

with Baer's

criticism is Paul Santmire:
We should be aware, however, that the biblical picture
of nature has not only been neglected inscholarly

5 Ibid., p. 1205.
£
John Macquarrie, "Creation and Environment," The Expository
Times 83 (1971), p. 7.
^Ibid., p. 4.

8

Richard A. Baer, Jr., "Conservation: An Arena for the Church's
Action," The Christian Century (January 1969), p. 41.
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study, but frequently obscured . . . .
The problem
has been an overly narrow focus.
Karl Barth is typical
in this respect when he states that the interest of the
biblical writers is God's activity in relation to man.
In similar vein Emil Brunner remarks that "the cosmic
element in the Bible is never anything more than the
^
'scenery' in which the history of mankind takes place."
Besides Cox, White, Barth, and Brunner, Macquarrie also sees
John Calvin as presenting an extreme monarchical view:
Everything happens by divine will.
The world itself is
a product of a free act of God's will, and he might
equally well have refrained from creating, so that in
no sense is the world organic to God.
Macquarrie further argues that with a "doctrine of voluntary creation"
the world has no intrinsic worth, but only utilitarian w o r t h . ^

Baer,

however, finds no scriptural basis for a utilitarian view of nature.
Although Scripture obviously demythologizes the pagan views of nature,
nature remains deeply respected.

12

This will be shown later in this

chapter.

9
Paul Santmire, Brother Earth: Nature, God and Ecology in a Time
of Crisis (New York:
T. Nelson, 1970), p. 81.
*^Macquarrie, ibid., p. 7.

i LIbid.
.j
12

Richard A. Baer, J r . , "Conservation Problems More Human Than
Technological," Catalyst II (1967), p. 5. Santmire (n. 9 above) per
ceptively notes that our 20th century utilitarian approach to nature
weakens our faith in God, especially our understanding of justifica
tion.
He contrasts our time with that of Calvin and Luther's where,
"men of faith could sense the presence and activity of God in nature,
as well as in history . . . having heard in the preaching of justi
fication by grace through faith alone that my salvation is sure and
certain . . . I can learn to sense that the same God of grace and
power is at work in, and controls finally, my environment . . . .
But if I cannot sense God's activity in the world around me . . .
there will be little or no sense of liberation of my earthly life."
Santmire, ibid., pp. 68-69.
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It is this "monarchical" view of God with its concomitant util
itarian approach to nature that Macquarrie sees as dominant in the
Old Testament, but it is not the only one.

He argues for another,

a more "earthy" interpretation where God is imminent in nature, not
sharply separated from the world.

He concludes, "obscure and frag

mentary though it may be, there are at least traces of [this] alternative model, which we may call the organic model."
2.

13

The "organic" model understands the world as eternally

emanating from God.

The world is not an arbitrary creation.

But

although God does not need to create, because he is a "creative
spirit" creation "flows" from his nature.

Since God is organically

connected with creation, he is affected by the absence of creation.
Consequently, the organic model accepts only one of Brunner's
equations:
The world minus God = Zero,
for the world would cease to exist if God were not.
Proponents of the organic model
Elder)

14

(e.g., Macquarrie, and Frederick

advocate an attitude of wonder and mystic communion between

man and nature.

Critical of this position is Hendrick Aay who argues

that Elder's view of a miraculous and mystic relationship with nature
13
Macquarrie, ibid., p. 6. Unfortunately, Macquarrie does not
cite any Old Testament texts to support his organic model.
"^Frederick Elder, Crisis in Eden (Nashville:
1970).

Abingdon Press,
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will not combat and defeat our mechanistic, dehumanized view of life
and nature.

Rather, Aay forsees it setting up a "tension between

nature and civilization.
The literature on the "organic" model is sparse, and unfortu
nately, for the purposes of this study, does not derive from an
examination of the Old Testament.

Rather it seems to derive from

pragmatic reasoning in order to develop an environmental ethic
designed to solve such current problems as pollution and natural
resource depletion.
3.

In contrast to both the "monarchical" model (where God is

aloof from his creation and humans are free to reign as tyrants) and
the "organic" model (which comes dangerously close to pantheism) is
what we may call the "covenantal" model.

This model will now be

developed by examining four fundamental concepts which try to explain
the interrelationship in the Old Testament between the Creator and
creation.

These concepts are:

1) Creation as order, 2) Creation as

history, 3) Creation and covenant, 4) Creation and purpose.

Creation as Order
The Creator commands and a creature or inanimate object is not
only brought into being, but is given its own particular nature and
tasks.
15

The stars, sun and moon, e.g., are God's servants with

Hendrick Aay, "Confronting the Ecological Crisis: The Kingdom
of God in Geographical Perspective," Vanguard (November 1972), p. 12.
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appointed functions.

They are not independent gods controlling man's

life as was commonly believed by Israel's neighbors.^
Then God said, "Let there be lights in the expanse of
the heavens to separate the day from the night, and
let them be for signs, and for seasons, and for days
and years . . .
(Gen. 1:14)17
Moreover, the earth itself "is not just the fertile 'mother,' from
whose womb all life proceeds and to which it returns (Job 1:21,
Eccles. 4:1), but is God's creature who produces vegetation and
animals at his command."

18

For example:

Then God said, "Let the earth sprout vegetation, plants
yielding seed, and fruit trees bearing fruit after their
kind, with seed in them, on the earth," and it was so.
And the earth brought forth . . . .
(Gen. 1:11,12)
Then God said, "Let the earth bring forth living crea
tures after their kind:
Cattle and creeping things
and beasts of the earth after their kind;" and it
was so.
(Gen. 1:24)
Furthermore, the order and regularity of creation are promised to Noah
and are established as a covenant between Yahweh and creation:
While the earth remains,
Seedtime and harvest,
And cold and h e a t ,
And summer and winter,
And day and night
Shall not cease.
(Gen. 8:22)

■^Anderson, ibid., p. 729.
"^Biblical quotations are taken from the New American Standard
Bible.

18

Anderson, ibid., p. 729.
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When the bow is in the cloud, then I will
look upon it, to remember the everlasting covenant
between God and every living
creature of all
flesh that is on the earth.
(Gen. 9:16; cf. 9:13-17)
Additional examples of Yahweh establishing order are numerous:
Do you know the ordinances of the heavens,
Or fix their rule over the earth?
(Job 38:33)
Thou didst set a boundary that they may not pass over;
That they may not return to cover the earth.
(Ps. 104:9)
He has also established them
forever and ever;
He has made a decree which will not pass away.

(Ps. 148:6)

Who gives rain in its season,
Both the autumn rain and the spring rain,
Who keeps for us
The appointed weeks of the harvest.
(Jer. 5:24)
Thus says the Lord,
Who gives the sun for light by day,
And the fixed order of the moon
and the stars for light by night,
Who stirs up the sea so that its waves roar;
the Lord of hosts is His name:
"If this fixed order departs
From before Me," declares the Lord,
"Then the offspring of Israel also shall cease
From being a nation before Me for ever."
(Jer. 31:35,36)
Jeremiah also expresses the Israelite view that all creation
belongs inalienably to God the Creator and thus he is in control,
nothing is impossible to him.
Ah Lord God!
Behold, Thou hast made the heavens and
the earth by Thy great power and Thine outstretched
arm! Nothing is too difficult for Thee
. . .(Jer.32:17)
Finally, Gerhard Trenkler summarizes themagnitude

of this

creative

act depicting the absolute lordship of the Creator over creation:
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Matter belongs inalienably to him. Nothing is impossible
to him (Jer. 32:17). Viewed from his standpoint the cos
mos shrinks to the dimensions of a mere toy. He measures
the oceans in the hollow of his hand and marks off the
heavens with a span (Is. 40:22).
He sets Leviathan, the
monster, swimming about in the sea like a goldfish in an
aquarium (Ps. 104:26).
All nature belongs to him: he
overthrows mountains, shakes the earth out of its place,
commands the sun (Job 9:57), and so on.-^
Clearly the Israelites’ view of creation is the antithesis to the
modern view of autonomous Nature.

Their view of order in creation

radically disagrees with the modern mechanistic view of the laws of
nature as imminent forces forming a universe.

In disagreement with

this modern view and in the spirit of the Old Testament, Donald MacKay
argues that "The laws of nature we discover are not alternatives to
divine activity, but only our codification of that activity in its
normal manifestations."

20

In other words, we do not have a mechanical

system of autonomous laws working in creation, but a Creator working
in and through his laws.

Creation as History
The ancient Hebrew view of creation also stands in contrast to
the views of Israel’s neighbors.
19

Gerhard Trenkler, "Creation," Sacramentum Verbi:
An Encyclo
pedia of Biblical Theology (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970),
p. 148.

20

Donald M. MacKay, The Clock Work Image (Downers Grove, Illinois:
Inter Varsity Press, 1974), p. 60.
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In various ways ancient people affirmed that the world
emerged out of primordial chaos.
In Babylonian mythology
the origin of the three-storied universe was traced to
a fierce struggle between divine powers that emerged
from uncreated chaos - Marduk the god of order and Tiamat
the goddess of chaos . . . .
Although the Bible takes
for granted the contours of ancient cosmology, it has
demythologized the ancient understanding of existence.
The Old Testament contains no theogony, no myth which
traces creation to a primordial battle between divine
powers, no ritual which enables men to repeat the myth
ological drama and thereby ensure the surpremacy of the
national god. Mythological allusions have been torn out
of their ancient context of polytheism and nature religion,
and have acquired a completely new meaning within the
historical syntax of Israel’s f a i t h . ^
Israel's "creation faith" as expressed in the creation stories of
Genesis, Isaiah, and various psalms

(e.g., Pss. 8; 19; 104) pre

supposes and yet radically transforms the cosmological views of
antiquity.

Yahweh's creative work was understood and expressed as

a polemic against the creation stories of the Babylonians, Egyptians,
and Canaanites.

22

Genesis begins not with "In the beginning chaos,"

but with "In the beginning God."

No struggle takes place between

order and chaos; rather, God simply and powerfully says, "Let there
be."

Thus the pagan cosmogonies of Israel's neighbors are denied

by Israel’s creation faith.

Creation of the cosmos out of primordial-

eternal stuff is rejected by Israel.

Only Yahweh is eternal.

Israel

does not speculate about an origin of Yahweh.
21

22

Anderson, ibid., p. 726.

Anderson, ibid., p. 727; Cf. John Reumann, Creation and New
Creation (Minneapolis:
Augsbury Publishing House, 1973), pp. 33-34;
and Claus Westermann, Creation, trans. John J. Scullion (Philadelphia:
Fortress Press, 1974), pp. 44-45.
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Nor are Israel's creation stories meant to be cosmogonies.
While affirming that Yahweh is the Creator, the Hebrews are somewhat
relaxed about how Yahweh created the world.

As Claus Westermann

points out:
The Old Testament never speaks of belief in the Creator
. . . and Creation or belief in Creation never occurs
in the confessions of faith of the Old Testament . . . .
One can easily see the reason:
for the man of the Old
Testament it was not possible that the world could have
originated in any other way.
Creation was not an article
of faith because there was simply no alternative . . . .
The question, how did God create the world, could never
have been a question of faith for the man of the Old
Testament.
There could be quite different opinions about
this . . . .
Consequently the Old Testament presents not
one but many Creation accounts.^3
Thus, the biblical stories of creation are not prescientific
attempts to explain the origin or evolution of the universe; rather
they reveal the Who and wherefore of creation.

They reveal that

Creator, creation, and history are inseparably related.
. . . creation is the starting point of history.
It
sets the stage for the unfolding of the divine purpose
and inaugurates a historical drama within which first
Israel and, in the fulness of time, the church were
destined to play a key role . . . .
In this view,
creation is a temporal event, the beginning of a move
ment of history.
This means that creation is an open system not closed; its future is
not wholly or necessarily determined by past or present.
to communication from without.
beginning.
23
24

The final state is different from the

Creation as historical event is three things:

Westermann, ibid., p. 5.

Anderson, ibid., p. 727.

It is open

beginning,
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present activity, and future consumation (restoration).

Creation as

historical-relational-event, rather than autonomous nature, is per
haps the main thread running through the ancient Hebrews* view of
creation.
Understanding creation as historical event means for instance,
that the creation stories of Genesis 1 and 2 are, "inseparable from
the narratives that follow it:

the call of Abraham, the deliverance

from Egypt, the guidance through the wilderness, and the inheritance
of the Promised Land."

25

The God who acted in the beginning continues

to act and work in creation-history.

The One who creates light and

darkness also brings peace and calamity (Is. 45:7); brings down
princes and undercuts the rulers of the earth (Is. 40:23); forms the
people Israel for himself (Is. 43:21) and makes all people great
according to his will (1 Chr. 29:11,12).

^Anderson,
26

ibid.

Although the importance of Israel's creation faith is its
concept of creation as historical event, this does not rule out the
acceptance of some of its neighbors' cosmological views.
A threestoried universe is taken for granted: heaven, earth, and underworld
(Ex. 20:4).
"According to this Weltbild, the earth is a flat surface,
corrugated by mountains and divided by rivers and lakes.
Above the
earth— like a huge dome— is spread the firmament, which holds back
the heavenly ocean and supports the dwelling place of the gods (Gen.
1:8, Ps. 148:4).
The earth itself is founded upon pillars which are
sunk into the subterranean waters (Pss. 24:2, 104:5), in the depths
of which is located Sheol.
In this view, the habitable world is
surrounded by the waters of chaos, which, unless held back, would
engulf the world in chaos (Gen. 7:11; cf. 1:6)." Anderson, ibid.,
pp. 725-26.
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Creation and Covenant
The Israelites not only had the security of a world and history
inseparably linked by a personal Creator, but they were promised con
tinuity:

a continuing relationship between Creator and creation.

The

source and form of this promise is a covenant initiated by the Creator.
Numerous covenants were

established:

already mentioned was the cove

nant made between Yahweh and creation after the flood (Gen. 9:11-17).
In Genesis 15 and 17 God initiates a covenant with Abraham.

Abraham

is promised to be the father of a multitude of nations, and the land
of Canaan is promised to Abraham and his descendents.

Notice that the

covenant is conceived and established by God, not Abraham.

It is

God's covenant in that he will fulfill the promises therein.

Abraham

accepted Sara's plan for producing Ishmael as heir, but God had made
an absolute covenant with Abraham, that is, Isaac, not Ishmael, was
God's plan to fulfill the covenant.

Therefore Isaac would still be

born according to God's plan, despite Sara's advanced age.
Israel thus understood the relationship between the Creator and
creation as essentially that of a covenant.
For the belief that "heaven and earth" or "everything"
(Ps. 8:6; Is. 44:24) is dependent upon Yahweh the
Creator is a derivative from Israel's covenant under
standing that her whole life is dependent upon the God
who delivered his people and bound them to himself.
The
covenant, rather than rational principle, is the ground
of the unity of creation .^

27

Anderson, ibid., p. 727.
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The covenant was a pledge of Yahweh’s allegiance to creation;
it would be upheld by his sustaining activity.

This faith is expres

sed in numerous passages (e.g., Jer. 10:13; Pss. 65:9,10; Lev. 26:4f.;
Job 5:10):
Thou dost visit the earth, and cause it to overflow;
Thou dost greatly enrich it;
The stream of God is full of water;
Thou dost prepare their grain, for thus Thou dost
prepare the earth.
Thou dost water its furrows abundantly;
Thou dost settle its ridges;
Thou dost soften it with showers;
Thou dost bless its growth.
(Ps. 65:9,10)
It is in Isaiah, however, that we find the covenantal relationship
between Yahweh and creation fully developed and applied to Israel's
historical situation.
The Israelite faith in the Yahweh of covenant (and exodus, e.g.,
out of Egypt) was shattered by the Babylonian captivity.

The Baylonian

nature-gods appeared to have swallowed up the tiny nation of Israel
and its God.

Isaiah, therefore, makes a spirited appeal to remember

that Yahweh is the God of Creation and covenant.

Isaiah reaffirms

and attempts to reestablish Israel’s faith in Yahweh as Creator and
Sustainer of history.

Yahweh is not depicted as simply in control of

creation - this would be too similar to baal worship control of history.

The link between creation

but also in

and history is re

established to reveal the power and sovereignty of Yahweh in contrast
, 28
to the impotent Babylonian nature-gods.
28

A. D. Matthews, "The Prophetic Doctrine of Creation," Church
Quarterly Review 166 (1965), pp. 148-49.
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Moreover, Yahweh alone is the God behind the deeds that Isaiah
often describes by the Hebrew word "bara" (create or make).

These

deeds have been revealed beforehand so that the "stiff-necked"
Israelites might know whose hand created them and might not say,
"My idol has done them, and my graven image and my molten image have
commanded them" (Is. 48:5).
They are created now and not long ago;
And before today you have not heard them.
Lest you should say, "behold, I knew them."

(Is. 48:7)

Here is Yahweh in a seemingly direct and current act of creation.
Apparently before now these new things (that is, deliverance from
Babylon) had not been created, but n o w , that is, the day of Isaiah's
prophetic utterance, they were created even though they would not
appear in human history for some time.

29

This is a good example of

the Hebrew link between Yahweh as Creator and as covenantal Sustainer
of history.

In yet another place, Isaiah uses a past historic event

and incorporates the creation element of Yahweh's power:
But now thus says Yahweh;
he who created you, 0 Jacob,
he who formed you, 0 Israel:
"Fear not, for I have redeemed you;
I have called you by name, you are mine."

(Is. 43:1)

Thus we see that Isaiah's thought is similar to the early Israelites:
Yahweh is the God of Creation and History.

But Isaiah has much more

to say about this God of Creation and History than these two passages
29

Edward J. Young, The Book of Isaiah (Grand Rapids:
1972), vol. 3, pp. 250-52.

Eerdmans,
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reveal.

Isaiah mounts a spirited attack on the idols and nature-

gods of the Babylonian exile period.
The whole of Isaiah 40 is concerned with the greatness of Yahweh
over against idols and nature-gods.

His greatness is explained in

terms of his power in and over creation; He is the Lord of Creation.
It is he who measured the waters, marked off the heavens and weighed
the mountains (Is. 40:12).

Idols are made by men; it even takes a

skilled craftsman to make an idol that will not fall over (Is. 40:20).
The folly of idolatry is humorously ridiculed in Is. 44, where a tree
is cut down and used for firewood and an idol:
And no one recalls,
standing to say, "I
and also have baked
and eat it.
Then I
nation, I fall down

nor is there knowledge, or under
have burned half of it in the fire,
bread over its coals.
I roast meat
make the rest of it into an abomi
before a block of wood!"
(Is. 44:19)

The stars which were of particular interest to the Babylonian
religious system of nature-gods and idol worship are brought into
proper perspective by Yahweh:
Lift up your eyes on high.
And see who has created these stars,
The One who leads forth their host by number
He calls them all by name; (Is. 40:26)
Whereas Babylonian cosmogony held that chaos first existed, and out
of this the gods emerged, Isaiah declares:
and "last."

Yahweh is the "first"

He formed the cosmos and did not create it to be chaos,

but formed it to be inhabited (Is. 45:18).
The Babylonian nature-gods included forces of nature, chaotic
forces of darkness of the depths of the earth which could bring chaos
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and woe.

To these supposed forces, before which the Babylonians burned

incense, Yahweh says:
I am the Lord, and there is no other,
The One forming light and creating darkness,
Who makes happiness and creates woe;
I am the Lord who does all these.
(Is. 45:6f.)
Yahweh also ridicules the Babylonian New Year Festival when, according
to Stuhlmueller, "the Enuma Elis [Babylonian creation story] was
chanted and the creation gods were carried through the streets
. . . ."

30

Yahweh*s response is:

They have no knowledge,
Who carry about their wooden idols . . .
Who has announced this from of old . . . ?
Is it not I, the Lord?
And there is no other God besides Me. (Is. 45:20f.)
Yahweh taunts the nature-gods to announce and declare what is going
to take place (Is. 41:22).
account (Is. 41:24).

But there is no response, they are of no

These false gods are divested of their false

powers and toppled from their stolen positions.

They are reduced to

wind and waste:
Behold all of them are false;
Their works are worthless,
Their molten images are wind a nd empitness.

(Is. 41:29)

Thus Isaiah dealt for the Israelites a devastating blow to the
gods of the Babylonian state religion.

This was no small victory for

the exiled nation, for the people of Israel found themselves engulfed
by these monstrous, deified powers of chaos and heavenly bodies.
30

Carrol Stuhlmueller, "The Theology of Creation in Second
Isaiah," Catholic Biblical Quarterly XXI (1959), p. 450.

In
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exile the nation of Israel appeared to be consumed by the Babylonian
gods.

Thus the prophetic annihilation of these gods was necessary if

the Israelites were to understand the true nature of their exile.
Isaiah shows them that the exalted Babylonian deities of darkness and
chaos are not as imagined, but as G o d ’s obedient servants:

31

I was angry with My people,
I profaned My heritage,
And gave them into your hand . . . . (Is. 47:6)
But evil will come to you . . . .
(Is. 47:1)
There is none to save you.
(Is. 47:15)
And to the Israelites Yahweh says:
Behold, I have refined you, but not as silver;
I have tested you in the furnace of affliction.
For My own sake, for my own sake, I will act;
For how can My name be profaned?
And My glory I will not give to another.
(Is. 48:10f.)
The children of Israel had lost faith in Yahweh, their God of
Covenant, Creation, and History.

They had turned away from the God

of their fathers to practice all sorts of abominations and idolatry.
Indeed, for these very reasons came the destruction of Jerusalem and
the exile to Babylon.

Isaiah was given the message that not only

would the exile take place, but also that Israel would be restored.
But how could he convince a people who had lost faith in their God
of Covenant

(and exodus from Egypt) that they would be restored in

a new exodus from Babylon?

He did this particularly by revising

their faith in Yahweh as Creator and thus Sustainer.

"^Ibid., p. 448.
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In Isaiah 48, it is Yahweh the Lord of Creation; the "first" and
the "last," who called out Israel in the past and who will now deliver
them from Babylon.

It is Yahweh-Creator who founded the earth, the

one who spread out the heavens with his right hand, who now calls them
to assemble and listen (Is. 48:13).
future deeds of deliverance.
mer, (17) who says, "Go

It is Yahweh-Creator who reveals

It is the Lord of Creation, their Redee

forth from Babylon!

Flee from the Chaldeans!

(20)."
A final example shows Isaiah's desire to link the power and pur
poses of Yahweh the Creator-Redeemer-Sustainer with the future restor
ation of Israel:
Thus says the Lord, your Redeemer, and the one who formed
you from the womb; I, the Lord, am the maker of all things,
stretching out the earth all alone, causing the omens of
boasters to fail, making fools out of diviners, causing
wise men to draw back, and turning their knowledge into
foolishness . . . .
It is I who says of Jerusalem, "She
shall be inhabited!" And of the cities of Judah, "They
shall be built."
(Is. 44:24-26)

Creation and Purpose
Purpose and meaning in creation are grounded in the God of Order,
History, and Covenant.

Creation has purpose and meaning because it

is established by and for the eternal purposes of the Creator rather
than by chance, fate, or even man.
. . . creation faith affirsm that God alone is the cre
ator of the meaning which supports all human history and
the natural world which is the theater of the historical
drama.
Human history or nature do not secrete their own
meaning. Rather, God's revelation creates the meaning
which undergirds all existence.
His Creative Word is the
source of all being.
So the psalmist affirms:
By the
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word of the Lord the heavens were made and all their
host by the breath of his mouth.
Hence it is folly
for men and nations to act as though their plans were
determining the meaning of life. Let all the earth
fear the Lora; let all inhabitants of the world stand
in awe of him!
For he spoke, and it came to be; he
commanded, and it stood forth (Ps. 33:6-9)."^
For the ancient Hebrew the ultimate purpose of creation is the
glory, praise

33

and joy

34

of the Creator as effected by all of cre

ation, each in its own way.

Psalm 148 enlists a whole host of animate

beings and inanimate objects to praise their Creator; which they do
by simply being what they were created to be:
Let them praise the name of the Lord,
For He commanded and they were created.
He has also established them forever and ever;
He has made a decree which will not pass away.
Praise the Lord from the earth,
Sea-monsters and all deeps;
32

Bernhard W. Anderson, "The Earth is the Lord's: An Essay on
the Biblical Doctrine of Creation," Interpretation IX (January 1955),
p. 6.
33

Gerhard Trenkler, ibid., p. 149.
In his opinion, the most
important aspects of the relationship of the creature to his creator
are "praise, trust and solidarity of all created things."
34

..
Kenneth Henry Maahs,
The Theology of Human Ecological Respon
sibility in the Old Testament," (Ph.D. dissertation, Southern Baptist
Theological Seminary, March, 1972), p. 130:
"According to Arthur
Weiser, [The Psalms: A Commentary, trans. Herbert Hartwell (Phila
delphia: The Westminster Press, 1962), p. 669] Psalm 104 serves to
forward one essential religious concept: God has created the world
for His own enjoyment in order that it might serve His purposes, the
chief religious purpose (v. 26) being ". . . G o d ’s joy in his creature
('to play with him'), a joy that is entirely detached from any thought
of human calculation or expediency (cf. Job 40:29)."
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Fire and hail, snow and clouds;
Stormy wind, fulfilling His word;
Mountains and all hills;
Fruit trees and all cedars;
Beasts and all cattle;
Creeping things and winged fowl;
Kings of the earth and all peoples;
Princes and all judges of the earth;
Both young men and virgins;
Old men and children.
Let them praise the name of the Lord.

(Ps. 148:5-13)

The heavens are telling of the glory of God;
And the firmanent is declaring the work of his hands.
All Thy
And Thy

(Ps.

19:1)

works shall
give thanks to Thee, 0 Lord,
godly ones shall bless Thee.
(Ps.
145:10)

All of creation exists to praise the Creator by being what it was
created to be and doing what it was

created to do. "The Lord has

made everything for its own purpose (Prov. 16:4)." Thus are the
high mountains a home for the wild goats and the rocky cliffs for
the badgers (Ps. 104:18).

The grass he grows for the cattle, vege

tation for cultivation by man, and trees for the birds (Ps. 104:14-17).
Each living creature looks to God and he gives them their food; he
satisfies their desire (Ps. 145:15-16).

Even the formidable lion

receives his prey from God (Job 38:39).

And finally God says to all

his creatures, including man:
Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the waters in the
seas, and let birds
multiply on the earth . . . .
Let the
earth bring
forth living creatures after their
kind:
cattle and creeping things and beasts of the
earth after their kind; and it was so . . . . and God
saw that it was good (Gen. 1:22, 24- 25 ).^5

■^Langdon Gilkey, Maker of Heaven and Earth (Garden City, New
York: Doubleday and Company, 1965), p. 78:
", . . when theologians
have spoken of the act of creation; they have used the analogy of
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And in the words of Bernhard Anderson,
. . . the doctrine of creation affirms that every crea
ture is assigned a place in G o d ’s plan in order that it
may perform its appointed role in serving and glorifying
the Creator.
This is magnificantly portrayed in the Priestly crea
tion story [Gen. 1]. God "calls" each thing by its name,
that is, he exercises his sovereignty by designating the
peculiar nature and function of each creature.
The heavenly
bodies, for instance, are not celestial beings who control
man's life, as was supposed in the astrological cults of
antiquity; rather, they are servants of God whose appointed
function is to designate the seasons and to separate the
day from the night . . . .
It is man, however, who occupies a special place in the
liturgy of creation . . . .
His task is to glorify God
by filling the earth and subduing it, thereby acting as
the appointed servant of his sovereign.
In the J creation
story [Gen. 2 and 3] the same truth is stated . . . . he
stands in an "I and thou" relation with his Maker and may
be obedient, or disobedient, to the task which is given
him:
to dress and keep the garden.36
The man of God, although he knew himself to be dependent and con
tingent like all creatures also knew that he was called into a covenantal relationship to serve God and his purposes.

37

He knew that he

was called to be a part of creation-history that is purposeful and is
going someplace; indeed, he was to be a steward of creation and a

human historical action.
They have emphasized that this act was a
free and intended act on the part of God, and that the purpose of
this act was that ’it was good.’"
Of:

Anderson, "The Earth is the Lord's," ibid., pp. 14-15.
"^Gilkey, ibid., pp. 201, 204-5; and Anderson, "The Earth is the
Lord's," ibid., p. 16.
"The natural world is man's God-given habitat,
wherein he is to find joy in the service of God.
Thus the doctrine
of creation frees man from the alternatives between which human
thought often moves:
either the materialistic enjoyment of the
natural world for its own sake, or the verdict that the world of
change and death is essentially meaningless," Anderson, "Creation,"
ibid., p. 729.
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history maker.

He was called to expend his energies in the meaning

fulness of the "God created moment," not to seek to escape the concreteness and contingency of the moment.

38

He knew that his ultimate

source of meaning and security in creation could only be found in the
Creator.

Only in God could he be free of the terror and tyranny of

his own contingency and temporality.

Only when he acknowledged his

dependence upon God as his ultimate source of existence and purpose
could he fully enter into creation and celebrate his dependence and
contingency in it.

Only because he understood that his finite crea-

tureliness was good and significant could he celebrate his role as
steward and history maker called in service to God.

39

Moreover, and in a more positive view, the ancient Israelite
affirmed his creaturely existence as good because he was created in
the image of God - imago D e i .

But what might that mean?

Anderson

argues:
. . . the main import of the statement about the imago
Dei is not to define man's essence in comparison to God,
but to accent the special function which God has assigned
to man in the creation. Man is designed to be God's
representative, for he is the representation or image
of God . . . .
Hence the statement about the imago Dei
is appropriately followed immediately by the further state
ment that God gives man a special blessing and commands
him to exercise dominion over the earth.
The dignity of man is not based upon something intrinsic
to human nature, such as "the infinite value of human
personality." Man's worth [and identity] lies in his
38
39

Gilkey, ibid., p. 305.

Gilkey, ibid., pp. 121, 229-35; and Bernhard W. Anderson, Cre
ation Versus Chaos (New York: Association Press, 1967), p. 81.
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relation to God.
He is the creature whom God addresses,
visits, and meets in fellowship; but above all he is
dignified by the task which his sovereign gives him.
This special eminence of man in God's creation excites
the wonder and praise of the psalmist:
"When I look at thy heavens, the work of thy fingers,
the moon and the stars which thou hast established;
What is man that thou art mindful of him,
and the son of man that thou dost care for him?
Yet thou has made him little less than God,
and dost crown him with glory and honor.
Thou hast given him dominion over the works of thy hands,
thou hast put all things under his feet . . . "
(Ps. 8:3-6) . . . .
As in Genesis 1, this high status endows man with a func
tion given to no other creature:
to have dominion over
the nonhuman creation. Man's rule on earth is to be
exercised within the sovereignty of God.
His "glory
and honor" is the task which God has given him.^0
Walther Eichrodt,

commenting on the imago Dei and Psalm 8, reminds

us, lest we forget, of the relative nature of our dominion.
. . . as a result of his being made in the image of God,
Man acquires not only supreme value, but also the power
for his work in the world, the programme of which is
summed up in the divine blessing:
"Be fruitful and
multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it!" . . .
His duty of realizing the task laid upon him by God
subordinates Man to the mighty teleological world
movement, which by its own inner logic moves inexorably
toward the concept of history.^-*And concerning Psalm 8 he says:
The almost defiant sense of power, and the naive joy in
what man can achieve, as evinced in the lively descrip
tion of his kingdom, [ w . 7-9] rings with all the

^Anderson, "The Earth is the Lord's," ibid., pp. 17-18.
^ W a l t h e r Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament, 2 vols.,
trans. J. A. Baker (Philadelphia:
The Westminister Press, 1961-67),
vol. 2 (1967), p. 110.
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self-confidence of antiquity,
and is given a distinc
tive twist only by the fact that it is combined with the
most profound reverance before the almighty Lord of crea
tion. What makes the free sovereign power of the latter
impressive is precisely the fact that the one whom he
clothes with royal status is a weak and insignificant
creature who by himself could never be more than an elo
quent testimony to the complete impotence of created things
. . . . it is God's inconceivably marvellous power which
alone is the basis of human self-confidence . . . . it is
a spiritual factor which determines the value Man sets
upon himself, namely his consciousness of partnership with
God, a privilege of which no other creature is considered
worthy.^3
The New Testament reinforces the Old Testament's view of man's
"partnership with God," of man's "worth and identity in his relation
ship with God."

Indeed, probably the central message of the New

Testament is that God, in the person and work of Jesus, is redeeming
and restoring humankind to their proper relationship with their
Creator and to their proper task in creation.
Through Jesus Christ the ultimate purpose of God is
revealed to be personal, fellowship with His creature
man . . . .
For it is through man's personal trust
and obedience that God's rule over man and man's
enactment of God's purpose are both achieved . . . .
the life of faith and obedience is a life in which the
divine sovereignty is fulfilled, and in which God's
rule over His creation is most perfectly accomplished.
Moreover, as a being rooted in God, man fulfills his
own essential structure only through personal fellow
ship with G o d : the creature becomes himself when he
lives in total dependence upon his Creator.
Only
through faith in God is man able to love his fellows,

^ A c c o r d i n g to Eichrodt, Psalm 8 "is often compared to the hymn
in praise of Man's dominion in the Antigone by Sophocles." Eichrodt,
ibid., p. 120.

^Eichrodt, ibid., pp. 120-21.
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and so to realize in his life the harmony of creation
which is God's own ultimate purpose in h i s t o r y . ^
Both the Old and New Testaments speak with much similarity on the
role of God as Creator and Sustainer, and also of God's judgment and
ultimate restoration of c r e a t i o n . ^
The eschatological aspect of the creation faith is more
evident in J [Gen. 2 and 3] and the prophets than in the
Priestly Source [Gen. 1] which lacks the story of Adam's
revolt against his Creator. While the priest emphasizes
God's sovereignty over the present world, the prophet sees
the present under the stigma of divine judgment.
For man,
whose every imagination of the heart is only evil continually
(Gen. 6:5), mars the goodness of the creation and thereby
provokes the Creator to destroy the works of his hands.
The contrast between God's original intention for his
creation and the sorry reality of the present is so sharp
that, according to prophets, God himself must act, bringing
judgment upon the world in order that he may create a new
heaven and a new earth . . . .
Here, again, we see that
from the Christian viewpoint the doctrine of Creation can
not be separated from Heilsgeschichte - the history of the
saving acts of God which is fulfilled in Jesus Christ.
The
whole of human history and all of nature stand under God’s
signature in Christ.
In Christ is laid bare the meaning
which undergirds all existence; through him men acknowledge
the God upon whom they are completely dependent; from him
they hear anew the summons to a task within God's plan.
From this standpoint of faith the Christian community
traces the purpose of God backward to the beginning, saying
that "In Christ all things were created," and it traces the
purpose forward to the consummation of history, saying that
"God will sum up all things in Christ.

^Gilkey, ibid., pp. 275-76.
^ " T h e chief difference is, of course, that the New Testament
gives Jesus Christ a place in this, as agent or mediator of the
creation." John Reumann, ibid., p. 84.
For similarities between
the New and Old Testaments on creation see, for example:
John 1;
Rom. 8:19-23; 1 Cor. 8:6; 10:26; 2 Cor. 9:7-12; Eph. 2:10; Philip. 2:
6-11; Col. 1:15-20; 3:10; Heb. 1:2-3; Rev. 21.
^Anderson,

"The Earth is the Lord's," ibid., pp. 19-20.
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Conclusion
Environmental exigencies have stirred up studies in the history
of man's attitudes toward and perceptions of nature.

Lynn White's

now famous article, "The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis,"
is one such study.

He comes to the conclusion that the roots of the

crisis lie in the Old Testament view of man and nature where,
God planned all of this [creation] explicitly for man's
benefit and rule:
no item in the physical creation had
any purpose save to serve man's purposes. And, although
man's body is made of clay, he is not simply part of
he is made in God's image.

nature:

In that same year, 1967, another study was published, but much less
publicized, which does not concur with White.

It was Traces on the

Rhodian Shore by Clarence Glacken.
Most striking, for our themes, is the idea of the dominion
of man as expressed in Genesis, and repeatedly expressed
in other writings, notably Psalm 8. But one must not read
these passages with
modern spectacles, which is easy
todo
in an age like ours
when "man's control over nature"
isa
phrase that comes as easily as a morning greeting . . . .
Man's power as a vice-regent of God on earth is part of the
design of the creation and there is in this fully elaborated
conception far less room for arrogance and pride than the
bare reading of the words would suggest.^®
1 would certainly agree with Glacken that a reading of Genesis 1 and
2 and Psalm 8 - without modern ideas of dominion as domination and
tyranny - will reveal no sense of arrogant pride in the biblical view
of creation.

Also in disagreement with White is James Barr who

^ W h i t e , ibid., p. 1205.
^ C l a r e n c e J. Glacken, Traces on the Rhodian Shore (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1967), p. 166.
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contends that "man made in the image of God" does not mean that as
God is sovereign over all,

so man is likewise.

49

As God's living image on earth, man is to act as his
representative.
He is the administrator of God's
works . . . .
Man is to exercise sovereignty within
God's sovereignty, so that all earthly creatures may
be related to God through him."’®
God remains the Creator, Sustainer and Ruler of creation and all
it contains.

He is personally, intimately and powerfully involved in

sustaining and ruling over all creatures and inanimate things for
their well-being and thus His own praise, glory and joy.
The people of God understood themselves and the rest of creation
to be utterly dependent on the Creator for order, history and purpose
in creation.

Even in their role of exercising sovereignty over cre

ation they knew themselves to be functioning within and under the
sovereignty of G o d .
absolute.

Their creaturely sovereignty was real but not

Furthermore, the function and purpose of their sovereignty

was to be servants of God to obtain His good purposes in creationhistory.

Commenting on the role of man as expressed in Genesis 2:15,

John Black says:
The burden of the passage in Genesis is clear enough:
God put man into the world in order that he should look
after it. The ultimate ownership of the world was never
for a moment in doubt . . . .
Man is frequently reminded
of his subordinate position; he may have been put on
earth to look after it, but there is no suggestion of
ownership at the time of creation, nor is there any

^ James Barr, "Man and Nature - The Ecological Controversy and
the Old Testament," Bulletin, The John Rylands University Library
55 (1972), p. 19.

^^Anderson, "Creation," ibid., p. 729.
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suggestion that in the course of time man might come to
inherit the earth for himself, for instance as a reward
for good management. Accordingly, the conclusion must
be that the Hebrews believed that one reason for man's
presence on earth was that he should look after it on
behalf of G o d .51
Gilkey profoundly summarizes the biblical view of man in creation.
Under God, a divine purpose, in which our lives may by
grace participate, runs through the chronological se
quence of time. And because of God's love and power,
no evil, whether of fate, sin, or death, can permanently
separate our lives from that ultimately significant
service
In Christian faith, concrete finite existence is given
an eternal meaning which does not absorb but enhances the
uniqueness of an individual person. A finite individual
person, with all his peculiar talents, is not only freed
from the terrors of contingency, the distortions of sin,
and the fears of transiency, but also he is used crea
tively for a significant work in his actual situation.
As a creature dependent on his Creator, each man's life
in time can become good and meaningful.
It is, therefore,
finally through his faith in God as redeeming love, and
his obedience to God's calling as providential Ruler, that
the Christian can experience and understand the real good
ness of God's creation. And the concrete meaning of his
own creation as a unique individual person is revealed
to him only when he finds that unique self restored to
its Creator and called to its own peculiar task in God's
history.52
The dependence of man - indeed, all of creation - upon the sus
taining work of the Creator is emphasized again and again in Scrip
ture.

This theme is so important to biblical people that really very

little, in comparison, is said about the particulars of man's task
as steward of creation.

The emphasis is almost always on the ini

tiating activity of God and the appropriate response of obedience

■^John N. Black, The Dominion of Man (Edinburgh:
University Press, 1970), pp. 48-49.

52Gilkey, ibid., p. 309.

Edinburgh
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by man.

But what is the appropriate response of obedience by man

the steward?

What does it mean to "have dominion" or "cultivate

and keep" the earth?

Although the Bible does not provide us with a

program for "creation management" (that is man's task as steward),
it does provide us with a vision of the principles and values of
proper stewardship.

THE BIBLICAL VIEW OF STEWARDSHIP
What does it mean to "have dominion . . . over the earth"?

One

man's answer to this question, which is pictured in the following
account, is not unusual, indeed, it may reflect a common notion.
Gavin Maxwell, the well-known writer of books about
otters, described, in an article in the Observer for
October 13, 1963, how he lost two lovely otter cubs
brought back from Nigeria:
"A minister of the Church
of Scotland, walking along the foreshore with a shot
gun, found them at play by the tide's edge and shot
them.
One was killed outright, the other died of her
wounds in the water.
The minister," added Maxwell
bitterly, "expressed regret, but reminded a journalist:
'The Lord gave man control over the beasts of the
field . . . .'"53
Putting aside the apparent violation of private property, does domin
ion entail license or responsibility in exercising our physical,
technological powers in creation?

And if not license, but rather

responsibility is called for, then what does responsible dominion
entail?

Recent studies on this fundamental biblical and environ

mental question have begun to unearth a biblical vision of human
kind as stewards of G o d ’s creation.

Moreover, exegetical and word

53C . F. D. Moule, Man and Nature in the New Testament (Phila
delphia:
Fortress Press, 1967), p. 1.
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studies are providing the necessary foundation for understanding key
words and concepts, such as:
ship (oikonomia)

dominion or rule (radah) and steward

More work, however, remains to be done in sys

tematizing a technology and philosophy (ethic) of stewardship which
addresses contemporary problems.
The concept of stewardship appears to have been rediscovered
around the turn of the century by the Protestant churches in the
United States.

At first it was restricted to mean tithing or service

within the church and its congregational life.

The concept slowly

broadened and the United Stewardship Council of the Churches of
Christ in America was formed in 1920.

The council, after considering

150 suggestions, produced a definition of stewardship in 1946, which
read;
Christian stewardship is the practice of systematic and
proportionate giving of time, abilities, and material
possessions, based upon the conviction that these are
trusts from God to be used in his service for the bene
fit of all mankind in grateful acknowledgment of Christ's
redeeming love.56

Economists will no doubt recognize oikonomia for as John
Reumann notes, "From this term oikonomia, which views the cosmos as
a well-organized city-state (polis) or household (oikos), we get our
term 'economics,' denoting the management of this (cosmic) household."
See his book Creation and New Creation, p. 11.
"^Our lack of a robust theology of stewardship is, of course,
partially due to the newness of perceived environmental problems, but
more importantly due to the heavy theological emphasis on redemption
to the exclusion of creation since the Englightenment.
■^Helge Brattgard, G o d ’s Stewards: A Theological Study of the
Principles and Practices of Stewardship, trans. Gene J. Lund
(Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1963), p. 5.
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This definition was soon criticized for implying that stewardship was
simply a function of "giving" rather than a "God-man relationship of a
total nature . . .

57

Subsequent studies further broadened the con

cept and produced more inclusive definitions.

For example, from three

early, prominent writers on stewardship:
No area of his [man's] existence is excluded from the
claims of Christ upon him.
Because the Lordship of
Christ includes everything - both in heaven and earth all of life is sacred . . . .
When Paul said, "Whatso
ever ye do, do all to the glory of God" (1 Cor, 10:31),
he made specific mention of the everyday need of eating
and drinking . . . . in the language of the New Testa
ment, stewardship means, simply, to be a worker together
with Christ (2 Cor. 6 :1 ).58
Acknowledgment of the absolute sovereignty of God and
of the instrumental nature of the things he has cre
ated leads to another basic thought of stewardship; the
thought of responsible trusteeship. We are neither the
lords of creation nor slaves of "the elemental spirits
of the universe" [Col. 2:8] but stewards to whom the
Creator and Owner of all things has entrusted what
belongs to him for the realization of his purpose with
regard to it.59
. . . stewardship is concerned with nothing less than
man's responsibility to God as he participates in the
whole technological-industrial-distributional system of
his environment context.
For stewardship is the active
recognition of the sovereignty of God over his whole
creation; over the creative and productive processes
in which men share and the uses to which they put all

57Ibid.
co

A. C. Conrad, The Divine Economy: A Study in Stewardship
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1954), pp. 122, 157-58.
CQ

T. A. Kantonen, A Theology for Christian Stewardship
(Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1956), p. 36.
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of the resources and means that come under their care
and control.
Thus, the biblical concept of stewardship has grown from a limited
notion of individual tithing for the support of the local church into
a fairly inclusive view of responsible living under the sovereignty
of God.

And yet, as T. K. Thompson notes, our understanding of

stew

ardship has not progressed very far if it simply means "the practice
of the Christian religion," however true that may b e . ^

It would be

helpful if we could begin to discern between responsible and irre
sponsible stewardship; for who today is not calling for "responsible
and wise use of our environment?"

Stewardship as Responsible Dominion Over Creation
In a study of the Hebrew root word radah (dominion or rule),
James Limburg observes that the word, as used outside of Gen. 1:26-28,
always denotes human relationships.

For example, it is used as the

rule of a king over his subjects (1 Kings 4:24; Ps. 72:8; Ezek. 34:4);
a master over a hired servant (Lev. 25:43); chief officers over
laborers (1 Kings 5:16).
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He suggests that a "king/people

60

Albert Terrill Rasmussen, "Stewardship in an Economy of Abun
dance," in Stewardship in Contemporary Theology, ed. by Thomas K.
Thompson (New York: Association Press, 1960), p. 232.
^ T h o m a s K. Thompson, "The Praxis of Stewardship in North Ameri
ca," in Christian Stewardship in Ecumenical Confrontation (New York:
National Council of the Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., 1961), p. 28.
62

James Limburg, "What Does it Mean to 'Have Dominion Over the
Earth'?" Dialog 10 (1971) pp. 221-23.
Cf.
Claus Westermann, ibid.,
pp. 51-53.
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relationship provides the model for understanding the man/earth-andits-creatures relationship as portrayed in Genesis 1:26-28."
the texts cited provide first a

63

Two of

positive, then a negative description

of the proper rule of a king over his people.

The first text reads:

May he judge Thy people with righteousness,
And Thine afflicted with justice . . . .
May he vindicate the afflicted of the people,
Save the children of the needy,
And crush the oppressor . . . .
For he will deliver the needy when he cries for help,
The afflicted also, and him who has no helper,
He will have compassion on the poor and needy,
And the lives of the needy he will save.
He will rescue their life from oppression and violence;
And their blood will be precious in his sight . . . .
(Ps. 72:2, 4, 12-14)
Contrary to those who think the biblical injunction "have dominion"
means arrogant, despotic, tyrannical exploitation, Psalm 72 describes
the dominion of the king as judging with righteousness and justice
which results in saving the oppressed and needy and crushing the
oppressor.
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The second text, which provides a negative example of kingly
rule, is an indictment brought against the kings of Israel who were
not shepherding the people,
Woe, shepherds of Israel who have been feeding themselves!
Should not the shepherd feed the flock? You eat the fat
and clothe yourselves with the wool, you slaughter the fat
sheep without feeding the flock.
Those who are sickly

63Ibid., p. 222.
64

Three examples of misunderstood notions of dominion are: Lynn
White, ibid., p. 1205; Ian L. McHarg, Design With Nature (Garden City,
N.Y.:
The Natural History Press, 1969), p. 26; and Hugh H. Macaulay
and Bruce Yandle, Environmental Use and the Market (Lexington, MA:
Lexington Books, 1977), pp. 7-8.
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you have not strengthened, the diseased you have not
healed, the broken you have not bound up, the scat
tered you have not brought back, nor have you sought
for the lost; but with force and with severity you
have dominated them.
(Ezek. 34:2b-4)
Limburg concludes that radah, as employed by the author of Genesis
1:26-28, in no way implies domination or exploitation.
To rule with "force and harshness," i.e., to exploit
rather than to care for, is to misrule! . . . to
"have dominion" over the earth and its creatures
. . . . man is called to exercise responsible care
for the fish, the birds, the cattle, that which
creeps on the earth, even the earth i t s e l f .^5

A Moral Relationship Between Man and Creation
Further light has been shed upon this biblical view of the
steward as a shepherd-king by the recognition of a moral relation
ship between man and creation.

Among the relevant texts the classic

is the encounter between God and a disobedient Adam in Genesis 3:17-19
where creation itself suffers as a result of man's sin.

A second well

known text is Isaiah 11:5-9 where, apparently in response to the wise
and righteous ruler from Jesse's stock, nature is blessed with a harmony of peaceful relationships.
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Another vivid example is Hosea 4:

1-3 where deception, murder, stealing, adultery and violence have

Limburg, ibid., p. 223.
Cf. Eichrodt, ibid., p. 127; Eric C.
Rust, Science and Faith:
Towards a Theological Understanding of
Nature (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 307-8; Emil
Brunner, Christianity and Civilization, 2 vols. (London: Nisbet and
Co., 1948-49) vol. 1 (1949), p. 89; Hugh Montefiore, Can Man Survive?
(London: Fontana, 1970), pp. 55, 71-72; and Carl E. Braaten, Christ
and Counter-Christ: Apocalyptic Themes in Theology and Culture
(Philadelphia:
Fortress, 1972), pp. 129-31.

^Moule, ibid., pp. 5-6.
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replaced faithfulness, kindness and knowledge of God, thus causing all
parts of creation to suffer.
Therefore the land mourns,
And every one who lives in it languishes
Along with the beasts of the field and the
birds of the sky;
And also the fish of the sea disappear.
(Hosea 4:3)
For a final example from the Old Testament, Rust observes that the
promised land of Israel was wed to God:
"Beulah" land, married to Yahweh, just as they themselves
were Yahweh's people [Isa. 62:4] . . . . So long as
Yahweh is with His people and they are not cut off from
Him by sin, so long Israel will be Beulah land; but when
they are cast off and forsaken, it becomes "Desolate" . . . .

^

The most striking example of this thought found in the New Testament
occurs in Romans 8.

Moule paraphrases Rom. 8:19-23:

For creation, with eager expectancy, is waiting for
the revealing of the sons of God. For creation was
subjected to frustration, not by its own choice but
because of Adam’s sin which pulled down nature with
it, since God had created Adam to be in close connec
tion with nature.
But the disaster was not unattended
by hope - the hope that nature, too, with man, will be
released from its servitude to decay, into the glorious
freedom which characterizes man when he is a true and
obedient son of God.
For, up to the present time, we
know that the shole of creation joins together in common
groaning and agony; and not only creation in general,
but we Christians too - even though we have the Holy
Spirit as a foretaste of that hope - groan inwardly in
f\

7

Eric C. Rust, Nature and Man in Biblical Thought, Lutterworth
Library (London:
Lutterworth Press, 1953), vol. 40, p. 51.
Cf.
Eichrodt, ibid., p. 119.
The biblical texts cited are only a few
of many where man's sin results in the land being defiled, for
example: Deut. 24:4; Lev. 18:25-28; 20:22; Jer. 2:7; 3:lf.; 16:18;
Ezek. 36:17f.
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our longing for that adoption as sons which means the
release of our bodily existence from decay . . . .6®
A summary statement by Rust provides an overview of the biblically
perceived moral relationship between man and creation.
The relation of the people to God is reflected in their
relation to, and in the state of, the natural order in
which their life is lived. Let man sin, and the whole
cosmos turns against him. Let man reject the living
God and his judgment is reflected in the way in which
the natural order hits back at him . . . .
A lack of
concern for his fellows and the divine plan of fellow
ship leads to a lack of harmony in the whole universe,
in which the balance of nature is upset and in which
nature itself becomes the medium of the divine judgment
upon a sinful civilization or people.^9
The conclusion to be drawn is that man, called to be a steward
of creation, can and does reject his calling to the peril of creation
including his own good life.
upon the Creator.

He rejects it by denying his dependence

He rejects it by "worshipping" the creation

(natural or man-made) and thereby becoming spiritually dependent upon
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Moule, ibid., p. 10. For similarity cf. Robinson, ibid., pp.
31-32.
Reflecting on Romans 8, Joseph Sittler says, "One is not
falling into words only in sentiment or poetic fancy but extrapolating
from a clear theological position when he makes the affirmation that
Christianly Lake Michigan must be regarded as ’groaning in travil,
waiting to be set free from its bondage of decay.'
...
A proper
doctrine of creation and redemption would make it perfectly clear
that from a Christian point of view the ecological crisis presents
us not simply with moral tasks but requires of us a freshly reno
vated and fundamental theology of the first article whereby the
Christian faith defines whence the Creation was formed, and why, and
by whom, and to what end." "Ecological Commitment as Theological
Responsibility," Zygon 5 (June 1970), p. 179.
69

Rust, Nature and Man in Biblical Thought, ibid.
For similarity
cf. Moule, ibid., pp. 13-14; and Robinson, ibid., pp. 31-32.

75

it rather than upon the Creator.

Man can be a steward and exercise

dominion over creation only as he is spiritually (although, not
physically) independent of it.

To be a steward is to be free from

the dread of a contingent creation; it is to know, with Job, that
in the Lord's hand, "is the life of every living thing, and the
breath of all mankind (Job 12:10)."

God's Sovereignty and Ownership
Job recognizes, as his friends have not, that the Creator is
not only transcendent, but also the sovereign "giver and maintainer
of life . . . .

Job is not the cosmic housekeeper.

God i s . " ^

partial understanding of God's sovereignty over creation

A

vis-a-vis

man's stewardship, is that God retains complete ownership of
creation.
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^ J a m e s M. Houston, I Believe in the Creator (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1980), pp. 197-98.
^ I ndeed, only a partial understanding is possible because in
Houston's words (pp. 196-99), "The mystery of the meaning of creation
is God's, and man can never fully explore it. This is eloquently
described in the didactic poem of Job 28. Man as Homo faber can
accomplish incredible feats . . . .
But the most precious reality
of all is the mystery of creation, which he will never discover by
his own unaided skills.
Only God knows its place and purpose.
It
is beyond the reach of man.
Thus to say the creation is ordered and
meaningful . . . is not to say it is fully understandable . . . .
the writer of Ecclesiastes, Qoheleth, points out that the created
world cannot be an end in itself. This is the 'vanity of vanities'
. . . to assume that man can absolutise any created things as if it
were God the Creator, or as if it were a compensation for His absence
. . . . So Job's repentance lies in accepting once again that he is
only a creature, who can trust the Creator when he cannot know His
w a y s ."

76

It is the Creator’s prerogative to declare:
"The world and all that is in it is mine
[Ps. 50:12]"; "Every beast of the forest is
mine, the cattle on a thousand hills [Ps. 50:10]";
"The silver is mine, and the gold is mine [Hag. 2:8]."
If God is God, then man can actually never own
anything.^2
Brattgard calls into question a m o d e m view of "our possessions" in
contrast to Luther's view.
Modern man is often said to believe in the good God
who is Creator of all . . . .
But to do this,
according to Luther, one must live his life as a
steward.
It is thus that one recognizes his total
dependence upon the Creator, at the same time that
he permits his gifts to go through his hands in order
to serve others and to praise God.
This kind of faith
excludes the egotistical ideas that there is something
which really belongs to man, which he has at his own
disposal.^
Also questioning a modern view of possessions, Quanbeck comments on
the so-called "stewardship parables" of Jesus.
The teaching of Jesus in these parables differs
radically from our viewpoint today.
It is first
of all a denial of man's autonomy, of his freedom
and competence to manage his own affirs. Man owns
nothing at all in the biblical view, not even his
own life. He has been placed in the world through
God's sovereign freedom, is maintained in life and
health through God's sustaining goodness, and pos
sesses all that he has as a trust from his Creator.
Man's presumption of autonomy is not a sign of his
peculiar glory as the crown of creation, as is often
supposed in liberal humanism, but rather an expres
sion of his sin, of the egocentricity that separates
him from God and flaws his life. Man is most truly
72

Kantonen, ibid., p. 33.

73
Brattgard, ibid., p. 142. Also see his comments (p. 86) on
the sabbatical year and the year of jubilee which were "of special
assistance to the Israelites who were to live in a right relation
ship to property and ownership . . . ."
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himself, not when he struts about in pride of ability
and possession, but when he sees himself as a creature
of God and submits to the will of his Creator which is
his true happiness.^
Needless to say, few moderns - Christians or otherwise - manage their
possessions or property as gifts from God who remains absolute owner.
That is to say, the biblical concept of stewardship, for the most
part, is not in operation either individually or institutionally.
More important than the question of what extent it may or may not be
presently operative, however, is the question:

how would it affect

our economic theory of "optimal" resource allocation?

As we will see

in the next chapter, a biblical theory of stewardship - as a normative
foundation for our economic theories of value, welfare, and "optimal"
allocation - has some radical implications for neoclassical economic
theory founded on individualistic, subjectivistic premises.

Conclusion
The biblical goal and task for man in relation to creation is to
be God's steward.

He is given the responsibility of discerning,

developing and exercising dominion over the earth that it might not
be a "waste place, but rather be inhabited" (Isa. 45:18).

Lynn White

Warren A. Quanbeck, "Stewardship in the Teachings of Jesus,"
in Stewardship in Contemporary Theology, ibid. pp. 47-48.
For similar
conclusions about the absolute ownership of property by God and the
relative rights of stewardship of man, cf., Black, ibid., p. 60;
Brunner, ibid., p. 95; Conrad, ibid., pp. 156-57; Denys L. Munby,
Christianity and Economic Problems (London: Macmillan, 1956), p. 37;
and Richard L. Scheef, Jr., "Stewardship in the Old Testament," in
Stewardship in Contemporary Theology, ibid. pp. 19-20.
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has argued that our ecological crisis is spiritual; but the crisis
is not - as he believes - due to the biblical vision of m a n ’s dominion
over creation.

Just the opposite; it is due to the lack of such a

vision; a vision of m a n ’s dominion as a stewardship of the welfare
of all creation.
Although the Bible reveals that man is to be the steward and not
the owner - fundamentally responsible to and dependent upon the Cre
ator not the creation - it does not reveal a ready-made set of "Chris
tian" political and economic institutions.

This is not to say,

however, that any institution or relationship is as good as another.
It is to say that perfect institutions, as well as, perfect knowledge
are as common as perfect human beings.

Consequently, the steward is

not called to ground his faith and hope in institutions or individuals
but in God.

And yet, Scripture is rife with principles for doing

good and ruling wisely, but lest we slip into a simplistic, reductionistic view of biblical wisdom and its vision of stewardship let
us be reminded of this fallacy in J o b ’s friends.

As Houston notes:

Unlike Proverbs, which teaches that there are ordi
nances that are useful in gaining wisdom, the book
of Job teaches that to live in a meaningful world
one needs to cultivate proper attitudes rather than
depend upon simple answers.
Relating to God is more
profound than knowing about God . . . .
The mystery
of the meaning of creation is God's, and man can
never fully explore it [cf. Job 28] . . . .
The
mistake made by Job's three friends . . . is to
reduce God to workable definitions, so that they
depend on systems of knowledge and belief, not the
living Creator.75

Houston, ibid., pp. 196-97.
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In other words, the steward is not called to do what only the Creator
can do, that is, inaugurate and complete his kingdom.

The Christian's

hope is a New Heaven and New Earth wherein God will dwell with his
people (Rev. 21:1-2).

Nevertheless, our calling as we live in the

"between times" is to live as signs of the coming kingdom which,
indeed, becomes an annunciation, anticipation, and even an approxi
mation of God's eschatological k i n g d o m . ^

^ C a r l E. Braaten, Eschatology and Ethics (Minneapolis: Augsburg
Publishing House, 1974), pp. 109-11.

CHAPTER 4
SOME IMPLICATIONS OF STEWARDSHIP
FOR ECONOMIC THEORY AND POLICY

A biblical theory of humankind's stewardship of a good and
valuable creation has recently begun to emerge as a model for human
valuation and choice.
Christian tradition:

The theory reaffirms a long-standing Hebrew"that creation exists to glorify God, not to

provide happiness to human beings;"

and "that man is not so much the

possessor of the world as a tenant on his Master's estate."

2

It

follows that the general purpose of mankind as tenant is to manage
the estate according to its general purpose:

to glorify its Creator.

To fully determine how creation might be managed, in order to glorify
the Creator, is neither a task for the fainthearted nor for a single
dissertation. A much more manageable endeavor is the following:
First, contrast neoclassical economic theory's subjective view of
value with a stewardship theory of objective value.

Second, deter

mine whether or not the normative premises and conclusions of Pareto
optimal allocation of natural resources are compatible with steward
ship premises and conclusions.

Third, contrast the so-called new

•^■Roger L. Shinn, "Calvin Revisited, Revised," Christianity and
Crisis 42 (July 12, 1982), p. 219.

2

R. V. Young, Jr., "A Conservative View of Environmental
Affairs," Environmental Ethics 1 (Fall 1979), p. 254.
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economic theory of property rights with a stewardship approach to
property.

Fourth, in the last chapter (Chapter 5), show how a

stewardship theory of objective value calls for an allocation of
resources different from neoclassical theory in the specific area
of renewable resources and the extinction of species.

Before embark

ing on this task it will be helpful to begin by defining some crucial
terms.

OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE VALUE
3

Georgescu-Roegen, in
different views of value

his article on "Utility,"

points to four

in its long and tortuous history.

First,

the position of the "ancient Greeks" was that value is "an intrinsic
quality of the object of value and a subjective evaluation by the
user."

4

Second, moving away from the Greek view,

economic thought was dominated for centuries by com
modity fetishism:
"the value of a thing lies in the
things itself," as we find it frankly stated by J. B.
Say. . . . value is determined by the amount of labor
crystallized in the commodity.5

The third view,
a reaction against commodity fetishism . . . swung
to the opposite extreme:
"A thing does not have

^Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, "Utility," in International Encyclo
pedia of the Social Sciences, ed. by David L. Sills (New York:
The
Macmillan Co. and The Free Press, 1968), vol. 16, pp. 236-67.

4Ibid., p. 237.
5Ibid.
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value because, as it is assumed, it costs; but it
costs because it has value [in use], "as Condillac
. . . was to summarize the position . . . .®
The fourth view is, of course, our contemporary utility theory,
where, "in value, utility and scarcity (both in their modern mean
ings) are linked together through the whole economic process."7
Presumably, the "modern meaning" of utility is a subjective,
individual view of pleasurableness or desirability.
however, the only possible meaning of utility.

This is not,

De Roover writes

that San Bernardino of Siena developed a theory of value that included
scarcity and two views of utility:
value is composed of three elements: (1) usefulness
(virtuositas) ; (2) scarcity (raritas); and (3) plea
surableness or desirability (complacibilitas) . . . .
Virtuositas is, he explains, a virtue, or property,
inherent in the goods themselves, of satisfying,
either directly or indirectly, human wants.
It may,
therefore, be defined as objective utility.
Com
placibilitas is undeniably a subjective factor which
depends upon the mood and preferences of the consumer
•

•

•

•

The distinction between virtuositas and complac
ibilitas , objective and subjective utility, in my
opinion, is quite a fruitful idea and it is perhaps
regrettable that modern economists did not accept
it, with the result that they became involved in
hedonism and pleasure-pain calculus.®

6Ibid.
7Ibid.

8Raymond De Roover, San Bernardino of Siena and Sant'Antonino
of Florence (Boston:
1967), p. 18.

The Kress Library of Business and Economics,
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San Bernardino's distinction between objective (virtuositas) and sub
jective (complacibilitas) utility is helpful because it points to the
further distinction between objective and subjective value.

Frankena

clearly differentiates between the two:
'Value' . . . is often used (a) to refer to what is
valued, judged to have value, thought to be good, or
desired.
The expressions 'his values,' 'her value
system,' and 'American values' refer to what a man,
a woman, and Americans value or think to be good . . . .
Behind this widespread usage lies the covert assumption
that nothing really has objective value, that 'value'
^
means being valued and 'g ood' means being thought good.
This is the meaning of 'subjective value' as it is used in this dis
sertation.

Something has value if a human subject deems it so.

Something has value because it is so valued, the reverse is not true;
thus we would not say that something is valued because it has value
(according to the subjective

definition).

To say this, Frankena

explains, would be a way of defining 'objective value.'
But the term 'value' is also used to mean (b) what has
value or i£ valuable, or good, as opposed to what is
regarded as good or valuable.
Then 'values' means
'things that have value,' 'things that are good,' or
'goods' and, for some users, also things that are right,
obligatory, beautiful, or even true.^®
Thus, if something is objectively valuable it is so regardless of
human valuation.

Human valuation of objective values can produce

conclusions that are either right or wrong.

Since, our knowledge of

9

William K. Frankena, "Value and Valuation," in The Encyclopedia
of Philosophy, ed. by Paul Edwards (New York: The Macmillan Co. and
The Free Press, 1967), vol. 8, p. 230.
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objective value is itself objective, in the same way that theoretical
knowledge is objective, it may be either correct or mistaken.

Thus,

like all human objective knowledge, knowledge of creation's objective
value is believed to be true, even though we know that it might con
ceivably be false .^

Our knowledge of the objective value of creation

may be false precisely because objective value does not derive from
our individual subjective preferences.
individual subjective valuation.

It is entirely different from

Individual subjective preferences

themselves cannot be correct or incorrect; only the individual may be
correct or incorrect about what his subjective preferences really are.
He may be mistaken about his preference for vanilla rather than choco
late ice cream, but his preference itself cannot be mistaken, it is
whatever it is.
The idea of creation having objective worth is not peculiar to
a biblically based theory.

Other religious and non-religious theories

of the "inherent-intrinsic value" of nature are emerging which argue,
that there is something morally objectionable in the
destruction of natural systems, or at least in their
wholesale elimination, and this is precisely the belief
that natural systems, or economically "useless" species
do possess an intrinsic value.
That is, it is an attempt
to articulate the rejection of the anthropocentric view
that all value ultimately, resides in human interests and
concerns.^

"^This material draws heavily from Michael Polanyi, Personal
Knowledge (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1962).
^^William Godfrey-Smith, "The Value of Wilderness," Environmental
Ethics 1 (Winter 1979), p. 312.
See also, for example, J. Baird
Callicott, "Elements of an Environmental Ethic: Moral Considerability
and the Biotic Community," Environmental Ethics 1 (Spring 1979), pp.
71-81; Charles Y. Deknatel, "Questions About Environmental Ethics -
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The practical outcome of this theory of intrinsic value would be
institutional changes which recognize such value.

Laurence Tribe

announces his intentions in this regard:
I propose giving institutional expression to the per
ception that "nature exists for itself" by taking
steps to recognize "rights" in natural objects, not
as a way of broadening the class of wants to be aggre
gated by a utilitarian calculus, but rather as part of
a structure for approaching a shared agreement about
our responsibilities as persons - responsibilities to
one another and to the world.
Consider the similar approach, taken by Earl Murphy, to use the
institution of property rights to incorporate nature's intrinsic
worth into our environmental decisions.
There must be a way to locate within human institutions
as the rules of property the perception of a worth in
nature requiring protection from human demand and having
importance independently of any conferral of value by human
activity . . . .
The rules of property and the bureaucratic mechanism
may set the constraints, so that no demand generating
activity can act independently of such l i m i t s . ^

Toward a Research Agenda with a Focus on Public Policy,"
Ethics 2 (Winter 1980), pp. 353-62; Paul W. Taylor, "The
Respect for Nature," Environmental Ethics 3 (Fall 1981),
and Holmes Rolston III, "Are Values in Nature Subjective
tive?" Environmental Ethics 4 (Summer 1982), pp. 125-51.

Environmental
Ethics of
pp. 197-218;
or Objec

•^Laurence H. Tribe, "Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees,"
in When Values Conflict, ed. by Laurence H. Tribe, Corinne S.
Schelling, and John Voss (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Co.,
1976), p. 62.
14

Earl F. Murphy, Nature, Bureaucracy and the Rules of Property:
Regulating the Renewing Environment (Amsterdam: North-Holland Pub
lishing Co., 1977), p. 203.
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And finally, Robert Dorfman speaks of the need for environmental
policy analysis to include "higher values" that "transcend the eco
nomic calculus."

He also argues that these values are objectively

knowable and can be agreed upon, but not proved as though they were
merely the valid conclusions of a simple syllogism.
For higher values to be integrated into a policy analysis
there must be widespread agreement about them - or at
least about the qualities to be sought in the process
for arriving at such substantive value agreement.
For
tunately, in any society there is often such agreement,
though this circumstance is frequently denied. The
denial arises from confusing what is "objectively
provable" with what is generally agreed.
The fact
that there is no way to "prove" that denuding forests
is bad is perfectly consistent with universal agree
ment that it i£ bad . . . .
In the environmental field,
the road to wisdom is a decision process that forces
explicit recognition that the environment has values
that transcend the economic calculus.^
Although Dorfman does not clearly explain or define these "higher
values" that "transcend the economic calculus," as we will see, it
is objective values that transcend the subjective valuation of neo
classical economics.

SUBJECTIVE VALUE AND NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS
Modern neoclassical economists, whether empiricists or a priori
rationalists - with all their epistemological differences - generally
agree that economics is the study of individuals whose actions aim to

Robert Dorfman, "An Afterword: Humane Values and Environ
mental Decisions," in When Values Conflict, ed. by Laurence H. Tribe,
Corinne S. Schelling, and John Voss (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Pub
lishing Co., 1976), pp. 167-73.
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maximize their utility (expected).
observed fact about individuals.
known a priori.

For the empiricist this is an

For the rationalist, it is somehow

For those economists between these extremes, it may

be either an assumption or a tautology.

Regardless of their broad

epistemological differences, they generally agree that the subject
matter of economic science is individuals who attempt to maximize
their utility.

They also tend to agree that whatever utility i s ,

even though seldom defined, it is a function of the individual’s
subjective preferences or valuations (with a positive first deriva
tive and a negative second derivative).

Here is the important dif

ference between "economic man" and a "steward":

whereas economic

man only values subjectively, the steward’s task is to value both
subjectively and objectively.

For example, the steward, like economic

man, chooses between red and green neckties according to his subjec
tive preferences.

Unlike economic man, however, he is not to choose

between a fancier car and an adequate diet for his family according
to his subjective preferences, but rather according to what he
believes to be objectively good and proper.

Thus, the steward may

be willing to sacrifice his subjective preferences and diminish his
subjective utility in order to either increase his objective utility
or choose according to what he believes to be objectively valuable,
or perhaps both.

16

16

The standard rebuttal to this type of example is that the
individual chooses to give his family an adequate diet because this
is a greater subjective preference for him than is the fancier car,
not because it is objectively good to do so.
Or, that even though
the individual may consider some of his preferences as objectively
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The idea of objective value influencing individual choice and
action apart from a utility function is foreign to the standard sub
jective approach as expressed in the following passage by Furubotn
and Pejovich:
. . . regardless of the number, character, or diversity
of the goals established by an individual decision
maker, the goals can always be conceived as arguments
in some type of utility function . . . .I?
Thus, the objective of all individual goals
to increase the individual's utility.

(choices,preferences)

is

Utility is usually conceived

as subjective utility (but the idea of objective utility would not
seem to violate the basic principle).

This is the subjective theory

of value, where individual utility is the ultimate criterion of value.
Such a theory rules out the stewardship idea of the objective value
of things, because objective value does not depend upon individual
utility for its value.
It is difficult to know who or how many economists subscribe to
a subjective theory of value, because it is

seldom examined in any

detail.

according to their desire

Do individuals always make choices

for utility or do they sometimes sacrifice utility and choose accor
ding to an objective value other than their own utility (which may be,
of course, objectively valuable)?

The passage above by Furubotn and

grounded and others as not, he still behaves as if he were maximizing
a utility function with preferences as arguments, and thus not accor
ding to the idea of objective value or good.
These views of human
behavior, known as Psychological Egoism, are discussed below.
•^Eirik G. Furubotn and Svetozar Pejovich, "Property Rights
and Economic Theory: A Survey of Recent Literature," Journal of
Economic Literature 10 (December 1972), p. 1138.
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Pejovich seems to imply all choices are and can be (can only be?)
explained in terms of utility and self-interest.

On the other hand,

Heilbroner and Thurow seem to say something different.
Economic theory is therefore a study of the effects of
one aspect of human behavior as it motivates people to
undertake their worldly activities. Very often, as
economists well know, other aspects will override or
blunt the acquisitive, maximizing orientation . . . .
[But] economists do not think that political or religious
or other such motives regularly overwhelm maximizing
behavior.18
Nor does Frank Knight believe that all valuation is based on our
preferences or desires.
People report and feel two different types of motiva
tion for their acts. There is the wish or preference
which is treated by the actor and by outsiders as final,
as a brute fact.
On the other hand, people make value
judgments of various sorts in explanation of their acts;
and explanation runs into justification.
In other words,
no one can really treat motive objectively or describe a
motive without implications of good and bad.
Thus not
only do men desire more or less distinctly from valuing,
but they desire because they value and also value without
desiring.
Indeed the bulk of human valuations, in con
nection with truth, beauty and morals, are largely or
altogether independent of desire for any concrete thing
or result.
The most extreme interpretation of the Furubotn and Pejovich
passage is that individuals are psychologically incapable of doing
anything but promoting their own self-interest.

This subjectivist

18

Robert L. Heilbroner and Lester C. Thurow, The Economic Prob
l e m , 6th ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1981), p. 87.
^•^Frank H. Knight, "Value and Price," Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences, ed. by Edwin R. A. Seligman (New York:
The Macmillan Co.,
1934), vol. 15, p. 221.
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theory, called Psychological Egoism,
scientific theory.

20

has some serious flaws as a

According to this theory, for example, the indi

vidual who says that he helped the little old lady across the street
because it was the proper or good thing to do, is deceiving himself
with artificial moral rhetoric.

The theory argues that if we dig

beneath this rhetoric we will find the true motives to be a sense of
personal pride or righteousness, or, at the very least, the avoidance
of social criticism or guilt feelings.

21

The problem with this theory

is that rather than rationally explaining the motives of such behav
ior, it results in a paradoxical relationship between the motives and
the behavior; as explained by Murphy:
It is indeed true that men sometimes feel good about or
proud of performing unselfish acts.
But the good feeling
comes only because of the perception that our act was not
motivated selfishly, not motivated by the desire for the
good feeling.
If it had been, then there would be nothing
to feel good about, nothing to be proud o f .22
At the root of the problem with this theory is its failure to
distinguish between two distinctly different meanings of an individual's desires.

23

The first meaning is that everything we do (freely),

2®Jeffrie G. Murphy, "The Possibility of Moral Philosophy,"
University of Arizona, Philosophy Department (Mimeographed), p. 26;
and William K. Frankena, Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
PrenticeHall, 1963), p. 19.

21 Ibid.
22Ibid., p. 28.
2^P. H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics (London: Penguin Books, 1954),
p. 142, offers the following explanation of the two different uses
of "desires." "It is a tautology that all my desires, inclinations,
wantings, likings, and enjoyments are mine; but it is a plain false
hood that what I desire, like, want, or enjoy is necessarily my own
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w e do because we want or desire to do it.

This merely means that

our actions are explained in terms of our wants or desires.
X because I desired to do X."
desire means.

That is all the first meaning of

Desire in this sense tells us nothing about the motives

behind our desired actions.
our motives.

"I did

The second meaning of desire concerns

Some of the things we do, we do with ourselves (self-

interest, utility, pleasure, etc.) as the ob.ject of our desires.
did Y because I desired to benefit myself."

"I

Y is the type of goal

that can be included in a utility function because the objective of
Y is the individual's utility.

Whereas all our actions or choices

are determined by our desire to do them (first meaning), that does
not necessarily mean that we are the object of our desires (second
meaning).

"I did X because I desired to do good," cannot - without

introducing a paradox - be reduced to an argument in an individual's
utility function.

X may or may not give the individual utility.

Even

if X does result in utility for the individual, it is difficult to
see how it could be conceived as an argument in a utility function
since its objective was not utility.

To include X in a utility funcA/

tion is to introduce the paradox explained above.

The objective

of the arguments in a utility function is utility, but the objective
of X is its intrinsic, objective value.

To include X in a utility

pleasure or my own anything else; and it is also a plain falsehood
that a man who does what he wants to do or 'acts from inclination'
always acts selfishly."
^ T h a t is, it is impossible to derive utility from an objec
tively good act, which of itself offers no utility to the individual,
if the act is done merely to gain utility.
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function is to deny its objective value, but there is no good reason
for doing this other than merely asserting that all actions are done
to maximize utility.

Rather than asserting either a tautological

theory (we do what we desire), or a theory of Psychological Egoism,
the neoclassical economist could agree with Heilbroner and Thurow,
"Very often, as economists well know, other aspects will override or
blunt the acquisitive, maximizing orientation."

25

Which of these

positions is predominant among economists is most difficult, if not
impossible to discern, because these fundamental aspects of the sub
jective theory of value as utility are seldom discussed.

Let us then

discuss them.
The subjective theory of value as utility is, of course, based
on the work of the great Austrian economists:
Bohm-Bawerk, and Friedrich von Wieser.

Carl Menger, E. von

The genius of their work is

evidenced by its ability to convince economists that a subjective
theory of value would best explain the workings of the market place.
It was, however, with some reluctance that the classical economists
relinquished their "costs of production" theory of value and prices
or exchange value as a measure of welfare.

Jacob Viner charges

Alfred Marshall, among others, with such a reluctance.
In several notable instances economists who have formally
accepted the utility analysis but were not well disposed
toward a calculus in subjective terms have found irksome
its questioning of the validity of objective measurement
of welfare, and by minimizing, on one pretext or another,
the degree of conflict between analysis in utility terms
and analysis in objective terms . . . have succeeded in

^Heilbroner and Thurow, ibid., p. 87.
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reverting to measurement of welfare in terms of price,
while retaining the language and the superficial appea
rances of subjective m easurem ent. 26
The Austrian subjective theory of value, besides successfully
challenging classical economic value theories, withstood a
from another subjective theory:
value."

challenge

B. M. Anderson's theory of "social

Anderson argued against both the classical and the Austrian

schools.
Value as treated by the cost theories, or value as a sum
of money costs, is a blind thing, a product rather than
an end, and fails utterly as a guiding, motivating prin
ciple for economic activity.
It is the merit of the
Austrian School to have pointed this out.
But the
abstract individual factors which the Austrians have
established are just as helpless in explaining the
motivation of social activity.27
Anderson developed a theory where value was seen as a motivating force
embodied in the object of value, not the subject.
value 'stripped for racing':

"Here, then, is

a quantity of motivating force, power

over the actions of a_ m a n , embodied in an object■"

28

At first blush

this appears to be an objective theory of value, but Anderson is care
ful to dispel this notion.

28Jacob Viner, The Long View and the Short (Glencoe, 111.:
Free Press, 1958), p. 201.
^ B . M. Anderson, Jr., Social Value (Boston:
Co., 1911), pp. 198-99.

28Ibid., p. 106.
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What I wish to insist upon is that no implication, either
optimistic or pessimistic, as to the existing social
order, can be drawn from the theory defended in this
.book. Whether or not economic values in particular
cases correspond with ethical values, whether or not
goods are ranked on the basis of their import for the
ultimate welfare of society, and the extent to which
this is the case, will depend on the extent to which
the ethical forces in society prevail over the antiethical
forces.
The theory as such is neutral.29
This passage alone does not make it clear that Anderson's "social
value" is a subjective theory.

Coupled, however, with the following

passage, "social value" is revealed to be subjective, since it merely
replaces the individual with society, as the arbiter of value.
The Austrian theory, and the cost theory . . . all fail
alike to lead us to an ultimate quantity of value . . . .
they abstract the individual mind from its connection
with the social whole . . . this abstraction is necessi
tated by the individualist, subjectivistic conception
of society . . . growing out of the skeptical philosophy
of Hume . . . present day sociology has rejected this
conception of society . . . [making] it possible to treat
society as a whole as the source of the values of goods
30
•
•
•
•
Replacing the individual with society is merely to relocate the sub
jective arbiter in an otherwise subjective theory.

Thus, the short

battle between the Austrian and "social value" schools was not a
battle between subjectivism and objectivism.
In the Austrian defense of subjective value and utility, objec
tive value and utility are defined, more or less, as the physical or
mechanical results from using a good.

29Ibid., p. 196.
30Ibid., pp. 197-98.
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Consider, for example, the following definitions of subjective
and objective value offered by William Smart:
Value, in the subjective sense, we may call, generally,
the importance which a good is considered to possess
with reference to the wellbeing of a person . . . a
good is valuable to me when I consider that my well
being is associated with or dependent on the possession
of it - that it 'avails' towards my wellbeing.
Value, in the objective sense, is a relation of
power or capacity between a good and an objective
result . . . .
Thus while the subjective value of
coal to me is the amount of 'good' I get from the fire,
its objective value is the temperature which it main
tains in the room . . . or the money it brings me if
I sell it . . . .31
His definition of subjective value is quite in keeping with the nor
mal understanding of a subjective theory of valuation.

That is,

something has value only in reference to and determined by the sub
ject (in this case individual) and his well-being or utility.

His

definition of objective value, however, is totally unrelated to
objective value as the philosophical countertype to subjective value.
Thus, rather than defining objective value, for example, as:

"the

importance which a good possess intrinsically as a part of a good
creation," it is defined as some physical characteristic.

To take

objective value out of the ethical realm by defining it as a temp
erature or price is a rather ineffectual way to eliminate the philo
sophical alternative to subjective valuation.

The objective value

33-William Smart, An Introduction to the Theory of Value (London:
Macmillan and Co., 1926), pp. 5-6.
Smart offers no explanation for
why the warmth that the individual gets from the fire is not also an
"objective result" and thus an objective value or, perhaps better,
objective utility.
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or utility of particular things or actions or relationships may or
may not exist, but it cannot be reduced to either individual sub
jective value or temperatures or velocities or whatever.

Defining

away the opposition is always one of the easier but more spurious
ways to fight a battle.
Given Smart’s initial definition of subjective value there are
two logically related definitions of objective value.
pocentric and the other is not.

One is anthro-

An anthropocentric definition of

objective value would read something like:

"Value, in the objective

sense, is the importance which a good possess with reference to the
well-being of a person.

A good is valuable to me when my well-being

is associated with or dependent on the possession of it - that it
avails towards my well-being."

The deletion of the phrase, "I con

sider that," from Smart’s subjective definition, causes it to become
objective although remaining individualistic or anthropocentric.
This definition would accord well with De Roover’s definition of
objective utility.
tive utility.

The individual’s well-being has become an objec

The individual’s well-being has become an objective

notion subject to objective definitions of human well-being which may
or may not agree with an individual's subjective preferences.

In

similar fashion, a nonanthropocentric or stewardship definition of
objective value might read something like:

"Value, in the objective-

stewardship sense, is the importance which a thing possesses with
reference to the well-being of God's creation.

A part of creation

is valuable when it is properly functioning and relating to the rest
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of creation according to its Creator’s good and valuable purposes."
Thus,, we have at least two very different ways for valuing:
tively and objectively.

subjec

How do people value?

The Austrian approach to a theory of value, according to Smart,
is based on analysis of actual human conduct.

"The theory of value,

therefore, must begin with a careful analysis of what the word means
in the mouths of ordinary people."

32

From this analysis Smart dis

tills three things about v a lue.
First, that, in probably the great majority of cases,
the word has some direct or indirect reference to
human life . . . .
Second, that men, as not only imperfect in nature
but erring in judgment, have made an easy extension of
the term "human life" to cover "human desire," . . . .
The economic "want" is not necessarily a rational or a
healthy want - and political economy, as primarily ana
lytic, must not be censured for the statement, nor con
demned as if it approved of the fact - but simply a
want, and the things which satisfy such wants we call
"goods." The desirable is interpreted in economics by
the desired.
Third, that the element of scarcity somehow plays a
large part in many, and seems to have a share in all,
estimates of value.33
Smart offers no empirical evidence to support his supposed careful
analysis from which he claims that "ordinary people" (whoever they
are) by and large exhibit a subjective philosophy of value.

Even if

this were true, it does not follow that those "unordinary people,"
with apparently an objective philosophy of value, do not count as

32Ibid., p. 9.
33Ibid., p. 10.
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worthy of economic investigation and theory.

34

What is more likely,

is that subjective valuation well describes the behavior of indivi
duals choosing between red and green neckties - "the great majority
of cases" - but not between feeding their children and fancier cars,
or between electric can openers and the snail darter as a species.
Furthermore, Smart's subjectivist "conclusions" (assumptions) lead
him to make the dubious statement that in economics, "The desirable
is . . . the desired."

This is only true if value is subjective; it

is certainly false if it is objective.

35

Continuing his analysis, Smart distinguishes between things
valuable and things useful, by noticing that the so-called "free
gifts of nature" are useful, but in their abundance, are not con
sidered valuable.

From this he concludes:

A subjective theory of value is a fundamental presupposition
of neoclassical economics, a well accepted value judgment.
Paul
Heyne commenting on the ethical, normative assumptions necessary
for scientific inquiry says about economists:
"They believe that
the value judgments which enter inevitably into scientific inquiry
are trivial or ones which all serious inquiries hold in common.
But if the claim was ever defensible, it is no longer . . . .
Eco
nomists are accused of doing economics on the basis of analytical
preconceptions that cause them to count as solutions [e.g., subjec
tive valuation] what their critics perceive as problems and that
prevent them from even seeing certain social relationships as in
any sense problematic."
"Economics and Ethics:
The Problem of
Dialogue," in Belief and Ethics, ed. by W. W. Schroeder and Gibson
Winter (Chicago:
CSSR, 1978), p. 186.
■^John Elliott, "Fact, Value, and Economic Policy Objectives,"
Review of Social Economy 38 (April 1980), p. 8, argues, "The good
. . . is not that which w e desire, but that which is desirable, not
that which we prefer, but that which is preferable . . . "
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Evidently Usefulness or Utility is the larger concep
tion of the two, and embraces Value. But if all val-uable things are useful, while all useful things are
not valuable, value must emerge at some particular
limiting point of utility.
Value, then, will be based
on utility - utility, limited in some particular way,
but still utility.
Quoting F. von Wieser, he goes on to conclude:
"Utility and not Value," says Wieser, is "the supreme
principle of all economy; where value and utility come
into conflict, utility must conquer." The statement
is suggestive.
The economic goal of civilization is
to turn the whole natural environment of man from a
relation of hostility or indifference into a relation
of utility.
In similar Austrian fashion, Wieser states:
all the utility which goods afford - amounts in the
last resort to satisfaction of wants, and the opinion
that the value of goods arises from their use may be
more exactly stated by saying that it rests upon the
satisfaction of wants which they furnish.
It is the
satisfaction of wants which, in the first instance,
has value, or "worth" or "importance" to us.
Satis
faction is that which is really desired, and is worthy
of desire;
and, as we do not desire goods for them
selves, but for the satisfaction they give, so do we
value them only for that satisfaction.
The value of
goods is derived from the value of wants . . . .
What
that .Sfgives
value to the satisfaction
....--- it
, is —,
... —
.... “fr'ft*...
itself we shall not here attempt to explain.JO

^^Smart, ibid., p. 12.
37

Ibid., p. 13. Thus does the goal of civilization from the
perspective of a subjective theory of value as utility contrast with
the stewardship goal to cultivate, keep, and replenish a good cre
ation which exists (including ourselves) to glorify God.
^®Friedrich von Wieser, Natural Value, trans. by Christian A.
Mailoch (New York:
G. E. Stechert and Co., 1930), pp. 6-7, emphasis
added.
Thus, by avoiding the question of the value of individual
preference, Wieser avoids the question of ultimately grounding value
in "something which is held to be good or valuable in itself."
William Godfrey-Smith, "The Value of Wilderness," Environmental Ethics
1 (Winter 1979), p. 309.
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Thus, we are to conclude that "ordinary people" do not desire or
value anything, action, or relation because it is good objectively,
but only if it avails the individual's subjective wants.
It is a commonplace that value is not inherent in
things: it is not so well recognized that neither
is utility.
There is nothing "useful" except in
relation to a being who finds it so, but even the
useful is not "of use" if that being has already
enough or too much of it.39
As with Smart, Wieser appeals to the supposed "commonplace" knowledge
that

people do not recognize value in creation objectively, but

in reference to human satisfaction.

only

This is a rather obvious method

ological ploy to give the impression that "ordinary people" have
indeed been analyzed to find out how they make valuations.

What is

actually being done is to define "ordinary people" as those who value
subjectively and "extraordinary people" (non-existent?) as those who
perhaps value objectively or both.
Is it extraordinary for an individual to believe that other
individuals are valuable, worthy and important parts of creation
apart from our individual desires for satisfaction or utility?

Is

it not a commonplace that value is intrinsic in human beings; that
they are objectively valuable as mere human beings irrespective of
their usefulness in satisfying another's subjective desires?

Is it

not ordinary to affirm this philosophical-theological view of human
beings and extraordinary to deny it?

39

Ibid., p. vii.
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Are human beings the only things in creation that violate
Wieser's statement:
is

"value is not inherent in things . . . .

There

nothing 'useful* except in relation to a being who finds it so?"

A theory of stewardship answers no.

The recognition of objective

value in creation is an affirmation that things have ultimate value
in relation to their Creator and to their purposes for existence.

In

the words of Charles Hartshorne:
My religious faith is in a God who takes delight in the
creation. Moreover, I hold that the ultimate value of
human life, or of anything else, consists entirely in
the contribution it makes to the divine life. Whatever
importance we, and those we can help or harm, have is
without residue measured by and consists in the delight
God takes in our existence . . . .
And I say that, while rational animals make a special
contribution to the Summum Bonum, every creature makes
some contribution, however humble it may be.^®
This specifically biblical-stewardship view of objective valu
ation is not the only basis upon which people ground their objective
views of valuation.

"Environmental ethics" has arisen as a speciality

within ethical philosophy as an effort to examine and articulate the
valuation of nature and to affect environmental policy.

Environmental

ethicists are not, perhaps needless to say, in complete agreement on
the subjective-objective nature of valuation, nor is it likely that
they ever will b e . ^

This should not be surprising, however, since

^ C h a r l e s H. Hartshorne, "The Rights of the Subhuman World,"
Environmental Ethics 1 (Spring 1979), pp. 49-50.
^ B y the same token, it is unlikely that "ordinary people" will
ever be in complete agreement about subjective versus objective
values, regardless of the Austrian assertions to the contrary.
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the subject matter is about fundamental presuppositions about the
nature of man and the nature of nature.

But absolute agreement is a

false goal; the basic function of both environmental ethics and
stewardship (religious and non-religious) is to show the relevance
of an objective theory of value for our political and economic actions
in nature.

A theory of objective value shows, as we will see, that

economic conclusions about "optimal" natural resource allocation, and
property rights assignments based on the criterion of Pareto optimal
ity (economic efficiency) are only true in a world of subjective v a l u e .
Pareto optimal allocation of resources in creation is not necessarily
the correct, or best solution and can be part of the problem.

STEWARDSHIP VERSUS PARETO OPTIMALITY
Is a Pareto optimal allocation of natural resources an optimal
allocation in light of a theory of stewardship?

Is economic effi

ciency, defined in subjective terms, a good criterion when judged by
objective terms?

hi

In other words, would a theory of stewardship

agree that competitive markets, which allocate natural resources
/ O

According to Edwin G. Dolan, Basic Economics, 2nd ed.,
(Hinsdale, 111.: The Dryden Press, 1980), p. 15, "Most economists
think that efficiency itself is a good thing." If this is true then
all the worse for most economists, because the bare concept of effi
ciency is valueless, it is neither good nor bad.
Efficiency takes
on value only in reference to the value of the end which is to be
efficiently accomplished.
Efficiency is a good "thing" if the end
is a good thing and efficiency is a bag "thing" if the end is bad.
The efficient killing of Jews in a gas chamber is not better than
the inefficient method of shooting them even if most economists think
efficiency itself is a good thing.
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among competitng uses according to individual subjective valuations,
is an optimal, good way to manage creation?

To answer these ques

tions let us begin by analyzing the subjective foundations of Pareto
optimality and economic efficiency.

For, as we will see, it is their

subjective view of value that stewardship rejects.
A Pareto optimal, economically efficient change is one where at
least one individual is made better off and no other individual is
made worse off.

This criterion for a welfare improvement may appear

unassailable to the subjective moral relativist, except, of course,
for questions of equity and justice of the resulting distribution.
But, the subjectivist argues, if we assume these other values are
adequately handled by the various social, political institutions how
could one possibly disagree that a Pareto optimal change is not a
good thing?

Recall the words of Freeman, Haveman, and Kneese, from

Chapter 2:
If these conditions [equitable distribution] hold, it
can be said that the competitive market system yields
the best possible allocation of resources.
It achieves
this optimum because it does the best that can be done
with a given technology, resource endowment, set of
tastes and preferences, and that particular distribution
of resource ownership and its associated distribution
of income that society has chosen through an effective
political mechanism.
Also recall the words of Seneca and Taussig:
Efficiency is a deceptively simple and attractive objec
tive for government economic policy. Who can oppose
the principle that more of every good for everybody
is desirable.
Economists are careful to point out,

4%reeman, Haveman, Kneese, ibid., p. 70.
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of course, that greater efficiency in the Pareto Opti
mum sense means only that more of everything is poten
tially available for everybody . . . . ^
A theory of stewardship has no quarrel with the logic and analytics
used to reason from the subjective premises (explicit and implicit)
to the conclusion that competitive markets yield a Pareto outcome
(assuming no third party problems).

Stewardship does not, however,

accept the subjective premises as true, and consequently rejects the
notion that Pareto optimality - the outcome of competitive resource
markets - is the best or optimal allocation of resources.
For the subjective theorist it is good to allocate resources
according to the "given . . . set of tastes and preferences." This
is the subjective definition of good.

The good is determined sub

jectively by each individual according to tastes and preferences.
Thus, for subjectivism it is only logical to say that a Pareto or
4.
competitive market allocation is the best (meaning good) allocation.
As we learned in Chapter 2, the careful, consistent, positive econo
mists (e.g., Robbins, tfyint, and Graaff) avoid labeling Pareto opti
mality as economic efficiency or good or best.

If, however, Dolan is

correct that "Host economists think that efficiency itself is a good

^ S eneca, Taussig, ibid., p. 114.
Efficiency is deceptive,
but it is anything but simple and attractive - in its subjectivist
guise - to stewardship. Moreover, Seneca and Taussig add to the
deceptiveness of efficiency by equating it with Pareto optimality.
^ W e are granting the assumption of equitable distribution.
And
therefore "best" allocation means better than any other allocation
with the same equitable distribution assumed.
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thing,

then these economists have accepted subjectivism as their

underlying theory of value.

It should be reiterated that only with

some.underlying theory of value can the Pareto criterion (and effi
ciency) be a criterion of value, that is, a criterion of better or
worse, or welfare or welfare improvement.

Without a theory of value

the Pareto "criterion" is not a criterion of anything, it is merely
an inconclusive outcome.

For as Jfyint has said:

. . . welfare analysis need not involve any normative
value judgments so long as we take the wants of the
individuals to be given and constant and confine our
study to the purely mechanical efficiency of the eco
nomic system in satisfying these given wants. At this
pure subjective level of analysis our propositions are
logically as stringent as those of price economics.
But, since we stop short at this neutral concept of
mechanical efficiency, we are still on an intermediate
plane or discourse and although our prepositions deal
with quantities of satisfaction they are in some ways
still as inconclusive as those at the physical level
as a guide to practical action.
Thus when we have
demonstrated that a particular pattern of allocating
the resources satisfies the given wants better than
others, this does not amount to a categorical imper
ative that this pattern ought to be adopted.
To obtain
that we need a further premise, viz. that these given
wants are of the same ethical quality of goodness.
It
is easy to make the mistake of slipping this premise
implicitly into the argument . . . .47
Myint refers to this analysis as "welfare analysis" of the given
wants of individuals, and yet without a theory of value (subjective,
or objective) the word ,lwelfare" has no meaning.

In his own words,

"Since we stop short at this neutral concept of mechanical efficiency

^ S e e footnote 42 above.
^Myint,

ibid., pp. 198-99.
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. . . our propositions . . . are in some ways still as inconclusive
as those at the physical level as a guide to practical action."

Note

carefully, that this inconclusiveness is not due to other contending
values (e.g. equity, etc.) which must also be considered.

The propo

sitions are inconclusive because without a definition of welfare, a
proposition which is supposed to describe an increase in welfare is
meaningless.

Without a theory of value,

(or as Myint says, "norma

tive value judgments" to define welfare, and thus Pareto optimality
as a welfare criterion) Pareto optimality is a criterion of something,
but we have no idea what.

Positive economic analysis of welfare is

possible, but only after welfare is defined according to some theory
of value.

Pareto optimality, apart from a theory of value, is at

best a meaningless combination of words and at worse an outcome which
merely satisfies the preferences of Vilfredo Pareto or the person
advocating them.
It would seem that Dolan is correct:

that most economists think

that economic efficiency and Pareto optimality mean something and use
these terms to meaningfully differentiate between policies as better
or worse.

That is, a theory of value is being assumed, whether or not

it is made explicit.

As Myint has shown, one can "take the wants of

the individuals as given," and one can show that "a particular pattern
of allocating the resources satisfies the given wants better than
others," but it takes a theory of value concerning the goodness or
badness of those subjective wants and the relevance of objective value
to pronounce one pattern optimal.

Indeed, it would require the
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subjective theory:

that individual preferences, each and every one,

are good (valuable), in order to say that the competitive market allo
cation of resources is the optimum.

This is exactly what Little is

presuming when he says that "an individual is better off if he is in
a chosen position."^8

Little goes on to say that,

If welfare economics is found to be useless, it is not
because there is anything shifty about the philosophical
or logical foundations. We claim to have stated the
required postulates in a clear, precise manner.
It
only remains to accept or reject them.^9
Little is to be commended for his clarity, precision and honesty.
Biblical stewardship, however, does not accept his subjective theory
of value nor the conclusion that competitive markets yield an optimum
allocation.

Neither the individual, nor the community, nor the rest

of creation is necessarily better off because the individual is in a
chosen position; but only if he has chosen the good and avoided the
evil.

Individual preferences do not define and determine what is

objectively good and valuable, rather they are to be judged by what
is objectively good and valuable.

Objective value, based on biblical

principles, derives not from individual subjective preferences, but
from the objective, purposes of the Creator for creation.

Satisfac

tion of individual subjective preferences is not the criterion of
value, but rather the purposive relationships, functions and activi
ties established by God.

To choose the good, stewardship argues, is

48Little, ibid., p. 124.
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to choose according to God's creational purposes.

Furthermore, the

good is an inclusive concept, it does not only include human rela
tionships, but includes all creational or creaturely relationships.
In such a world of purposive, valuable relationships, Pareto opti
mality palls in comparison.

In a creation, which is good and valued

by its Creator, subjective valuation is denied its claim as the
ultimate arbiter of value.

Thus, "subjective economic efficiency"

and Pareto optimality are restricted to involving truly indifferent,
innocuous tastes and preferences, that is, choices between green and
red neckties and between chocolate and vanilla ice cream cones, etc.
The conclusion to restrict economic efficiency is also reached
by Talbot Page."*^

He has done a more technical than philosophical

analysis of the subjective valuations of the present value criterion
as it applies to the intertemporal allocation of natural resources.
He contrasts the present value criterion which allows individuals
to discount future costs and benefits by their rates of time pref
erence with a so-called conservation criterion which discounts by
the marginal productivity rate of the resource or of the whole
economy depending on the situation.

About these two criteria he

concludes:
The conservation criterion functions at the macroeconomic level establishing a context for markets;

"^Talbot Page, Conservation and Economic Efficiency, published
for Resources for the Future (Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins Uni
versity Press, 1977).
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the present value criterion functions at the microeconomic level of market efficiency.
For policy
analysis and prescription both levels are needed.
The context which the conservation criterion is to establish is
future livability; a sustainable allocation of resources which pro
tects against the elimination of so-called essential resources without which human survival would be impossible.

52

Practically this

means that market allocation of essential resources would be somehow
controlled to ensure a sustainable allocation.

Within this restricted

market context the present value criterion as exemplified or mimicked
by efficient markets is the appropriate criterion for the valuation
of all other resources.

Thus, the conservation criterion- with future

livability as its objective social goal - calls for limits on the use
of essential resources even though this violates the economic effi
ciency goal of the present value criterion.

This result, as Page

notes, is often although erroneously criticized.
The conservation criterion, or at least, its more ordi
nary manifestation as a sustainable yield criterion,
is often criticized on the grounds that it does not
maximize the present value of the yield's benefits.
This reasoning is surely wrong.
It is no more appro
priate to conclude that the sustainable yield criterion
is invalid because it does not satisfy the present value
criterion than it is appropriate to conclude that the
present value criterion is invalid because it does not
satisfy the sustainable yield criterion.
One cannot
use one criterion to bludgeon another.
They are on

5lIbid., p. 205.
52

Page does not enter the debate about the existence of essen
tial resources. Rather, his analysis assumes that such resources do
exist and proceeds to address the question of whether or not markets
would exhaust themD
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the same logical level.
The most one can say at this
point is that the two criterion conflict; they imply
different states of the world.^3
In reconciling the two conflicting criteria, Page has drawn the con
clusion that only the non-essential resources may be allocated by the
present value criterion whereas resources deemed essential for the
goal of a sustainable future need to be allocated by the conservation
criterion.

The goal of the present value criterion is to maximize

the subjective values of the present generation whereas the goal of
the conservation criterion is to keep the resource base intact for
the present and future generations.

The latter goal requires that

essential resources be treated differently, that they be allocated
on a sustainable yield basis apart from pure market allocations.
These conclusions are not fully shared by economists so it is all the
more important to understand how they have been derived.
As was noted above, Page does not attempt to demonstrate that
essential resources exist.

Rather, he notes that this is a widely,

albeit not completely, accepted belief of so-called conservationists
who have a reasonable, if not full proof, basis for their beliefs,
and therefore assumes it to be true.

Given this assumption he pro

ceeds to analyze the question of interest:

is economic efficiency

an adequate criterion to guarantee that essential resources will not
be exhausted?

The present value criterion is employed as a reasonable

model of the criterion of economic efficiency since the two criteria

53page, ibid., p. 188.
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are closely related.

The efficiency criterion is used to evaluate

specific projects and particular markets in the short run and the
present value criterion is used to evaluate both specific projects
and projects on a macro level and also over short or long time spans.
The connection between the two criteria,
is that for each distribution of market power in the
present and implied intertemporal allocation of resource
usage, there exists a social welfare function and dis
count rate such that maximization of the present value
of this social welfare function under this discount rate
leads to the same allocation of resource usage as given
under the efficiency criterion.
This is the sense of
the statement that the present value criterion tends,
more or less, to mimic what the market automatically
does.
In this sense the present value criterion is an
intertemporal version of the efficiency criterion.^
The next step in setting up a model for the analysis is to
simplify the present generation’s decision making process about both
the intragenerational allocation and intergenerational distribution
of resources.

This is accomplished by collapsing the present gene

ration into one individual, Robinson Crusoe.

This model is then

used to determine the results of discounting Crusoe’s future under
two different resource situations.

In the first case, Crusoe is

cast upon an island with only a supply of corn which he may eat or
plant.

In the second case, Crusoe is less fortunate, he has only

a large supply of hard tack.
In the first case, if Crusoe does not discount the future (i.e.,
the discount rate is zero) then he will arrange his planting and

54Ibid., p. 163.
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consumption so that he eats little in the early years and gluttonously
in the later ones.

If, on the other hand, he discounts the future by

some positive rate then his consumption will be more egalitarian.
Moreover, if he discounts by the productivity rate of the corn then
his consumption would be completely egalitarian.

This final possi

bility provides Page with the concept of intergenerational justice
as egalitarian consumption and with the criterion that we discount

55

by the rate of marginal productivity of the economy.’

In the second situation, if the initial stock of hardtack is
large enough then Crusoe will be spared the difficult decision of
when he is going to starve to death.

Assuming this is the case, if

Crusoe discounts by his time preference (assumed positive) then he
will eat well in the early years and at a subsistence level in his
final year (assumed to be known).

If, on the other hand, he discounts

by the productivity rate, which is zero, he will follow an egalitarian
consumption pattern eating the same amount each year.

Page notes

that in this extreme "hardtack economy" it is impossible for market
forces to bring the rate of productivity (zero) into equality with
normally positive rates of time preference.

The implication

is

that present generations, if allowed to discount resources according
to their rates of time preference, will fare well but future gene
rations will experience, at best, subsistence levels of consumption.

55Ibid., p. 154.
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In these simplified models each generation is collapsed into a
single individual, Crusoe, with the succeeding generation being Crusoe
one year later.

These models allow Page to ignore the intragenera-

tional distribution questions which Crusoe, a single individual, does
not face and to focus on the Intertemporal decision.

Page argues

that if we are willing to accept, as a formal solution to this
decision, the scheme of aggregating discounted utility streams then,
We now have three possible candidates for an individual's
definition of the 'discount rate':
the rate at which he
would loan money or some other commodity, the productivity
of the economy, or his 'pure time preference' (his comparison of the worth of future utility in terms of present
utility).
If our desire is to be egalitarian over time
in terms of a total measure of well-being, the above
examples tell us that the proper discount rate is the
rate of marginal productivity of the econom y. 56
Page's conclusion is based on the result that in the corn (renewable)
economy not to discount

(i.e., discount rate is zero) means that the

present generation would live at a subsistence level so that future
generations could live gluttonously.

And to discount by time pref

erence would be egalitarian only if it happened to equal the produc
tivity rate.

Whereas, discounting by the productivity rate produces

an egalitarian allocation which, however naive it might be, is one
possible definition of intergenerational fairness.

Finally, in a

hard tack economy to discount by the rate of productivity (zero) is
the same thing as not discounting future generations.

This results

in an egalitarian consumption path, but it remains to determine the
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level of consumption and thus the finite number of future generations
that will exist.

The higher the level of consumption above subsis

tence the fewer generations that will exist.
Crusoe deciding when he will starve to death.

This is equivalent to
(Page does not mention

this latter situation possibly because he does not believe the world
is fully a hard

tack economy.)

57

Page continues the analysis by considering the objection that
the present generation may have as one of its preferences the exis
tence of future generations and therefore its discounted allocation
of resource would provide for the future.

Making the usual assump

tion of separable utility functions he shows that indeed the more
(less) altruistic the present generation the better (worse) off are
future generations.

In fact, if the present generation is completely

selfless the discount rate is zero and the future is very well-off
indeed.

At the other extreme, if the present generation decides

that provision for future generations gives them no satisfaction then
the future is entirely cut off.

58

In all these cases the common

element is that the present generation determines the allocation
according to its subjective valuations.

The future is provided for

only to the extent that the present is satisfied from contemplating
such a future.

This version of the present value criterion Page

equates with the actual working of markets wherein future costs and

57Ibid., p. 149-54.

58Ibid., p. 159-61.
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benefits are discounted by the present generation’s time preference
(and also weighted by the distribution of dollar votes).

In con

trast. to this version with its sovereignty of the present Page offers
the concept of "disinterested fairness."

In this version the welfares

of future generations are aggregated and weighted (discounted) by the
rate of marginal productivity of the economy.

Thuss the higher the

rate (assuming it is positive) the higher the level of consumption
possible for the present and all future generations and vice versa.

59

These two versions of the present value criterion would, of course,
become equivalent if the rates of time preference and marginal pro
ductivity were equal.

This might happen by coincidence but, Page

argues, it would not happen systematically.
Thus we have two interpretations for the present value
criterion, with the important difference that for one
the discount factor measures the time preference of the
first generation and for the other the discount factor
measures the economy’s productivity.
In the actual
world these two interpretations do not boil down to
the same thing, for a wedge may be driven between the
rates of time preference and productivity. Moreover,
there will be differences between the interpretations
59

An interesting possibility for investigation is that the mar
ginal rate of productivity is negative.
The work of Georgescu-Roegen
would seem to suggest that if productivity is broadly defined in
entropy terms then it is negative.
Consider his statement quoted
earlier:
"Economists are fond of saying that we cannot get something
for nothing.
The Entropy Law teaches us that the rule of biological
life and, in m a n ’s case, of its economic continuation is far harsher.
In entropy terms, the cost of any biological or economic enterprise
is always greater than the product.
In entropy terms, any such
activity necessarily results in a deficit." Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen,
Energy and Economic Myths (New York:
Pergamon Press, 1976), p. 55.
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as the rates of time preference and productivity change
over time.
In the final stage of the analysis. Page attempts to reconcile
these two conflicting criteria by arguing that each is appropriate
but in different situations, for different social goals.

If one of

our social goals is permanent livability then the present value cri
terion needs to be restricted within the context of a sustainable
yield allocation of essential resources.

The conservation criterion

thus needs to be used to establish (as best as possible) the context
of permanent livability by limiting the rate of depletion and pollu
tion of essential resources to a sustainable y i e l d . ^
Page's analysis of the present value and conservation criteria
represents an analysis with conclusions similar to those presented
in my analysis of subjective and objective valuation.

Given the

assumption of essential resources Page concludes that markets which
mimic the present value criterion do not guarantee future livability.
Future livability serves as a good example of an objective valuation
of resources and one that is not guaranteed by the subjective val
uations of resources in free markets.

Future livability, in Page’s

work, is limited to the human specie but it need not be.

^Page,

62

ibid., p. 162.

^ P a g e proposes severance taxes as the best mechanism to estab
lish a sustainable yield allocation of essential resources. Whether
or not this mechanism is the best or will even work is subject to
debate, but is not important for the purposes of this dissertation.
62

The general question of species extinction as a problem of
subjective versus objective valuation is discussed in Chapter 5.
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Nevertheless, it serves as one example of the implications for a
neoclassical economic theory rooted in a subjective theory of value.
A theory of stewardship not only restricts the efficiency cri
terion, it also expands the concept of welfare economics from its
singular focus on human beings to encompass all of creation.
wardship is concerned with human and non-human welfare.
is called to be a caretaker of all of creation.

Ste

The steward

This means, among

other things, that the steward is not an allocator of a given
"resource endowment," and a given "distribution of resource owner
ship" with its given system of property rights.

One of the more

subtle and pervasive assumptions of neoclassical natural resource
economic theory is that it knows what natural resources are.

For

the neoclassical economist natural resources seem to be determined
by eyesight; "everyone knows what a tree looks like."

For the

steward, however, labeling parts of creation as natural resources
for human production and consumption, and other parts as "protec
ted," and determining the appropriate property rights for their
management requires much more than good eyesight.

PROPERTY RIGHTS
The relatively new economic theory of property rights is an
attempt to use the neoclassical economic methodology to both explain
and guide the development of the legal-economic institution of
property rights.

In general, property rights theorists have retained

the perspective of subjective individualism with its assumption of
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utility maximizing behavior motivated by self-interest, and thus
ignore, for example, "satisficing" behavior and objective valuation.
The basic goal of the property rights approach is to expand the
neoclassical model into the legal arena and show that the develop
ment of property rights can be made endogenous to the economic model
of individual subjective utility maximization.

In the words of Eirik

Furubotn and Svetozar Pejovich:
Can the logic of economics explain the development of
property rights? Is the development of property rights
determined endogenously within the economic system?
Does the creation and specification of property rights
take place in response to the desire of individual
decision-makers for more u t i l i t y ? ^
To a reader uninitiated to the ambiguous, all-inclusive concept of
utility, this passage might suggest the necessity of a rather sub
stantial empirical undertaking.

Such an impression would be wrong.

The property rights approach is purely deductive and given the ency
clopedic understanding of utility it is fairly simple to deduce that
the answer to the above question is "yes."

Thus, with their all

encompassing notion of utility and using deductive logic, Furubotn

Eirik G. Furubotn and Svetozar Pejovich, eds., The Economics
of Property Rights (Cambridge, Mass.:
Ballinger Publishing Co.,
1974), pp. 7-8. Also see their article "Property Rights and Eco
nomic Theory:
A Survey of Recent Literature," Journal of Economic
Literature 10 (December 1972), p. 1157, where the authors identify
one of the characteristic features of the property rights literature
as, "confidence that the market logic can be applied fruitfully to
a very great range of practical problems.
Thus, the focus of dis
cussion is on economic efficiency and the conditions under which
markets should be, or should not be, extended into new areas."
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and Pejovich summarize the economic theory of endogenous property
rights:
Assuming that individuals or groups in society are
motivated by self-interest and seek constantly to
increase their utility levels, they will, presumably,
try to exclude others from exploiting an existing good
whenever it appears advantageous to do so. That is,
whenever their own expected benefits appear to exceed
the expected costs of defining, negotiating, policing,
and enforcing the "claim." Of course, to exclude some
people from the free access to a good means to specify
property rights in that good . . . .
Thus, new property
rights are created, and existing ones are changed because
certain individuals and groups believe it profitable to
restructure the system and are willing to bear the costs
of bringing about such change.53In similar fashion, H. Demsetz says,
It is my thesis . . . that the emergence of new property
rights takes place in response to the desires of the
interacting persons for adjustment to new benefit-cost
possibilities . . . . property rights develop to inter
nalize externalities when the gains of internalization
become larger than the costs of internalization.^
He goes on to add something of a disclaimer, however, when he
says,
I do not mean to assert or deny that the adjustments in
property rights which take place need to be the result
of a conscious endeavor to cope with new externality
problems.

■^Furubotn and Pejovich, The Economics of Property Rights, p.
C O

H. Demsetz, "Toward a Theory of Property Rights," in The
Economics of Property Rights, ed. by E. Furubotn and S. Pejovich
(Cambridge, Mass.:
Ballinger Publishing Co., 1974), p. 34.

53t1
.,
Ibid.
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This statement is clear enough, but he doesn't stop here.

He adds

the following comment which seems to question the subjective utility
maximizing hypothesis, albeit rather weakly:
These adjustments have arisen in Western societies
largely as a result of gradual changes in social
mores and in common law precedents . . . .
These
legal and moral experiments may be hit-and-miss pro
cedures to some extent but in a society that weights
the achievement of efficiency heavily, their viability
in the long run will depend on how well they modify
behavior to accommodate to the externalities asso
ciated with important changes in technology or market
values.54
Although Demsetz makes a slight recognition of values other
than unhampered exchange, he ultimately declares that efficiency that

persuasive and deceptive word - to be the overriding concern of

our society.

Consequently, he feels

justified in concluding that

property rights are overwhelmingly determined by the desire for
efficiency.

This problematic conclusion, apparently perceived by

property rights theorists as a logical deduction, becomes an unde
fended norm in such boldly normative statements as:
Economists have to offer a testable theory of the
development of property rights.
Ideally, such a
theory will throw light on the linkages between the
system of laws and economic decisions and, in this
way, contribute to the establishment of an institu
tional environment favorable to efficiency and
progress. 55
J

55

Furubotn and Pejovich, The Economics of Property Rights, p. 7.
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With efficiency as its criterion, the new theory requires that
well.defined and exchangeable property rights be established.

In

those situations where property rights cannot be clearly defined,
the normative goal is to mimic the efficiency of the market's sub
jective valuation and allocation by regulating to achieve maximum
real income.

Recall the passage by Coase, for example,

The aim of such regulation should not be to eliminate
smoke pollution but rather to secure the optimum
amount of smoke pollution; this being the amount
which will maximize the value of production.56
The fundamental weakness of the new economic theory of property
rights is its assumption that the institution of property rights
arises and changes in response to individuals trying to maximize
their subjective utility.

Moreover, even if this assumption were

found to be empirically true, it does not logically follow that that
is what ought to determine a system of property rights.

In other

words, to advocate Pareto optimality or maximum value (subjective)
of production as the criterion for establishing a system of property
rights requires an explicit normative defense of individual subjec
tive valuation.

Although Furubotn, Pejovich and Demsetz do not pro

vide such a defense, others have.

Demsetz's reference to the

"hit-and-miss" legal and moral procedures is hardly indicative of the
vast body of literature and long standing debate over the justifi
cation of property rights.

~^Coase, ibid., p. 42.

122

The subjective-individualist theory of property rights, as
defended by Murray Rothbard, for example, depends on the truth of
two premises:
(a) the absolute property right of each individual in
his own person, his own body:
this may be called the
right of selfownership; and (b) the absolute right in
material property of the person who finds an unused
material resources and . . . occupies or transforms
that resource by the use of his personal energy . . .
called the homestead principle . . . .57
He defends the premise of right of self-ownership by arguing
that no valid alternative exists.
There are only two alternatives:
either (1) a certain
class of people, A, have the right to own another class,
B; or (2) everyone has the right to own his equal quotal
share of everyone else.
The first alternative implies
that while Class A deserves the right of being human,
Class B is in reality subhuman and therefore deserves no
such rights.
But since they are indeed human beings, the
first alternative contradicts itself . . . . [concerning
the second alternative] in practice, any attempt at com
munist society will automatically become class rule, and
we would be back at our rejected first a l t e r n a t i v e . 58
At first glance this defense appears sound, but there is a defect in
Rothbard's argument.

There is a missing third alternative.

A ste

wardship theory of property rights would contend that only God has
absolute property rights.

Individuals have limited, conditional

property rights, even including one’s rights over self.
57

Individuals

Murray N. Rothbard, "Justice and Property Rights," in
Property in a Humane Economy, ed. by Samuel L. Blumenfeld (LaSalle,
111.:
Open Court Publishing Co., 1974), p. 106.
CO

Ibid., pp. 107-8.
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have the rights of a steward not an owner.

Although Rothbard does

not deal with this third alternative, F. A. Harper, another defender
of a subjective-individualist theory does.
Harper acknowledges the biblical view of G o d ’s absolute owner
ship expressed by passages such as:

"For all the earth is mine

(Ex. 19:5);" and "The earth is the Lord’s, and the fullness thereof;
the world and they that dwell therein (Ps. 24:1)."

59

These notions,

however, are quickly dismissed by Harper as not pertinent to the ques
tion of property rights in the "here and now."
Important as are these underlying religious questions
about creation, it seems to me they are not necessarily
involved in our consideration of property and ownership
among persons on earth for the duration.
The problem
of those other matters are of another dimension. Whether
one be a devout atheist or a devout patron of a faith
that considers all to belong to the Creator and that
therefore nothing in that sense belong to mortal man,
he must face the same problem of how we shall deal with
one another here and now while the show of earthly life
is in process; how shall we resolve these problems as
they arise? Neither the religious nor the secular view
would seem to necessitate giving any property privilege
to one person that is denied to another. ®
Regardless of "how it seems" to Harper, the absolute ownership by God
and conditional stewardship by humans are not matters of "another
dimension."

The problems of "how we shall deal with one another

here and now," and how we shall manage and care for the rest of cre
ation "for the duration," are radically dependent on religious and
CQ

F. A. Harper, "Property and Its Primary Form," in Property in
a Humane Economy, ed. by Samuel L. Blumenfeld (LaSalle, 111.:
Open
Court Publishing Co., 1974), p. 16.

60-.,
Ibid.
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moral presuppositions.

The subjectivist and objectivist, of course,

"face the same problem of how we shall deal with one another here and
now;" but, because of different presuppositions about value, creation,
and the nature of the good, they come to different conclusions.

Ste

wardship presuppositions and conclusions relate to the here and now,
not some other dimension as Harper would have us believe.
Harper continues his "argument" against the relevancy of biblical
principles by dragging in a familiar red herring:

the question of

dictating values.
If the view is held that all belongs to the Creator, for
instance, and that it cannot belong exclusively to you
as an individual, such a limitation of your powers of
ownership of created property would hardly give you a
license to dictate to other human beings what they may
or may not use during their lives; or what they may or
i
their claim on property at the time of

Whether or not this is true, it is irrelevant; the political-philoso
phical question of a justification for dictatorial pronouncements is
not the issue.

Harper, however, concludes, on the basis of one red

herring and his confused idea of "another dimension," that biblical
principles of stewardship are ruled out as a justification for limited
property rights.
So for the purpose of our present discussion, I would
prefer to avoid completely this interesting theological
question.
And if someone should contend that all cre
ation belongs to the Creator, and that we function only

^Ibid., pp. 16-17.
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as His tenants, perhaps we can at least speak of property
and ownership as being at a lower - but real - level of
dealings of persons with one another . . . .
We could
then go on with our discussion of the problem, using
terms for a common problem that faces atheists and
religious members of our earthly society alike.^2
And what is the conclusion of "our present discussion" now that
the "religious members" supposedly have been convinced that their
"interesting theological question" is not relevant to the justifica
tion of individual property rights at a "lower-but-real-level?"
Not surprisingly, Harper concludes with the secular position:
the individual, rather than God, is the absolute owner.
The primary object of property and ownership which ante
dates all others and is superior to all others in its
importance is self. It seems to me that all other items
are secondary to this . . . .
The origin of
all economic property and claimsto
ownership, then,
is to be found in self-ownership of
persons and thence on to derived and valid claims to
all other forms of property.
He acquires these other
things, in part, by using his own labor to "create"
^
something from the tools made available to us by Creation.
Contrary to this secular, individualist theory which reasons
that ownership determines and validates use of property, a steward
ship theory reasons in the exact reverse direction.
property determines valid stewardship.

Proper use of

This biblical direction of

reasoning is also found to predominate in the thinking
with few exceptions.

of theChurch

A. J. Carlyle finds this line ofreasoning in

St. Augustine:

62Ibid., p. 17.
63Ibid., pp. 19, 21.
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. . . he maintains that the right of property is limited
by the use to which it is put, a man who does not use his
property rightly has no real or valid claim to it.64
Carlyle also notes the similar reasoning of St. Thomas on the relative
rights of individuals:
private rights cannot override the common right of man
kind to the necessaries of life . . . . temporal pos
sessions are indeed private as regards ownership, but
not as regards their use: as regards use, so far as
they are superfluities, they belong to others who have
need of t h e m . 6 5
In addition, H. G. Wood finds a similar view in the non-Puritan groups
of the Reformation and the Evangelical Revival of the 18th and 19th
centuries:
only a good use of property confers a moral right to it,
and . . . this moral right is deeper than any legal right,
is indeed the standard by which any legal right may be
questioned or revised.66
And finally, Carl F. H. Henry argues that property rights derive
neither from the individual nor from the state.
Private property . . . is not an institution to be
authorized by the state but an inalienable right
divinely conferred upon mankind . . . .
The Church
has no mandate to impose spiritual imperatives . . . .
But the Church is obliged to proclaim those revealed

*^A. J. Carlyle, "The Theory of Property in Mediaeval Theology,"
in Property:
Its Duties and Rights, 3rd ed. (New York: Macmillan Co.,
1922), p. 131.
^ I b i d . , p. 1 37.
^ H . G. Wood, "The Influence of the Reformation on Ideas Con
cerning Wealth and Property," in Property:
Its Duties and Rights,
p. 175.
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principles which government must promote and men must
observe for the sake of a just society . ^
The Church, and others, have indeed spoken out on proper prin
ciples and our legal institution of property rights does exhibit
limitations on individual property rights for the sake of a just
society.

One such limitation which directly affects the so-called

right of self-ownership is that individuals are not allowed to sell
themselves or their children into slavery.

Besides this single

example, there is the broad area of limitations on individual prop
erty rights commonly called the "police powers" of the state which
are exerted for the "health, safety, and well-being of the people."00
The governing principle of the police power of the state (compen
sation not compelled) in contrast to a "taking" by the state (com
pensation compelled) is found in the following statement by the
Supreme Court (1876):
Property does become clothed with a public interest when
used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and
affect the community at large. When, therefore, one
devotes his property to a use in which the public has
an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an
interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled
by the public for the common good, to the extent of the
interest he has thus created.
He may withdraw his grant
67

Carl F. H. Henry, "Christian Perspective on Private Property,"
in Property in a Humane Economy, ed. by Samuel L. Blumenfeld (LaSalle,
111.: Open Court Publishing Co., 1974), p. 28.

68

Thomas James Norton, The Constitution of the United States
(New York:
Committee for Constitutional Government, 1943), p. 95.

by discontinuing the use; but, so long as he maintains
the use he must submit to the control.69
These few examples of existing limitations on individual property
rights are not meant to demonstrate that our legal institution of
property rights is based on a theory of stewardship.

They are,

however, meant to show that individual property rights are not
conceived as absolute but limited.

CONCLUSION
The differences between subjective and objective theories of value
are substantial.

The subjective theory of neoclassical economics

locates the source of value in the individual's tastes and pref
erences; that which is valuable is that which satisfies the individ
ual's desires.

In contrast, a stewardship theory presupposes an

objective theory of value.

A biblically based stewardship theory

would locate the source of value in an objectively good creation as
created and sustained by God.
It was argued that the objective value of creation is not an
unknowable entity.

Quite the contrary, the biblical theory of human

kind as stewards presupposes our capability to discern good and proper
functions, relations and uses of creation.

The theory argues, more

over, that at least the basic principles for proper stewardship are
revealed in the Hebrew-Christian Scriptures.

It remains the theologi

cal and philosophical task of mankind to flesh out a more distinct
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theory and ethic of stewardship; to identify the proper functions and
uses of creation; to balance conflicting objective values.

In short,

to exercise creaturely dominion over creation.
How well have we done; how well has economic theory done?

It

is the contention of this dissertation that the subjective theory of
value of neoclassical economics is neither compatible with nor condu
cive to the development of an objective theory of stewardship.

In

addition, it is contended that absolute, unattenuated property rights
do not provide for stewardship, but rather as we learn to exercise
proper dominion we will put limits on our property rights as we
already have on our personal and social relationships.
Stewardship does not agree that values are only subjective; that
they are reducible to personal preferences.

Consequently, it rejects

Pareto optimality as a sufficient or necessary criterion for the best
allocation of natural resources.

Nor does it accept the related

conclusion that natural resources will be optimally allocated when
individuals have well defined and exchangeable property rights.
Stewardship thus rejects the fundamental, normative conclusions of
neoclassical natural resource economic theory; a theory that is
appealing, however, to those who only recognize the need to resolve
conflicts in individuals' subjective valuations.
69

69

For conflicts

Gordon C. Bjork, Life, Liberty and Property (Lexington, M a s s . :
Lexington Books, D. C. Heath and Co., 1980), pp. 7-8, for example,
recognizes social, ethical conflicts in land-use decisions, but con
cludes that exchangeable property rights will solve the problem.
He
says, "The most fundamental questions in land-use planning are about
who should benefit . . . and who should lose.
They are questions
about equity . . . .
[but] there is no social consensus about how
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over innocuous tastes and preferences competitive markets function
well (with a few well recognized exceptions).

But for the more impor

tant conflicts between individuals over objective valuations, compet
itive markets and neoclassical theory are inadequate and misleading.^
To resolve these conflicts, stewardship points to the requirement of
a double criteria of proper ends and economically efficient means to
achieve them.

The criterion of proper ends will mean limits, duties

and obligations, besides rights, on the part of mankind as stewards
of property.

Proper ends function to recognize and incorporate objec

tive value into the process of managing all of creation and allocating
parts of it as natural resources.

They are part of the process of

defining what in creation is and is not a natural resource; what will
and will not enter the market place for allocation to human produc
tion and consumption.

land should be used . . . .
The problem to be solved is the recon
ciliation of those inevitable conflicts of interest . . . .
The
establishment of clearly defined and transferable property rights to
the use of resources is the important element in the reconciliation
of conflicts of interest."
^ T h e environmentalist who disagrees with the idea that compet
itive markets will optimally allocate natural resources is usually
accused, by the economist, of being ignorant of economics.
Indeed,
it may be that the environmentalist understands better than the
economist the subjective value premises supporting that persuasive
word, "optimal."

CHAPTER 5
A COMPARISON OF NEOCLASSICAL AND STEWARDSHIP
THEORIES ON THE QUESTION OF ENDANGERED SPECIES
AND EXTINCTION
In the previous chapter we argued in fairly general terms that
the subjective

value premises of neoclassical economics were incom

patible with the objective value premises of a stewardship theory.
The typical result of this incompatibility is the inability of the
neoclassical theory to resolve conflicts between economic efficiency
and equity or ethics - other than subjective ethics.

The neoclassi

cal economist is equipped to determine the optimal outcome when the
tradeoffs are between subjective values, but cannot incorporate objec
tive values (usually and erroneously referred to as ethics) into the
welfare analysis.

In this chapter the fundamental differences between

neoclassical and stewardship theory are examined in the context of
a specific and currently relevant problem:
gered species and their extinction.

the debate over endan

First, the neoclassical theory

of optimal allocation and extinction of renewable resources is
explained.

Second, the question of extinction is examined from a

stewardship perspective.

Third, the Federal Endangered Species Act

is evaluated in light of both theories.

NEOCLASSICAL THEORY
The neoclassical concept of optimal allocation of natural
resources is based on the familiar cost-benefit criterion of
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maximizing present values of net economic revenues.

The criterion can

be applied to both private and public resource decisions, although the
relevant costs, benefits and discount rates are not necessarily the
same in both situations.

Private resource owners are normally con

cerned only with internalized costs and benefits, whereas public
resource managers are presumably concerned with social costs and
benefits.

In addition, there may be

reasons for a social rate of

discount that is different in value from a private rate.'*'
Regardless of ownership (public agency or private), a fundamental
aspect of the theory is that the resource owner views the resource as
an investment or capital asset.

The resource is managed so that it

earns at least the "normal" (opportunity cost) rate of return,
otherwise the resource may be disposed of (e.g., sold, extinguished,
or even abandoned).

This conclusion is usually credited to Hotelling

although others before him, such as Lewis C. Gray, had developed the
theory but not the math.

o

The question that we are interested in is whether or not it is
ever optimal to deplete a renewable resource to extinction.

The

theory argues that, given certain conditions and functional relation
ships between the rate of depletion, initial stock of the resource,

"'’The terms "interest rate" and "discount rate" always refer to
real rates.
^H. Hotelling, "The Economics of Exhaustible Resources," Journal
of Political Economy 39 (1931), pp. 137-75. Lewis Cecil Gray, "The
Economic Possibilities of Conservation," Quarterly Journal of Economics
27 (1913), pp. 497-519.
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price, cost, renewal rate and discount rate, it will be optimal to
harvest a renewable resource to extinction.

It is sometimes pointed

out, however, that this may not be the ethical thing to do; never
theless, no guidance or theory has been developed to reconcile this
conflict of criteria or values.

For example, Colin Clark says,

The technical sense in which the term ’optimal' is used
here should be emphasized . . . extinction is the optimal
harvest policy only because it leads to the largest present
value of economic revenues. We are certainly not sugges
ting that the deliberate extinction of a species is socially
or aesthetically desirable just because extinction appears
to be the most profitable course of action.^
What are the conditions under which it is optimal to harvest a
renewable resource (animal or plant specie) to extinction?

In devel

oping the answer to this question, the theory has grown from its early
beginnings in Hotelling's 1931 article and a 1954 article by Gordon
on a common property resource:

the fishery.^

Gordon, using a static

equilibrium model rather than the present value maximization model,
concluded that a common property renewable resource will tend to be
harvested at the rate where total revenue equals total cost.^

This

rate may or may not lead to extinction depending on the relationship
(or more precisely the ratio) of the cost of harvesting (extraction,
catching) to the price of the resource.

If costs were large enough

O

Colin W. Clark, Mathematical Bioeconomics:
The Optimal Manage
ment of Renewable Resources (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976),
p. 61.
^H. S. Gordon, "Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource:
The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy 62 (1954), pp. 124-42.
■’Gordon's model, of course, points to the inefficient (MR 4 MC)
use of a common property resource.
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relative to price, for a given resource renewal rate, the resource
would not be exhausted and vice versa.

At very high costs relative

to price the resource would not be harvested at all.

Thus, some

renewable "resources" might not be profitable enough to promote com
mercial production:

either because of relatively high extraction

cost or because of no demand at positive prices (e.g., sparrows,
starlings, and snail darters).

These conclusions are, of course,

well known; what may be somewhat less well known is that privately
owned or publicly managed renewable resources may also call for
extinction as the optimal allocation.

The conclusions of "optimal

extinction" applies to both private and public management, but may
be less likely with the latter due to the possibility of including
social costs and benefits.
Clark and Munro, together with Smith,^ who expanded on the work of
Gordon and Scott,^ have shown that a sole owner (whether private or
government agency) with the goal of maximizing the present value of
net revenues may find it optimal to harvest a renewable resource to
extinction.

If the discount rate is large enough relative to the

renewal rate then extinction will be optimal.

On the other hand,

^Colin W. Clark and G. R. Munro, "Economics of Fishing and
Modern Capital Theory: A Simplified Approach," Journal of Environ
mental Economics and Management 2 (1975), pp. 92-106; V. L. Smith,
"Control Theory Applied to Natural and Environmental Resources,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 4 (1977), pp. 1-24.
^H. S. Gordon, ibid.; Anthony D. Scott, "The Fishery: The
Objectives of Sole Ownership," Journal of Political Economy 63
(1955), pp. 116-24.
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the renewal rate could be large enough such that the resource would
be protected from extinction "even under free-access harvesting . . . .
This . . . explains why squirrels and rabbits are not likely candidates for a list of endangered species."

8

Cropper, Lee and Pannu further expand on the work of Clark and
Munro by allowing the resource price to be inversely related to the

9
rate of harvest.

Thus, as the resource approaches extinction and

the rate of harvest decreases (presumably), the price rises.

Their

results indicate that extinction is optimal only for sufficiently
small initial stocks of the resource.

The economic sense of this is

that with a low initial stock, and a slow reproduction rate, the time
required for the stock to grow to a stable equilibrium is not worth
the cost.

The authors further note:

The fact that the optimal policy depends on the initial
stock means that the rate of interest does not play as
important a role in the non-linear case.
Indeed for
sufficiently large stocks, extinction need not be optimal
even if the discount rate is infinite.-*-®
Economically, this means that if it is not profitable to harvest the
resource at rates greater than the renewal rate then extinction will

®V. L. Smith, ibid., p. 10.
q
M. L. Cropper, D. R. Lee, and S. S. Pannu, "The Optimal Extinc
tion of a Renewable Natural Resource," Journal of Environmental Eco
nomics and Management 6 (1979), pp. 341-49.
Clark and Munro assumed
net revenues to be a linear function of the rate of harvest.

10Ibid., p. 342.
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not take place even with an infinite discount rate or, it might be
added, with open access to the resources.

11

The theory is developed a bit further in an article by Sinn,
wherein he reintroduces Ciriacy-Wantrup’s idea of a minimum viable
population.

12

(This is defined as the population size below which

extinction is likely to occur given current technological knowledge
and economic capabilities of species management.)

13

Sinn shows that

if it is profitable to harvest a resource below the minimum viable
population then extinction is optimal even if the marginal cost of
extraction approaches infinity as the resource approaches extinction.
Since this conclusion is approaching the limits of economic useful
ness; let me summarize these findings of neoclassical theory.
The optimal allocation of renewable resources may lead to ex
tinction whether the resource is common property or privately owned
or governmentally managed.

Extinction is the optimal policy if it

leads to the maximization of discounted net revenues.

Whether or not

extinction is the optimal policy for a particular resource depends on
its renewal rate

the discount rate, the profitability (a function

of net revenues) as the resource is depleted, and the initial stock.

^ I b i d . , p. 346.

12

Hans-Werner Sinn, "The Economic Theory of Species Extinction:
Comment on Smith," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
9 (1982), pp. 194-98.
S. V. Ciriacy-Wantrup, Resource Conservation.
3rd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 38-40.
13

As Ciriacy-Wantrup notes, this concept is open to a great deal
of uncertainty as regards our knowledge and the economics of reversing
the process of extinction.
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Other things remaining equal, and assuming profitability, if the
renewal rate is low relative to the discount rate then extinction
will be optimal.

Extinction will also be optimal if it remains

profitable to harvest below the minimum viable population or if the
initial stock is low relative to the stable equilibrium size.
These conclusions apply equally well to both market determined
prices and costs and nonmarket valuations which might include
aesthetic, amenity and option values as part of the opportunity
cost of extinction.

14

Other things equal, the inclusion of these

additional social costs could change the optimal policy for particular
resources from extinction to non-extinction; but they do not change
the general conclusions:
counted net revenues.

extinction is optimal if it maximizes dis

The inclusion of these nonmarket valuations

is, of course, important if we are to correctly calculate the net
revenues of a natural resource, but they do not necessarily preclude
extinction. ^
It is also important to recall that these nonmarket values are
based on subjective valuations

(individual preferences) not on the

notion of intrinsic or objective value.

Aesthetic, amenity and option

values are values that accrue to individuals - to our self-interest,

14For a summary discussion of amenity services and option value
see John V. Krutilla and Anthony C. Fisher, The Economics of Natural
Environments (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975).
^ T h i s is an important point in relation to the Endangered Spe
cies Act discussed below.
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satisfaction or subjective preferences.

Subjective, human values are

the only values that the neoclassical paradigm incorporates.

Objec

tive values are not denied by neoclassical theory, they are simply
outside of its definition (assumption) of value.
rub.

But there is the

Neoclassical economics is incapable of resolving or even addres

sing problems of human choice that involve both subjective preferences
and objective values.

We have seen numerous examples of this, e.g.,

Clark's comment on extinction in terms of profitable versus desirable.
In response to this problem economists are fond of pointing out that
moral philosophers have yet to agree on the best moral theory of
value.^

This is undoubtedly the case (and likely always will be),

but this provides no reason for the accpetance of a subjective theory
of value.

Furthermore it provides economics no rationale for accept

ing any particular theory of value as its own.

If economics is to

be a science of human choice with the goal of adding to human knowl
edge about choices in terms of better and worse, then it has no legi
timate business presupposing one particular theory of better and
worse.

17

Neoclassical economics has neither remained value-free nor

^ O n e economist, Sidney Alexander, however, humorously calls into
question the individualistic-utilitarian ethic of neoclassical econom
ics.
"Economists, and those who seek to honor economics, ai e fond of
quoting Keynes' dictum that practical men are only the slave;? of some
defunct economist.
It may afford philosophers in turn some mischi
evous amusement to see the power of defunct philosophies in economics
and other social studies." Sidney S. Alexander, "Human Values and
Economists' Values," in Human Values and Economic Policy, ed. by
Sidney Hook (New York:
New York University Press, 1967), p. 102.
17

Recall, for example, Lionel Robbin's comments; see pp. 9-10.
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made it possible to analyze economic problems of human choice invol
ving .subjective and objective values.

When confronted with an eco

nomic problem involving both values, the economist - as we have seen has no solution.

He defines an optimal solution and then says it may

not be optimal if "other values" are included.

If people make choices

on the basis of both subjective preferences and "other values" then
we can't expect neoclassical economics to determine optimal, efficient
choices as long as it refuses to include these "other values" in its
analysis.

It is the contention of this dissertation that the resolu

tion to this deficiency lies in the direction of neoclassical theory
giving up its sole commitment to a subjective theory of value.

(Philo

sophers may not agree on the best theory of value, but it seems rea
sonable that subjective relativism will not be their rallying point).
This new direction requires economics to be able to analyze human
choice in relation to or in the context of any theory of value.

It

means that economics would be able to incorporate knowledge (however
18
tentative) from all related disciplines.

One result will be the

ability to analyze and suggest policy when human choices confront
subjective and objective values.

Let us see how this result is pos

sible in the specific case of extinction and endangered species.
18

This incorporation is currently happening in the relationship
between economics and physics (and ecology).
See, for example,
Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, The Entropy Law and the Economic Process,
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971).
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STEWARDSHIP THEORY
The essence of an objective theory of value is that all value
is not lodged in the satisfaction of human subjects.

This is true

whether the theory is based on religious or non-religious premises.
Both bases reject subjective relativism as an acceptable general
theory of value.

Both postulate instead an objective moral universe

wherein the satisfaction, or better yet, the true happiness of
humans is one source of objective value (but also that some human
"satisfactions" are of no objective value).

They postulate a uni

verse full of objective value and full of "valuers":

things that

are not only instrumentally valuable, but also experience value or
value their experiences.

19

Apparently not all things in creation

are "valuers" and perhaps not all things possess intrinsic value;
this is certainly problematic.

Regardless of the resolution of these

problems, an objective theory of value is essentially different from
the subjective theory adopted by neoclassical economics.

It should

not be surprising, therefore, that the two theories would at least
on occasion disagree on what is best or worse in an economic analysis
of human choice - resource allocation.
Neoclassical theory, under certain conditions, concludes that
the optimal use of a renewable resource means its extinction.
stewardship theory lead to a different conclusion?
19

Would

The answer to

See, for example, Peter Singer, Animal Liberation:
A New
Ethic for Our Treatment of Animals (New York: New York Review/
Random House, 1975); and Richard A. Watson, "Self-Consciousness and
the Rights of Nonhuman Animals and Nature," Environmental Ethics 1
(Summer 1979), pp. 99-129.
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this question lies in the differences between the methods of analysis
of neoclassical and stewardship theory.

As we saw above neoclassical

analysis is based on maximizing the present value of net revenues
(value being determined subjectively).

Stewardship analysis, al

though it does not ignore individual preferences, is concerned with
the objective worth of those preferences.

20

Satisfying individual

preferences is objectively valuable if the preferences are objec
tively worthy of satisfaction.
It is, presumably, still a commonplace that not all of our pref
erences are worthwhile either for ourselves or for the rest of society.
Some of our preferences are so unworthy that we (family, or society)
inflict punishment on each other when we try to satisfy them.

The

punishment may be as mild as a sumptuary tax on liquor or a ban on
pornography or as strong as incarceration for cruelty to animals and
draft evasion or even capital punishment for rape and treason.

On the

other hand, some preferences are considered meritorious and have led
at least one economist, Richard Musgrave, to introduce the idea of
"merit goods."
. . . observation of budget policy suggests many instances
where the very intent of the decision maker appears to be
to interfere with or override individual preferences.
Thus,
sumptuary taxes are imposed on liquor because the consump
tion thereof is held undesirable, or low-cost housing is
subsidized because decent housing for the poor is held

^ T h e worth or value of things, such as our preferences, can be
a question of either moral or nonmoral values (or perhaps both).
For
example, truth telling is morally valuable and lying is morally disvaluable, whereas a moderate diet is nonmorally valuable and gluttony
is nonmorally disvaluable.
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desirable . . . .
The issue now under consideration,
therefore, must not be confused with the distinction
between private and social goods itself.
Certain
.goods are held meritorious (they are considered 'merit
goods’) while others are held undesirable . . . . when
interpreted as imposition of preferences of the ruling
group or decision makers, allocation on a merit-good
basis stands outside what has been dealt with here as
the theory of social goods. In all these cases it is
evident, however, that interference may apply with
regard to private goods (e.g., pornography) no less
than to what we have defined as social goods.
The
social- and merit-good problems must therefore be
distinguished.
Musgrave's idea of merit (and "demerit") goods has not caught on with
neoclassical economists.

This is not surprising since the idea is

that some "goods" are truly good and other "goods" are actually bad.
This idea of merit goods, as Musgrave is careful to explain, is not
to be confused with public or social goods which neoclassical theory
recognizes.

22

Therefore, neoclassical theory has made no room for

21

Richard A. Musgrave and Peggy B. Musgrave, Public Finance in
Theory and Practice, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1973),
pp. 65-66.
OO

Merit goods, when they are even mentioned in public finance
texts, are often explained (away?) as a type of public good in spite
of Musgrave's careful explanation that he thought otherwise.
See,
for example, Werner Z. Hirsch, The Economics of State and Local Gov
ernment (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970), p. 12:
"Merit goods involve
interdependencies in utility functions . . . . " o r see Ansel M. Sharp
and Bernard F. Sliger, Public Finance (Austin: Business Publications,
1970), p. 18, where merit goods are merely a way of redistributing
income:
"Another category of public goods and services is merit
goods . . . .
These public goods are provided for the expressed
purpose of enhancing the economic well-being of specific individuals
or groups . . . .
Public merit goods and services must be defended
on another ground-equity in the distribution of goods and services
. . . . an admitted interference with the distribution of income
which otherwise would exist."
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goods or preferences which purport to be objectively good or bad.
It cannot compare a subjective value with an objective one.

Nor can

Pareto optimality, based as it is on the assumption that the indivi
dual is better off in a chosen position, incorporate objective
positions.

And yet, it is not necessary for economics to assume

that all preferences are equally worthy of being satisfied and thus
"taken as given."

Furthermore, although this assumption may be

praised for its tolerance, it does not (as Little has clearly shown)
mean that economics is value-free, tolerant; "yes;" value-free, "no."
Stewardship, on the other hand, need not be intolerant or author
itarian.

The notion of objective value in creation does not logically

lead to a "stewardship elite" who will tell the rest of us what has
objective value and what doesn't.

But stewardship theory does force

us to evaluate economic decisions, such as the extinction of another
specie in a broader value context.

As we will see, extinction may

indeed be the optimal allocation according to stewardship, but the
analysis hardly resembles that of neoclassical theory.
For extinction of a specie to be optimal, the objective value of
the specie would have to be less than the objective value sacrificed
to preserve it.

How do we determine the objective value of a specie

and of the goods and services that would be sacrificed if the specie
were preserved?

The problem is how should we allow for trade offs

when the things being traded (sacrificed) are both objectively val
uable?

We are faced with the difficult question of ends and how a

society ought to determine them.

We are, so to speak, at the

interface of economics, ethics, religion and political theory, to
name only a few.

The function of a stewardship theory is not to

resolve the fundamental questions of these disciplines.

Its function

is to help us integrate; to show us the need to integrate knowledge
from various disciplines in order to make better decisions and policy.
Its function is to help us discern between ends and means.

When neo

classical theory, for example, analyzes extinction it places it in
the category of means, the accepted end is maximizing discounted net
revenues.

Stewardship theory, however, argues that extinction of a

specie is a good candidate for objective valuation:
end?

The question:

is it a worthy

"How should society determine whether or not

extinction is a worthy end?" is a fundamental question for religion,
ethics and political theory.

That does not mean the question is

irrelevant to economics and stewardship, far from it.

It simply

identifies where we must look for knowledge on the subject.

For

the purposes of this dissertation I will accept the fact that in the
United States democratic solutions are preferred to authoritarian
ones.

Furthermore, the more important the end in question, the more

we tend to call for full democratic participation, whereas ends of
lesser importance are more likely to be determined by representative
democracy.

Where the question of specie extinction lies on this

continuum of ends is neither clear, nor my major concern.

Rather,

I want to show how we might proceed with an objective valuation of
a specie in a democratic process.
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The crucial point is to construct an evaluation process wherein
objective-intrinsic values are appraised, rather than subjective tastes
and preferences.

We want to determine and compare the objective value

of the specie with the objective value of the alternatives (e.g.,
goods and services).

The obvious way not to do this is to ask people

how much they would be willing to pay to preserve the specie.
this obviously wrong?

Why is

We certainly have a problem of tradeoffs, and

economic theory of scarcity and opportunity costs helps us to see that.
But "willingness to pay" solutions ask people to think and compare in
terms of subjective not objective values.

Although no mechanism will

guarantee that we rationally try to determine the objective value of
a specie with whatever would have to be sacrificed for its preserva
tion, trying to put a monetary value on these things seems likely to
promote subjective valuations.

A better procedure might be to com

pare the alternatives in real terms.

That is, compare the specie

with the actual goods and services that would be sacrificed for specie
preservation.

For example, preserving a specie, such as the snail

darter, might mean a smaller dam or a more expensive location, or
some other alternative that would raise electricity rates.

Rather

than comparing those increased rates with "willingness to pay" esti
mates, compare the specie with real sacrifices due to those higher
rates.

Perhaps the higher rates would mean sacrificing television

for one hour per day; or not using electric appliances such as can
openers, knives and toothbrushes.

The point is to design the analysis

so that we try to evaluate the intrinsic goodness of two competing

ends.

We are not interested in the subjective value that we place

upon the specie, but rather in the intrinsic value that the specie
has as a part of creation.

If we decide to sacrifice a specie it

should be as clear as possible to us what objective values we have
lost and gained.
Stewardship is not a theory concocted to preserve nonhuman spe
cies, wilderness, etc.

Nor is it designed with a logic or mechanism

(criterion) that defines and guarantees that we make right choices it does not promise optimality (Pareto or otherwise).

It does how

ever make the choice process aware that subjective preferences and
objective value are different and may conflict.
the institutional mechanisms

When theydo conflict,

(the market, property rights, etc.) for

making choices may need changing if the ends (objective values)
involved are important enough.

23

To recognize conflicts and make

institutional changes requires knowledge of what is good and valuable
(morally and nonmorally) in creation and in our lives.

This is not

the task of any single discipline; nor is it unrelated to economics
(and especially so since neoclassical economists enter the debate
armed with their subjective criterion of efficiency).
23

We allow the market exchange process to be our institutional
mechanism for making many choices that are clearly a matter of sub
jective valuations (from chocolate ice cream to Chevrolets), but we
put limits on this institution when the "goods" partake of objective
value.
It is curious that economic theory has done so little work
in differentiating subjective and objective goods, i.e., determining
the proper domain of market exchange.

147

Economics as a science of human choice has a long history of
affiliation with moral philosophy, religion and political theory.
Classical, medieval and ancient political economy are the sources
for an economic perspective on stewardship.

Indeed, stewardship

theory is quite vulnerable to the charge that it is merely ancient
political economy in disguise.

A "political economy awakening,"

however, does not require abandoning the analytical progress of
neoclassical theory.

The problems of stewarding creation in the

20th century are not going to be answered by giving up useful
analytical techniques, but rather by learning when and when not to
use them.

It remains to be seen whether or not neoclassical theory

will see the reasons for giving up its superficial positivistic
approach and its underlying normative theory of subjective moral
relativism.

THE FEDERAL ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
The differences and the benefits of a stewardship versus neo
classical approach to the question of species extinction can be
24
further exposed by examining the Endangered Species Act (ESA).
The ESA and related literature show some rather confused, ambiguous
thinking about values.

Consequently, the purpose, implementation

and amendments to the act are unclear.

Much of this confusion can

be traced to the failure to understand and distinguish between the

2416 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976 and Supp. Ill 1979); Pub. L.
93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973).
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subjective valuation of neoclassical economic theory and the objec
tive valuation of a stewardship theory.

Due to this failure, the act

is unclear on how endangered species are to be valued and compared to
the proposed projects which threaten their existence.
In December 1973 the ESA became law apparently with the major
premise,
. . . echoed by increasing p u M i c outcry in recent years
. . . that wildlife are valuable national resources and
that the extinction of an increasing number of species
in the name of progress must be stopped.
Presumably,
while most congressional supporters of the act must have
felt that the needs of wildlife were valid considerations,
it is doubtful that many meant for wildlife to be the only
consideration.
Yet §7 of the Act seems to do just that in
that it precludes all federal agencies from 'authorizing,
funding or carrying out' anything that may 'jeopardize'
an endangered or threatened species, irrespective of any
and all other considerations.*5
Lachenmeier has thus identified part of the confusion:

did the Con

gress actually intend preservation of a specie to preclude any and
all conflicting goals; that there should be no weighing and balancing
of the value of preservation with the opportunities sacrificed?

This

particular question was supposedly resolved with the 1978 amendments
to the ESA which established a procedure and a committee

26

to weight

^ R u d y R. Lachenmeier, "The Endangered Species Act of 1973:
Preservation or Pandemonium?" Environmental Law 5 (1974), p. 29.

26

The committee is composed of at least seven members:
Secre
taries of Agriculture, Army, and Interior; Chairman of the Council
of Economic Advisors; Administrators of the Environmental Protec
tion Agency, and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration;
and one individual from each affected State.
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the benefits of preservation with the benefits of the proposed project.

27

The amendments indicate that a weighing of benefits is to

take place, but confusion remains because of the ambiguity of "bene
fits."

Does this mean benefits as determined by individual pref

erences or does it mean objective benefits (i.e., the intrinsic value
of the specie existing and the intrinsic worth of the project’s goods
and services)?

The amendments resolve the question of whether or not

balancing ought to take place (it should), but the more fundamental
vagueness remains.

Indeed, the differences between subjective and

objective values are confused by Lachenmeier when he says that the
major premise of the act is that "wildlife are valuable national
resources," (subjective or objective?) and that the congressional
supporters of the act took as valid considerations "the needs of
wildlife" (presumably objective).

In fairness to Lachenmeier, and

to others who easily speak of "economic values" and "ecological
values" the ESA itself falls victim to this prevalent ambiguity.
For example, the act reads:
The Congress finds and declares that . . . these species
of fish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, ecological,
educational, historical, recreational and scientific value
to the Nation and its people . . . .28

The committee will grant an exemption to a project ("agency
action") if five of the seven members determine that - "(i) there
are no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the agency action;
(ii) the benefits of such action clearly outweigh the benefits of
alternative courses of action consistent with conserving the species
or its critical habitat, and such action is in the public interest;
and (iii) the action is of regional or national significance . . . ."
16 U.S.C. § 1536 (h) (Supp. Ill 1979).
2816 U.S. C. § 1531 (1976).
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What are these values; are they subjective or objective?

Does "value

to the Nation and its people" mean objective-intrinsic value of the
specie or simply "social value," which is recognized by neoclassical
economics?

Even "ecological value" can easily be understood to mean

the subjective value of a specie as it performs a life support function in man's environment.

29

If these values refer to human bene

fits then the ESA is far less radical than some feared and others
hoped.

If the benefits that the committee is to weigh are purely

subjective then neoclassical resource economics will prove of good
service.

For the ESA would simply be forcing the inclusion of all

social values into a cost-benefit analysis.
nomists know how to do.

This neoclassical eco

But is this the actual intent of the act?

Even though the language can be interpreted to mean only subjective
values, section 1536 of the 1973 unamended act suggests otherwise.
This part of the act directs all Federal departments and agencies to:
utilize their authorities in furtherance of the pur
poses of this chapter by carrying out programs for
the conservation of endangered species and threatened
species listed . . . and by taking such action necessary
to insure that actions authorized, funded, or carried
out by them do not jeopardize the continued existence
of such endangered species and threatened species or
result in the destruction or modification of habitat
of such species . . . .30
29

For a discussion of terms such as "ecological values' in relation to subjective and objective values see, for example, John N.
Martin, "The Concept of the Irreplaceable," Environmental Ethics 1
(Spring 1979), pp. 31-48; and Holmes Rolston, III, "Values in Nature,"
Environmental Ethics 3 (Summer 1981), pp. 113-28.
3016 U.S.C.

§ 1536 (1976).

151
This section of the act, with its apparent absolute proscription
against jeopardizing the existence of endangered species, went
through various litigations with mixed results.

The final decision

by the United States Supreme Court in TVA vs. Hill established the
intent of the ESA to be the absolute proscription of interferences
with endangered species that would result in their extinction.

31

Since the original act had no procedure for weighing benefits, abso
lute proscription meant just that - there was no appeal to overriding
benefits of a project.

This fact was, of course, the undoing of the

original act and it was subsequently amended.
The amended ESA is more reasonable than the original because it
recognizes that endangered species are not of infinite value (either
subjectively or objectively).

Preserving species means some alterna

tive opportunities will not be preserved.

Preserving a particular

specie may actually require the sacrifice of another specie.
amended ESA thus recognizes the economic problems of scarcity
opportunity cost.
opportunity cost?"

The
and

But has it recognized the nature of "objective
Has it worded the amendments carefully enough to

do what seems to have been its original intent?
If the original intent was to protect otherwise uneconomical

32

species from extirpation, then the ambiguities of the terms

■^David B. Stromberg, "The Endangered Species Act of 1973:
Is
the Statute Itself Endangered?" Environmental Affairs 6 (1978),
p. 533.
32

This is Stromberg*s conclusion and he notes that had the
Supreme Court not decided in favor of "absolute proscription" and
had allowed a benefit-cost approach," . . . a 3-inch fish could
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"benefits," used in the amendments,

33

and "values," used in the

original act, will make it difficult to preserve that intent.

The

common sense interpretation of the "benefits" referred to in the
amendments is the standard benefit-cost notion.

If "benefits" is

supposed to mean something else, for instance, something like intrin
sic value then we should expect to see a clear explanation of this
fact since intrinsic value is not the common sense meaning of "bene
fits."

But no such explanation appears.

Regardless of the intent

of the amendments the results are very confusing and future liti
gation over the function of the committee is virtually certain.
It seems reasonable to speculate that the original act was
designed to protect endangered species by placing them above eco
nomic consideration via a benefit-cost study.

Indeed, this was

the final conclusion of subsequent litigation over the ESA's alleged
economic hardship which found in favor of absolute proscription and
led to the amendments in 1978.

The amendments appear to call for a

typical benefit-cost approach, albeit a very thorough one, which
would be a radical departure from an intent of absolute proscription.
Do these amendments actually represent such a fundamental change in
Congress' intent to

never compete with a $90 million dam project, an 'unattractive and
useless1 Furbish lousewart plant could not hope to survive against
a $600 million project." Stromberg, ibid., pp. 532-33.
33

See footnote 27 above.
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provide a program for the conservation of such endang
ered species and threatened species . . . . [because
-some] have been rendered extinct as a consequence of
economic growth and development untempered by adequate
concern and conservation . . . . ^
It is more likely that this legislation is stumbling over the
idea that things have value other than their value for satisfying
human preferences.

It is stumbling because we lack something like

a theory of stewardship which differentiates between subjective and
objective values in creation.

The legislation has moved from one

extreme to another; from giving endangered species infinite objec
tive value to giving them no objective value and thus only subjective
value.

If the real intent of the ESA is to force us to recognize

that we are stewards of a creation full of objective value and not
merely managers of natural resources for human consumption, then it
has failed and requires further amendments.

The necessary amendments

will have to clarify the belief that preserving species is one objec
tive good (end) that has to be balanced with other objective goods.
Choosing between conflicting objective goods is not accomplished with
the standard economic benefit-cost analysis based on subjective pref
erences.

Objective goods are balanced on objective grounds:

of the two conflicting good ends is the best, most desirable.

which
This

-^16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1976).
For a discussion of the content of an
environmental ethic that would represent an attitude of "adequate con
cern and conservation," see, for example, J. Baird Callicott, "Ele
ments of an Environmental Ethic: Moral Considerability and the Biotic
Community," Environmental Ethics 1 (Spring 1979), pp. 71-81; Charles
Hartshorne, "The Rights of the Subhuman World," Environmental Ethics
1 (Spring 1979), pp. 49-60; and Don E. Marietta, Jr., "The Inter
relationship of Ecological Science and Environmental Ethics," Environ
mental Ethics 1 (Fall 1979), pp. 195-207).
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difficult question is not decided by asking people about their wil
lingness to pay for subjective desires.

It should be decided by

human beings rationally comparing the intrinsic worth of each pro
posed end.

The comparison of ends is clearly a normative problem and

it should not be mistaken or disguised
one.

as a positivistic economic

Which human beings should participate in this determination of

ends should depend on the importance of the ends.

Some projects may

have such a profound impact on creation that a referendum would be
best.

Others of lesser importance would probably be better suited to

a congressional vote or perhaps simply a special committee.

The

committee as defined in the ESA, however, does not seem at all appro
priate for weighing the religious and moral considerations of a
specie's existence and human needs or wants.

Why would any of the

various Secretaries or Administrators on the committee be expected
to have this kind of expertise or to speak for the stewardship ethic
of the American people?

If we are committed to a democratic process

in the determination of stewardship ends (even though this does not
guarantee the correct moral choice - no system does) then a small
committee of administrative experts with no special knowledge of
stewardship ethics seems to be ruled out.

A congressional decision

would probably be more representative, although not necessarily any
better informed by a stewardship ethic.
Indeed, a stewardship ethic which recognizes the objective value
of God's creation does not seem to describe
of 20th century mankind.

the prevailing ethic

And yet, the ESA offers a small amount of
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hope that such an ethic Is emerging, albeit rather confused.

To

alleviate the confusion and ambiguity surrounding this particular
act, future acts, and other institutional changes requires, among
other things, an economic theory which recognizes and incorporates
into its analysis of human choice and "optimal" resource allocation
both subjective and objective values.
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